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Since the 1980s, competitive pressure has increased in the world economy. In
addition to traditional trade flows, the globalisation of production and markets
has greatly enhanced the complexity of the international division of labour.
Declining transaction and information costs have stimulated the fragmentation
of production processes on a worldwide scale and the relocation of non-
competitive industries. As a result, in both industrialised and developing coun-
tries, newly emerging competitors have increasingly challenged established
suppliers.
The aim of this study is threefold. First, the authors portray the trend towards
globalisation and assess by which means enterprises have gone global. Second,
they discuss the adjustment needs of traditional producers by evaluating the
consequences of globalisation on trade, production, employment and wages.
Third, they analyse whether the economic policy reactions to globalisation in
industrialised countries are adequate to deal efficiently with competitive chal-
lenges.
It turns out that the scope of national policies has been significantly reduced
by globalised production and markets, while corporate strategies have increas-
ingly been less constrained. Consequently, major policy revisions are indis-
pensable. Most importantly, governments in industrialised countries should fo-
cus their attention on human capital formation, rather than on defensive trade
policies, whose effectiveness has been seriously eroded.
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Kiel, July 1994 Horst SiebertThere are some economic forces so
powerful that they constantly break
through all barriers erected for their
suppression [Baumol, 1967, p. 415].
I. Introduction
Globalisation has become a catchword for a number of political, sociological,
environmental and economic trends that are supposed to present challenges on
a worldwide scale. Most of the time, the exact meaning of the term has re-
mained unclear. In a purely economic sense, globalisation means the increasing
interdependence of markets and production in different countries through trade
in goods and services, cross-border flows of capital and exchanges of technol-
ogy. Hence, globalisation results in an increase in the international division of
labour, achieved by an international fragmentation of production.
1 While it is
relatively easy to say where certain products have been assembled, it will be-
come increasingly difficult to say where they actually have been "made" if
firms place their production around the world, sourcing this component from
one country and that component from another country.
An increase in the international division of labour is by no means a new
phenomenon. Over approximately the last 30 years, international trade has
grown faster on average than production [GATT, c]. A faster growth of trade
relative to production means that the world economy has become more inte-
grated. International trade provides the opportunity for specialisation, i.e., it al-
lows for differences in the consumption and production structures of econo-
mies, and this increases interdependency. What has been identified by some
observers as a relatively new trend in the world economy is a dramatic increase
in the international redistribution of ownership that has occurred especially dur-
ing the last decade. Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), for instance, have
grown even four times faster than international trade flows [IMF, a]. In addition
to rising FDI flows, other forms of international investment cooperation such as
licensing, offshore processing and so-called strategic alliances have become
more important in recent years.
For recent summaries of the causes and consequences of globalisation, see Dicken
[1992] and Harris [1993]; for a somewhat dissenting view, see The Economist
[1993].The increasing intemationalisation of production and markets implies a new
international division of labour. The relatively simple pattern of core and pe-
riphery suggested by the standard economic theory may not apply any longer.
Trade flows have become more complex. Today, they cannot be explained
solely on the basis of factor endowments, and they increasingly include serv-
ices, either as a final product or as an intermediate input As a result, many
production processes can be geographically fragmented and relocated on a
global scale. According to this view, more FDI and more non-equity forms of
investment cooperation indicate that national boundaries tend to lose their rele-
vance for international business strategies. Furthermore, international invest-
ment cooperation no longer seems to be confined to transnational corporations
(TNCs).
The main driving force behind globalisation strategies of firms is not differ-
ent from what drives international trade. Firms seek to maximise profits, given
the constraints they face. Changing or vanishing constraints imply new profit
opportunities and thus require new strategies of firms. Hence, globalisation can
be interpreted as an entrepreneurial response to a changing environment, while
the leitmotiv of firm behaviour — constrained profit maximisation — remains
unchanged.
One of the most important reasons for globalisation is that large parts of the
world have become industrialised since the Second World War. Many develop-
ing countries (DCs), especially Southeast Asian DCs, have attained, or are
about to attain, the status of an industrialised country. This successful catching-
up has increased the number of suppliers on world markets. Hence, global pro-
duction capacities and international competition have increased, and so have
the opportunities to exploit market niches. This process will gain momentum
once the large markets of China, India and Eastern Europe, which represent
roughly one half of the world's population, will be fully integrated into the
world economy. Put differently, the constraint of market size, which may have
hindered globalisation strategies in the past, has become less relevant and
probably no longer applies at all.
At the same time, other constraints that prevented firms from implementing
globalisation strategies have disappeared. Thanks to the micro-electronics revo-
lution, communication technologies have undergone a dramatic change during
the last decade, and new production and organisation technologies such as CAD
(computer-aided design) and CIM (computer-integrated manufacturing) have
evolved. Successive GATT rounds have substantially reduced tariff barriers for
trade, and capital markets have also been liberalised, especially during the
1980s. Many business services have become internationally tradable. As trans-
action and communication costs fall, the proximity between sellers and buyers,
which has traditionally been considered to be essential for many services, fig-ures less prominently. Most important in this regard is that financial capital has
gone global. Nowadays, the financial centres of the world economy provide the
possibility for 24 hour trading in all sorts of financial assets. The deregulation
of other business services such as banking and insurance also provides new op-
portunities for the tradability of services. Hence, standardised business services
have become available around the world, which, in turn, has made the interna-
tional fragmentation of production feasible. As a consequence of all this, the
constraints for firms and governments have completely changed.
An almost perfect mobility of international financial capital flows across the
world guarantees that no government can pursue economic policies that do not
fit into the international framework set by the major players without risking a
devaluation of its currency. The experience of France with a socialist economic
policy in the early 1980s and the de facto collapse of the EMS in 1993 due to
inconsistent macroeconomic policies of the member countries provide evidence
in this respect. Since a devaluation implies a lower standard of living and is,
therefore, not desirable, the increased worldwide competition for financial capi-
tal has somehow created a more or less stable macroeconomic environment.
Furthermore, improved macroeconomic stability allows globalisation of pro-
duction and markets to proceed, not only through FDI by TNCs but also
through non-equity forms of international investment cooperation among inde-
pendent firms.
In the absence of exchange rate risks, the consequences of globalisation
strategies would be felt even stronger because then physical capital flows could
be expected to increase as well. However, almost perfectly mobile financial
capital flows do not necessarily imply an increase in physical capital mobility,
which requires an increase in current account imbalances. Since the current ac-
count mirrors the difference between saving and investment of an economy, net
trade flows and net physical capital flows are two sides of the same coin.
Physical capital flows are surprisingly immobile, as is indicated by a strong
positive correlation of cross-country saving and investment rates, which have
shown signs of a moderate decline only for the last decade [Sinn, 1992]. There-
fore, physical capital markets seem to be much less integrated than financial
capital markets.
The main reason is exchange rate volatility. Widely fluctuating real ex-
change rates seemingly not related to so-called economic fundamentals require
an additional compensation for potential investors to cover the additional risks.
This risk premium may be just high enough to offset the incentive for increas-
ing physical capital flows, especially towards developing countries with a well-
known history of disastrous macroeconomic policies resulting in hyperinflation
and political chaos. As a matter of fact, physical capital mobility is much
higher within countries, where an exchange rate risk is absent, than betweencountries. Therefore, globalisation strategies of TNCs, as indicated by increas-
ing FDI flows and other forms of investment cooperation, may be the appropri-
ate answer to the situation where a liberalisation of goods and factor markets,
declining transaction and information costs, and a relatively stable macro-
economic environment provide new opportunities for a finer international divi-
sion of labour through an international fragmentation of the production process,
but where exchange rate risks are still prevailing.
In the following, we interpret the emerging trend towards globalisation of
production as the outcome of the complex interaction between TNCs, which
operate on a worldwide scale, independent national firms, which seek interna-
tional investment cooperation, and national governments, which try to influ-
ence trade and factor flows through a combination of trade, industrial and
macroeconomic policies. The basic hypothesis advanced in this study is that the
effectiveness of national economic policies is likely to suffer under the condi-
tion of globalisation. Specifically, national governments in developing and in-
dustrial countries will find it increasingly difficult to apply policies that aim at
protecting internationally less competitive domestic production factors. This is
because in doing so they run the risk of losing attractiveness as a location for
international production. Increasing unemployment and an erosion of the tax
base will be the result and may lead to a vicious circle of ever increasing pro-
tectionism and further declining attractiveness.
This study presents empirical evidence on symptoms and consequences of
the ongoing globalisation of production and markets. Chapter II reviews recent
trends in FDI flows from the perspective of major home countries and discusses
whether recent integration schemes in Europe and North America have slowed
down the trend towards globalisation, i.e., whether recent increases in FDI
flows merely reflect regionalisation rather than globalisation. As was noted be-
fore, FDI is not the only instrument of globalisation strategies. There are other
forms of international investment cooperation such as licensing, offshore proc-
essing and strategic alliances. Chapter III provides an overview of these alter-
native instruments of globalised production and discusses their motivational
background. In Chapter IV, we present case studies for selected manufacturing
industries. They reveal that globalisation strategies differ: first, according to in-
dustry-specific characteristics such as factor intensities and the international
competitive environment, and second, according to major players in the world
economy.
In Chapter V, we evaluate the links between FDI flows and international
trade beyond an industry-specific perspective. We suggest that the trend to-
wards globalised production should show up in a positive correlation between
FDI flows on the one hand and exports and imports on the other hand. This
proposition has several implications:(i) complementarities between FDI and trade flows are supposed to domi-
nate over possible substitution effects resulting from the use of FDI as
an instrument to circumvent trade barriers;
(ii) a trend towards intra-industry trade is expected even for trade between
countries with different factor endowments;
(iii) intra-firm trade is likely to figure prominently as a result of globalisa-
tion strategies.
In Chapter VI, we attempt to identify the consequences of globalisation for
wages and employment in advanced countries. Globalisation is most likely to
affect the earnings of the least mobile factors of production. In a general per-
spective, labour is internationally less mobile than capital, and unskilled labour
is less mobile than skilled labour. Hence, increasing globalisation is expected to
have severe consequences for the wages of workers of different skill levels, and
especially for the distribution of incomes within rich industrial countries.
In Chapter VII, we evaluate possible trade policy responses to these potential
threats of globalisation with respect to their likely economic costs and benefits.
We discuss whether the results of multilateral trade negotiations are well suited
to meet the challenge of globalisation. Furthermore, we scrutinise the feasibil-
ity of internationally harmonised production standards and of industrial poli-
cies. A successful response to globalisation seems to require a forward-looking
approach, in which human capital formation has to play an important role.
Chapter VIII summarises and presents major policy conclusions. In the past,
protectionism was an inefficient but possible answer to the effects of interna-
tional trade on relative factor incomes, with overall welfare-reducing conse-
quences. In the age of globalisation, this policy will-not work any longer, be-
cause production has become internationally mobile. In the long run, it is
hardly imaginable how to escape the tendencies towards factor price equalisa-
tion by defensive strategies. In an integrating and growing world economy, the
message for national governments is, therefore, to concentrate on the provision
of public goods to get an edge in locational competition. Improving the skills of
the workforce by investing more in basic education and training may prove to
be the most promising task to avoid the potential losses that may result from in-
tensified globalisation without foregoing the gains that can be achieved. How-
ever, the benefits of such a strategy will only accrue after a long gestation pe-
riod. In the meantime, alternative responses to globalisation are declining rela-
tive wages or mounting unemployment of low-skilled workers in advanced
countries.II. Globalisation versus Regionalism: Trends in FDI
1. Overall Trends
The world economy has witnessed a strong move towards regional integration
during the last decade. The European Union (EU) has traditionally been known
for its "enthusiastic support for and active involvement in free trade arrange-
ments of a regional character" [GATT, 1991, Vol. II, p. 32]. Institutionalised
integration received a further push by the Commission's White Paper of July
1985, which outlined the strategy towards achieving the Internal Market by the
end of 1992.
2 Moreover, the deepening and widening of integration in Europe
continued beyond the Internal Market programme. The Maastricht Treaty of
December 1991 has established the timetable and the conditions for a European
Monetary Union. Several EFTA countries are going to join the EU soon, and
membership will be extended to post-socialist economies in Central Europe in
the medium run. The EU is becoming a regional trading bloc encompassing
most of Europe.
Partly as a response to European integration, regional integration schemes
have spread all over the world. Especially in the Third World, the EU has
served as a model, although the economic and political conditions for success-
ful integration have typically not been given [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990].
More importantly, the United States concluded the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, which is "the most comprehen-
sive free trade pact (short of a common market) ever negotiated between re-
gional trading partners, and the first reciprocal free trade pact between a devel-
oping and industrial countries" [Hufbauer and Schott, 1993, p. 259]. Even in
the Asian-Pacific region, new attempts at institutionalised integration have
gained momentum, a prominent example being the Malaysian initiative to form
an East Asian Economic Caucus (for details, see Ohno et al. [1993]). Compared
with other regions, however, the regionalisation of economic activities in East
and Southeast Asia continues to be primarily driven by market forces, rather
than by institutional reforms and administrative regulations.
A second development of worldwide dimension that has been of crucial im-
portance during the last decade concerns the unprecedented growth of FDI.
During eight years after the worldwide recession of 1982-1983, FDI outflows
increased by 35 per cent per annum, nearly five times the growth of the value
For a detailed analysis, see Hiemenz et al. [1994].of exports of goods and services (Figure 1 and Table Al).
3 The growth of FDI
outflows also superseded the growth of GDP and gross domestic investment at
a global level [UNCTAD, 1993, p. 15]. This raises the question whether it was
just by coincidence that FDI increased steeply when the move towards region-
alisation gathered momentum.
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For several reasons, it appears plausible to argue that FDI boomed in antici-
pation of regional integration. Frequently, integration schemes are not only tar-
geted at closer intra-regional trade relations. They are increasingly considered a
means to attract risk capital and, thereby, foster productive activities and eco-
nomic growth within the region. Market size has turned out to be an important
determinant of FDI in various empirical investigations, and international inves-
tors have tended to respond positively to promising market integration efforts
ever since the Treaty of Rome in 1957.
4 This tendency may have been rein-
forced recently by the renewed focus on the relationship between markets and
plant location [Miller, 1993]. Production in proximity to large markets may
help adapting to specific customer demands, for example.
In 1991-1992, FDI flows fell sharply (to 72 per cent of the 1990 amount) [see also
UNCTAD, 1993, p. 16]. However, this downturn is probably a cyclical phenome-
non triggered by the recession in the United States in 1990 and its later spread to
Japan and Europe.
For an overview of the literature, see Agarwal [1980] and UN [fj.These arguments notwithstanding, it remains open to question whether a
stronger focus of foreign investors on regional markets will divert away FDI
from other host countries. The diversion hypothesis implicitly assumes that
worldwide FDI flows are a zero sum game. However, there is not necessarily a
loser if an integrated region attracts additional FDI. The counterhypothesis ex-
pects regionalisation and globalised FDI patterns to go hand in hand. Globalisa-
tion beyond regional boundaries is supposed to continue for a variety of rea-
sons: Globalisation is expected to result from the perpetual search of TNCs
5 for
cost efficient production sites and lucrative markets, which are not necessarily
part of an integrated region.
6 Moreover, globalisation is encouraged by techno-
logical progress with respect to transport and communication systems, which
has substantially reduced the cost effects of geographical distance. Finally,
many host countries have liberalised FDI regulations unilaterally [UNCTC, a;
ERT, 1993], may be partly in response to regionalisation elsewhere, in order to
remain attractive for foreign investors.
7
By focussing on the EU, the United States and Japan, i.e., the so-called
Triad, we analyse if regional integration has led to creation or diversion of FDI
flows. Before looking at each of the major players in more detail, we portray
some broader trends in FDI. The Triad supplies and hosts most of worldwide
FDI (Figure 2 and Table A2). In terms of FDI outflows, it strengthened its posi-
tion from about 72 per cent in 1982 to 83 per cent in 1992. The Triad's share in
global FDI inflows increased only slightly to 64 per cent in 1990-1992. The
weakest link here is Japan receiving less than one per cent of global FDI flows
in the 1980s. The EU has become the largest recipient of FDI flows. Appar-
ently, the Internal Market programme on completing the Internal Market has
raised its attractiveness for foreign investors and has made it the largest inte-
grated host and home region for FDI. Figure 2 points to a dramatic shift of FDI
inflows from the United States to the EU, but this shift exaggerates the signifi-
cance of the Internal Market programme for FDI flows.
The shifts in regional FDI shares are less pronounced with regard to FDI
stocks, whose distribution is inherently more stable.
8 Major findings as con-
cerns the distribution of FDI stocks are as follows (Table 1):
TNCs are estimated to have one third of productive assets of the world under their
governance [UNCTAD, 1993, p. 101].
China is probably the most relevant case in point.
The less restrictive stance towards TNCs is also evident from privatisation schemes
that allowed for foreign equity participation in privatised state enterprises.
The global FDI stock was estimated to have increased to $1937 billion in 1992, up
from $517 billion in 1980 and $680 billion in 1985 [Rutter, 1993, p. 1].— Almost all of the FDI stocks are held by developed countries. DCs raised
their share by less than one percentage point (to 3.3 per cent) between
1980 and 1991. DCs were much more important as hosts of foreign eq-
uity capital: they accounted for a share fluctuating around 25 per cent.
This pattern is consistent with the conventional wisdom that industrial-
ised economies will channel risk capital to less advanced countries.
— Among the developing countries, international investors shifted their lo-
cational preference from Latin America to Asia because of the opposing
developments of investment conditions in these two areas, especially
during the mid-1980s [Agarwal et al., 1991; Nunnenkamp, Agarwal,
1993].
— The EU has emerged as the largest owner of international equity capital,
the place occupied by the United States in 1980. Likewise, the EU is the
biggest locational site in terms of inward FDI stocks. However, the in-
crease in the amount of FDI stocks held in the United States support the
conclusion that this country has remained an attractive location for
globalised production.
— As concerns the net international investment position,
9 Japan has beaten
all its competitors. In 1991, Japan's net position was 4.2 (2.6) times
higher than that of the United States (EU). This outstanding position is
due to two factors. First, Japanese TNCs have globalised their produc-
tion faster than any other major investor country in the last decade. Sec-
ond, FDI stocks held in Japan have remained very low.
1
0 FDI in the
country was inhibited by a host of factors such as the government's pref-
erence for licensing over equity capital, a rather slow process of liberal-
ising FDI regulations, difficulties of buying existing Japanese firms due
to a relatively high equity involvement of local financial companies, as
well as "Keiretsu" relationships putting foreign firms at a disadvantage.
While the Triad has dominated the overall development of FDI, the shifts in
the ranking of its members as home and host countries are remarkable. The fol-
lowing sections analyse the regional clusters in the foreign investment behav-
iour of the Triad members to find out if they have undergone significant
9 The net position is the difference between FDI stocks held abroad by country A
and FDI stocks held by other countries in country A.
1
0 The total foreign involvement in the Japanese economy is higher than indicated by
the inward stock of foreign equity capital only. During 1987-1991, Japanese pay-
ments for royalties and license fees for foreign patents, copyrights, etc. were nearly
ten times higher than the inflows of FDI [UNCTAD, 1993, pp. 42-43]; see also
Section III.2.10
changes in response to regional integration and globalisation efforts during the
last decade.
Figure 2 — Regional Distribution of Global FDI Outflows and Inflows (per











































































































































































































































































































^ess than one-tenth of one per cent.
Source: Rutter [1993].
2. The European Union
Apart from further strengthening intra-regional trade linkages, it was also ex-
pected from the Community's Internal Market programme that investors would
focus their attention on the Single Market. As a result, the globalisation of EU
companies beyond regional boundaries may have been retarded or even re-
duced. Two factors appear to be of major relevance in motivating stronger in-
tra-EU FDI. First, FDI has provided a means to penetrate markets that had tra-
ditionally been protected by national governments and for which the comple-
tion of the Internal Market promised substantial liberalisation. This applies to12
services such as banking, insurance, transport and telecommunication in the
first place. Second, FDI in manufacturing might have been encouraged by the
search for scale economies in the large unified market. Although the impor-
tance of the second factor has remained heavily debated,
1
1 the Internal Market
programme indeed provoked unprecedented amounts of FDI of the member
countries to each other. The intra-EU share in their total outward investments
increased by 20 percentage points from 1985-1987 to 1988-1990 and by addi-
tional 6.7 percentage points in 1991 (Table 2). A revival of direct investments
in the United States, following US economic recovery, may reduce this tre-
mendous increase. But it is unlikely to be wiped out completely. This is evident
from regional shares in FDI stocks, which tend to be much more stable than the
distribution of flows. The intra-EU share of FDI stocks soared from 25 per cent
[UNCTC, d, p. 32] in 1980 to 44 per cent in 1991. Hence, it is beyond any
doubt that the EU has become a most attractive host region for FDI.
The aggregate of FDI at the EU level hides considerable differences among
individual member countries, however. Germany and the United Kingdom rep-
resent the extremes. Germany, which was the world's fourth biggest host coun-
try of FDI in 1980, participated in the recent boom of FDI in the EU only to a
limited extent. Its share in the global stock of inward FDI went down from 9.5
per cent in 1980 to 6.5 per cent in 1991 (Table 1). This is probably due to its
reputation as a high-cost location, which made foreign investors to look for
more attractive production sites in the EU. The United Kingdom, the biggest
host country in the EU and second biggest in the world (after the United States)
was able to accelerate its annual growth of inward FDI stocks from 0.3 per cent
(1980-1985) to 24.3 per cent (1985-1991). The above average increase of FDI
stocks resulted from both intra and extra-EU inflows [OECD, e]. the remaining
EU countries can be divided into two groups:
— Measured by the growth of total FDI stocks during 1985-1991, foreign
investors found Denmark, Greece and Ireland relatively unattractive in-
vestment locations within the EU. The latter two cases suggest that the
availability of relatively low-cost labour does not automatically make a
country attractive for foreign investors who are interested in capturing
gains from the Single European Market.
1
1 In earlier evaluations of the Internal Market programme, scale economies figured
prominently as a source of integration induced economic gains [Emerson et al.,
1988]; for a critical assessment, see Hiemenz et al. [1994].13
Table 2 — Regional Distribution of EU
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Source: OECD [e]; Deutsche Bundesbank [1993].
— More than EU-average rates of growth in FDI stocks were registered in
Belgium-Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. But France, Italy and the
Netherlands were also able to raise their shares in FDI stocks during
1980-1991. France and the Southern periphery are vying for the position
of the second most important host region for FDI within the EU in the
1990s.
The most relevant question is whether stronger investment activities at the
regional level occured at the expense of other host countries of EU FDI. Of
course, the counterfactual of what would have happened in the absence of
European integration is impossible to establish. Hence, it is difficult to decide14
whether globalisation has lost ground due to the deepening of integration.
However, FDI diversion can definitely be ruled out for regions that have at-
tracted higher shares of EU FDI despite the progress made in completing the
Internal Market. As a matter of fact, EU investors have expanded their en-
gagement not only in EU member countries but also in other regions (Table 2):
— Rising FDI shares have been devoted to European industrialised coun-
tries outside the EU. This indicates that investors were stimulated not
only by the impending completion of the Internal Market but also by the
envisaged integration between EU and EFTA in the form of the Euro-
pean Economic Area.
— The high growth of EU investment in Central and Eastern Europe, albeit
from a very low level, is also remarkable. This is a result of the change
from command to market economy in this region. FDI was encouraged
by the preferential access of post-socialist economies to EU markets un-
der the Europe Agreements, by historical, geographical and cultural
links between the home and host countries and by the investors' inten-
tion to secure first mover's advantages and to reduce production costs.
Most of the new FDI in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to be addi-
tional to traditional flows. The opening of markets in this region has
mobilised extra capital from smaller enterprises in neighbouring coun-
tries, expatriates living in Western countries, and TNCs such as Fiat and
VW that have acquired state-owned car manufacturers such as FSM in
Poland and Skoda in former Czechoslovakia.
Rising FDI shares of non-EU hosts within Europe may be attributed to the
expected widening of integration. EU investors may have anticipated that
EFTA countries such as Austria, Sweden and Norway will become more attrac-
tive locations because they will join the EU soon. Likewise, Central European
countries such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Republics are
expected to receive full membership in the medium run. Hence, the develop-
ment of EU FDI in non-European host regions is more telling with respect to
FDI diversion.
Particularly DCs were concerned that European integration would proceed at
their expense. However, conclusive evidence to the effect that the rise in intra-
EU FDI has diverted FDI away from DCs does not exist The modest decline of
their share in EU FDI outflows in 1988-1990 appears to be a temporary phe-
nomenon (Table 2). In 1991, the share of the most DC regions recovered again
and surpassed the 1985-1987 share; the only exception was Latin America. The
slow recovery in Latin America is hardly attributable to integration-induced
FDI diversion, but has to be attributed to local factors in the first place, for ex-15
ample, persistent policy failures in Brazil, which had traditionally been the
most important host country in the region.
Further evidence against the notion that European integration has negatively
affected the integration of DCs into globalisation strategies of EU companies is
provided by the following observations:
— FDI outflows of individual EU member countries reveal significant dif-
ferences. France is the only major EU investor country for which the
share of FDI outflows to both all DCs and Asian DCs has declined over
the whole period under consideration (Table A3). By contrast, Asia has
attracted higher shares from three of the four larger home countries of
EU investors (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and
also from Belgium and Luxembourg.
1
2 This indicates that European in-
tegration has not eroded Asia's attractiveness for major EU investors
who were looking for cost advantages and promising markets.
— Lower FDI shares are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for FDI
diversion. As a matter of fact, regional FDI inflows continued to rise in
absolute amounts throughout the period under consideration. Comparing
1985-1987 and 1988-1990, EU FDI flows to Latin America and Asia
increased by 46 and 39 per cent, respectively.
— Data on FDI stocks make a strong case against any presumed delinking
of DCs from the globalisation strategies pursued by EU investors. Dur-
ing 1985-1991, FDI stocks held by Germany, Italy and the Netherlands
roughly doubled in the case of Latin America and nearly tripled in the
case of Asian DCs [OECD, e; Deutsche Bundesbank, var. issues].
1
3
— Finally, it has to be taken into account that globalisation is an issue with
respect to manufacturing in the first place. Hence, further insights may
be gained from a sectoral breakdown of FDI stocks, which is available
for Germany and the Netherlands [Deutsche Bundesbank, var. issues; De
Nederlandsche Bank, var. issues].
1
4 FDI stocks in the manufacturing in-
dustries of Asian DCs, originating from both Germany and the Nether-
The Netherlands as well as Belgium and Luxembourg reported continuously in-
creasing shares of FDI outflows to all DCs as well.
1 Corresponding data for 1985 and 1991 are not available for other major EU inves-
tor countries. France and the United Kingdom may be included, however, when the
comparison of FDI stocks is restricted to the period 1987-1990. It then turns out
that FDI stocks held by all five EU countries increased by 43 per cent in Latin
America (to $42 billion) and by 64 per cent in Asia (to $20.5 billion) within three
years.
1
4 For a detailed analysis of the sectoral structure of EU FDI, which is beyond the
scope of this chapter, see Agarwal et al. [1994].16
lands, has increased not only in absolute amounts since 1985; in the
early 1990s, this region also accounted for a larger share of total German
and Dutch FDI stocks in manufacturing. The same applies to all DCs in
the case of FDI originating from the Netherlands.
1
5
What we have said for Asian DCs largely applies to Japan as well. Japan
continued to be a minor host of EU FDI. In other words, the potential for any
FDI diversion arising from European integration was extremely small from the
very beginning. Starting from a very low level, EU FDI flows to Japan indeed
increased during the second half of the 1980s, followed by a minor decline in
1991 (Table 2). The emerging attractiveness of Japan as a host of EU FDI is
more clearly revealed by stock data. FDI stocks held by Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands have more than quadrupled to $4.9 billion in 1991 [OECD, e;
Deutsche Bundesbank, var. issues].
1
6
In terms of EU FDI outflows, North America was the main loser. Its share
declined from almost 50 per cent in 1985-1987 to 30 per cent in 1988-1990
and merely 17.6 per cent in 1991 (Table 2). This implies that North America
was the only region where FDI inflows originating from the EU declined in ab-
solute amounts, though only very recently.
1
7 Even for this region the evidence
with respect to FDI diversion is inconclusive. It is debatable whether the recent
decline of FDI outflows is a cyclical phenomenon, rather than pointing to a
longer-term decline in the propensity of EU investors to globalise their opera-
tions.
Two observations render the cyclical interpretation more plausible. First, the
declining trend of the North American share in EU FDI outflows appears to
have come to an end recently; the share increased from 16.4 per cent in 1990 to
17.6 per cent in 1991. Second, and more importantly, the development of FDI
stocks held by EU countries in the United States is in striking contrast to flow
data.
1
8 Stocks owned by German, Italian and Dutch investors more than dou-
1
5 By contrast, the share of all DCs in total German FDI in manufacturing declined
during the 1980s. This was mainly due to policy failure and economic stagnation in
Latin America. Even for this region, however, FDI stocks in manufacturing were
higher in 1991 than in 1985-1987.
1
6 Including FDI stocks held in Japan by France and the United Kingdom, the Euro-
pean engagement rose from $4.7 billion in 1987 to $7.6 billion in 1990.
1
7 Inflows amounted to ECU 21.1 and ECU 23 billion per annum in 1985-1987 and
1988-1990, respectively. In 1991, they declined to ECU 13.2 billion.
1
8 Of course, stock data have their own flaws. While the volatility inherent in flow
data does not affect stock data as significantly, the latter may be subject to consid-
erable valuation effects; distortions may arise from exchange-rate fluctuations in
the first place. For a detailed discussion with respect to German FDI data, see
Agarwal et al. [1991, pp. 19 ff.].17
bled in the period 1985-1991 [OECD, e; Deutsche Bundesbank, var. issues].
Data on French and UK FDI stocks held in the United States in 1987 and 1990
suggest an even steeper increase for these two home countries.
Although the picture remains ambiguous with respect to the United States,
there is little evidence that EU investors have reduced their efforts for globali-
sation because of European integration. It is reasonable to conclude that rising
intra-EU FDI has been additional, rather than having replaced the engagement
in other regions. The companies can obviously not afford to lock themselves
into a fortress Europe, i.e., rising trade protection against outside competitors,
and forego the cost advantages and market chances to be exploited by means of
globalised FDI patterns. Otherwise, they would ultimately lose their competi-
tiveness even in the European market.
The sectoral breakdown of EU FDI supports the notion of additionally. The
shift towards the EU was much less pronounced in manufacturing activities
than in services (for details, see Agarwal et al. [1994]). This differential pattern
is related to EU trade policies. Remaining barriers to trade within the EU were
highest for services, while trade in most manufactured products had already
been liberalised completely prior to 1985 [Hiemenz et al., 1994]. Hence, poten-
tial benefits of market integration could be expected to accrue primarily to
services and only to a much more limited extent to manufacturing activities. As
concerns the latter, intra-EU FDI took largely the form of mergers and acquisi-
tions in neighbouring countries, in order to restructure production at the re-
gional level in the wake of the Internal Market programme. This restructuring
resulted in relatively declining domestic production, rather than adversely af-
fecting globalisation (Chapter IV).
3. The United States
Regional integration in America has largely been a reaction to the widening
and deepening of integration in Europe. Traditionally close economic relations
of the United States with Canada and Mexico notwithstanding, institutionalised
integration started only in 1989, when Canada and the United States formed the
free trade agreement CUSTA (Canadian-US free trade agreement). This ar-
rangement has recently been extended to Mexico under the NAFTA. In the fu-
ture, regional trade and investment cooperation may gather further momentum
on the American continent. Latin American DCs (for example, Argentina) have
announced to apply for membership in the NAFTA, and the "Enterprise of the
Americas" initiative of the US government may ultimately result in substantial18
widening of integration encompassing America as a whole. Assuming that US
investors anticipated the recent move towards regional integration and its future
extension, it appears reasonable to consider the American continent to be their
regional "home turf". It may then be assessed whether US investors have di-
verted FDI away from other regions, which would indicate that regionalism has
been favoured over globalisation. Similar to European integration, apprehen-
sions to this effect were raised by (non-American) DCs.
1
9 However, integra-
tion-induced diversion effects are difficult to be isolated from the "normal" pat-
tern of US FDI:
— The link between integration and FDI is more ambiguous in America
than in Europe. While intra-EU trade in manufactured products was not
impeded by significant trade barriers even before launching the Internal
Market programme, the removal of such barriers figured high on the in-
tegration agenda in America. An integration-induced expansion of FDI
might then be offset by trade-replacing FDI, if the latter had been used
as a means to jump over protectionist fences prior to trade liberalisation.
— The first moves towards regional integration in America coincided with
comprehensive economic reforms in several Latin American economies
(notably Mexico and Argentina). Hence, it is difficult to decide whether
higher FDI inflows originating from the United States occurred in an-




— Finally, regional shares in US FDI outflows (especially outflows to Latin
America) are rather volatile because of significant fluctuations in capital
transfers to and from the Caribbean financial centres. Consequently, we
mainly refer to FDI stock data in the following.
These qualifications notwithstanding, it is evident from Table 3 that US di-
rect investment abroad reveals a more globalised pattern than EU FDI. Canada
and Latin America together accounted for less than one third of total US FDI
stocks in 1992, compared with an intra-EU share in total EU FDI stocks of
more than 50 per cent (Table 2). Furthermore, the overall share of all hosts of
US FDI outside America slightly increased from 65.6 per cent in 1982 to 67.4
per cent in 1992. Put differently, the high level of globalisation achieved in the
early 1980s was maintained.
On the competition for risk capital from the US (and for access to US markets)
between Latin American DCs and other DCs, especially Asian DCs, see Lang-
hammer [1992b].
Latin America regained its attractiveness for FDI also because debt problems were
overcome [Nunnenkamp, Agarwal, 1993].19
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Traditionally, the overseas engagement of US investors has been concen-
trated on Europe, notably the EU. The focus on the EU has become even
stronger over time, especially since the mid-1980s [USDOC, a]. This suggests
that the Community's Internal Market programme has provided a stimulus for
US investors. Starting from significantly lower base levels in 1982, an ex-
panded US engagement is also observed for Japan and Asian DCs. Promising
markets in this fast growing region and cost advantages to be exploited by pro-
duction sharing are the motives underlying this further move towards globalisa-
tion.
It would be premature, however, to conclude that regional integration had no
effect at all on the distribution of US FDI. Table 3 indeed reveals striking shifts
between stocks held in different countries on the American continent. As a host20
of US FDI, Canada has not benefited from integration.
2
1 Its share in FDI flows
stagnated when comparing the early 1990s with 1982-1985,
2
2 while its share in
stocks even declined. This shows that free trade and investment agreements are
no guarantee for increasing the regional involvement, compared with global
sourcing and marketing efforts of TNCs. Rather, the removal of tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers may have stimulated US firms to exploit scale economies at
their home production base. Falling transport and communication costs and
converging demand patterns facilitated this process. Regional integration did
not help to promote Canadian FDI in the United States either. In 1991, the US
share in Canadian outward FDI was seven percentage points below the level
reached in 1988 [OECD, e]. Multinational^ operating firms from both coun-
tries seem to have continued the globalisation of their sourcing and marketing
strategies irrespective of the administrative efforts to seek greater regional inte-
gration.
Compared with Canada, the experience of Mexico was strikingly different.
The North American agreement with Mexico not only envisages freedom of
trade but also contains wide-ranging provisions for encouraging FDI among the
partner countries [UNCTAD, 1993, pp. 51-52]. The rise in Mexico's share in
US FDI (Table 3) may reflect integration effects to the extent that anticipation
by US investors has played a major role. Such an interpretation would be mis-
leading for several reasons, however:
— First, products manufactured by US firms across the border in Mexico
enjoyed import preferences in the United States even before the NAFTA
was signed. This preferential treatment has traditionally been an impor-
tant stimulus for US FDI in the so-called "maquiladora" industries.
— Second, it is highly likely that the increase of US FDI in Mexico would
have occurred in the absence of institutionalised integration as well.
Probably, the increase is largely the result of successful liberalisation
and stabilisation efforts launched by the Mexican government since the
2
1 Canada used to be the world's biggest host of worldwide FDI in the 1960s. How-
ever, the comparative attractiveness of Canada in international competition for risk
capital has been losing ground for long. Its share in the world stock of inward di-
rect investment had declined from 18 per cent in 1967 to 10 per cent in 1980
[Rutter, 1993]. Canada's association with the United States as the single largest
home country of TNCs has not been able to stop this decline, and the Canadian
share has fallen to 6 per cent (1991), below that of Germany. Now the United
States host 3.7 times more stock of inward FDI than Canada and has become the
single largest recipient of FDI in the world [ibid.], thanks to the massive inflow of
Japanese FDI (see also Section n.4).
2
2 The temporary rise of the Canadian share in US FDI outflows in 1986-1989 is
consistent with reports of US firms planning higher direct investments there in an-
ticipation of CUSTA [UNCTC, b, p. 32].21
mid-1980s [Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al., 1991]. This proposition is
supported by the fact that the recovery of FDI in Mexico was not re-
stricted to flows originating from the United States; also other industrial-
ised countries such as Germany and Japan have strengthened their en-
gagement in Mexico recently.
2
3
— Third, the recovery of US FDI in other Latin American countries has
been more pronounced than in Mexico (Table 3). The hypothesis of in-
tegration effects dominating the behaviour of US investors would sug-
gest the opposite pattern, as the prospects of NAFTA were relatively
easy to anticipate as compared with the fairly vague vision of the
"Enterprise of the Americas".
All in all, the revival of US FDI in Latin America appears to be driven pri-
marily by local factors, rather than by anticipated integration. Among DCs,
Latin America has traditionally been the principal region of international
sourcing and marketing activities of US companies. Most countries in this re-
gion have recovered from the debt crisis, which adversely affected the activities
of foreign investors from the United States and other home countries during the
1980s. Economic reforms, comprising macroeconomic stabilisation, liberalisa-
tion and privatisation schemes, and the consolidation of foreign debt (for ex-
ample, via debt-equity swaps and debt reduction offered under the Brady plan)
have contributed to restoring the foreign investors' confidence in the region. It
now hosts a greater share of the total stock of US FDI than prior to the debt cri-
sis. The globalisation of US companies beyond the American continent re-
mained unaffected, however.
4. Japan
Institutionalised regionalism is largely absent in Asia. It is, rather, in the sense
of a market-driven regionalisation of corporate activities that Japan can be
viewed as a member of an economically integrated region. In the early phase of
Japanese FDI in East Asian DCs, the investors were motivated to take advan-
tage of low-cost labour. Now FDI is also targeted at penetrating promising
markets, for example, for consumer goods, in view of the increased income
2
3 German FDI stocks held in Mexico nearly tripled during the period 1984—1991
[Nunnenkamp, Agarwal, 1993, Table 3]. Japanese FDI flows to Mexico, which av-
eraged $50 million in 1987-1989, rose to $168 and 193 million in 1990 and 1991,
respectively [OECD, e].22
levels and high growth rates in this region. Many Japanese TNCs have inte-
grated their Asian affiliates on a regional scale, with a wide-ranging network of
intra-company trade between different countries. These regional networks, es-
pecially in electronic equipment and more recently in the automobile industry,
suggest that the East Asian region can be viewed as an integrated group of
countries, among which Japan is the most important player.
The importance of Asia as a low-cost location and a promising outlet for
consumer and investment goods continues to be high. Consequently, the me-
dium-term outlook for Japanese FDI in Asia is highly positive. Among the host
countries targeted by Japanese TNCs in the.near future, China, Indonesia, Viet-
nam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and India occupy prominent positions be-
sides the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Mexico [EXIM,
1993]. The recent strong appreciation of the Yen has encouraged Japanese
firms to use their Asian bases for exporting to Japan as well, whereas formerly
they served as export bases mainly to other developed countries.
However, favourable investment conditions within Asia have not prevented
large-scale globalisation of Japanese TNCs beyond regional boundaries, and
they are unlikely to do so in the future. To the contrary, the Asian share in Ja-
pan's stock of FDI abroad declined considerably (Table 4), while the absolute
value of FDI stocks held in Asia soared from $15 billion in 1982 to $60 billion
in 1992. Correspondingly, there was a fall in the share of all DCs in Japan's




The main reason for the relative decline of Japanese FDI in Asia and in other
DCs, too, is the phenomenal boost of Japan's engagement in the United States
and the EU. The significant move of Japanese companies towards integrating
these two regions into their globalisation strategies was in response to actual or
conceived trade protection and the need for consumers' proximity. Japanese
TNCs were eager to raise their market share through local production, which
can be more easily adapted to local market needs than exports. Furthermore,
local production was expected to enable Japanese companies to get an insider
status in the United States and the EU.
The United States are by far the biggest single host country of Japanese FDI.
More than two fifths of FDI stocks are placed there. Japan's investments in-
creased by 28 per cent per annum in the period 1982-1992 [MOF, var. issues].
Relating 1992 stocks to 1982 stocks, the highest increase was in a group of six ad-
vanced Asian DCs (by a factor of 6), followed by Latin America (5.2); Africa and
the Middle East ranked at the bottom, but Japanese FDI stocks held there still in-
creased by a factor of 2.7 and 1.7, respectively.23
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Source: OECD [e]; MOF [var. issues].
The recession in Japan and the United States prompted a deceleration of FDI
growth in the early 1990s. However, FDI flows to the United States are ex-
pected to resume their basic upward trend. In the 1993-survey of the Export-
Import Bank of Japan, investors voted the United States as the second most im-
portant host country, after China, for their future direct investments abroad
[EXIM, 1993]. This optimistic evaluation is based on the persistence of the ba-
sic motivations of Japanese direct investors in the United States. It is the largest
final market for Japanese goods, and its long-term growth prospects are consid-
ered favourable.
2
5 Growth and FDI inflows are generally highly correlated.
25 Investment conditions appear to have further improved because of the NAFTA.
Japanese FDI in the other two member countries, Canada and Mexico, is still rela-
tively low, but it increased in the early 1990s. Japanese firms are expected to raise
their production facilities in Mexico and other Latin American countries. Tradi-
tionally, most of the Japanese FDI in Latin America has been in finance and ship-
ping, notably in Panama, the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas. Regional integra-
tion and economic recovery of major Latin American countries may unleash a re-24
This is more so in the case of extremely large host markets such as the United
States. Moreover, the high growth of Japan's FDI in the United States is also a
response to its persistent trade surpluses, which have provoked various gov-
ernment actions against Japanese exports and resulted in the appreciation of the
Yen. The latter has, in turn, made it cheaper for Japanese TNCs to install more
production capacities in the United States. The strong flow of Japanese FDI
into the United States is thus likely to continue.
The highest rate of growth of Japanese FDI during 1982-1992 was recorded
in the EU. In terms of flows, the EU share rose from 14 per cent in the early
1980s to 22 per cent in the early 1990s. The EU now hosts a greater stock of
Japanese FDI than Asia, while it accounted for only about one third of the
Asian share ten years earlier (Table 4). Most of Japan's engagement in Europe
is in services, and it has traditionally been undertaken to support trade. The lib-
eralisation of service sectors in European countries and the boom in capital
market transactions in the 1980s have led to a further expansion of the activities
of Japanese TNCs in services. Japanese banks and security houses have become
influential players in European capital markets, especially in London.
Nevertheless, the pull effect of the Internal Market has been greater on Japa-
nese FDI in the manufacturing sector. Its share in Japan's FDI flows to Europe
increased from 18 per cent in 1987-1989 to 31 per cent in 1990-1992 [Tejima,
1993, p. 47]. This shift has been triggered by several factors, including favour-
able growth prospects offered by the Internal Market programme and the
widely perceived potential for economies of scale after the removal of remain-
ing trade barriers within the EU. Frequently, however, fears of a fortress
Europe, i.e., rising trade protection against outside competitors, are considered
to be the most important motive of increasing Japanese FDI in manufacturing
industries [Heitger, Stehn, 1990]. Such fears appeared reasonable given that
Japanese exporters have been among the principle targets of "voluntary" export
restraints, orderly marketing agreements, or outright quotas on automobiles,
colour televisions, semi conductors, machine tools and video cassette recorders
[UN, 1993, p. 89].
Economic integration in Europe so far was not accompanied by a seriously
deteriorating market access for third country suppliers (see also Hiemenz et al.
[1994]; GATT [c]). Even though respective concerns may vanish, Japanese FDI
can be expected to continue, as it provides the most effective means to preserve
and expand market shares in the EU. This motivation has dominated the loca-
tional decisions by Japanese investors. Relatively low labour costs in the EU's
Southern periphery and related factors are less important [Tejima, 1993, p. 60],
covery of manufacturing FDI [Tejima, 1993]. For a detailed discussion of Japan's
engagement in Mexican "maquiladora" industries, see Kenney and Florida [1994].25
which is evident from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands being the major
targets of Japanese FDI in the EU. Cost advantages are sought, rather, in Asia
or other DCs.
5. Summary
FDI by investors based in the EU, the United States and Japan has become a
major vehicle of globalising production patterns. Since the early 1980s, FDI has
increased at an unprecedented rate (see also Figure 3). The interruption of this
tremendous growth in the early 1990s, as shown in Figure 1, can safely be as-
sumed to remain a short-lived phenomenon. FDI is likely to resume its upward
trend once the recent economic recovery in the United States will spread to
Europe and Japan.
Figure 3 — FDI Hows within the Triad,




aAnnual averages; Ireland and Greece are not included in EU outflows. — "Including
Canada. —
 C1989-1991 for EU outflows.
Source: OECD [e]; USDOC [a]; MOF [var. issues].
Foreign investment activities are highly concentrated on industrialised coun-
tries. The EU, the United States and Japan are the major players in terms of the
source and the target of FDI:
— The United States have been the frontrunner with respect to globalisa-
tion. So far there is no evidence of investment diversion as a conse-26
quence of NAFTA. The reemergence of Latin America as a host region
is primarily the result of domestic economic reforms and the ensuing
improvement of investment conditions, rather than of the still vague ini-
tiative of the "Enterprise of the Americas".
— Japan's performance has been most impressive in terms of catching-up
with the degree of globalisation achieved by US companies. Most of the
growth of worldwide FDI outflows stemmed from Japan's overseas in-
vestment. While the regional focus on Asia has been reduced in the past,
the high priority attached to China may lead to some resurgence of the
Asian share in Japan's FDI in the future. But this is unlikely to affect Ja-
pan's engagement in Europe and the United States to a significant ex-
tent. To the contrary, the FDI-to-exports ratio, which is still much
smaller in the case of Japan than in the case of the United States, sug-
gests that there is further scope for globalisation of Japanese production.
Finally, as a host of FDI, Japan is lagging far behind the EU and the
United States despite of its liberalisation efforts with regard to FDI regu-
lations.
— Concerns for FDI diversion triggered by regionalism have been most
pronounced in the case of the EU. The deepening of integration and the
prospects of the widening of integration have definitely contributed to
the boom of intra-European FDI. However, the large bulk of integration
induced EU FDI appears to be additional. There is no conclusive evi-
dence that the globalisation of EU companies has been adversely af-
fected.
To conclude, the recent move towards regional integration has not put an
end to the globalisation of companies based in the member countries of integra-
tion schemes (Figure 3). Moreover, the formation of integrated markets has
prompted further globalisation by companies from outside the region. The EU
is the best example in this respect While it had attracted Japanese FDI flows in
the order of one-third of Japanese FDI flows to the United States in 1982-1985,
this relation amounted to nearly 50 per cent in 1990-1992. US FDI flows to the
EU increased by a factor of 2.5. At the same time, EU companies strengthened
their presence in the United States and in Japan, although flows have remained
small in the latter case. Evidently, regional integration does not only benefit the
member countries but stimulates FDI from outside the region as well, and com-
panies based in an integrated region cannot afford to lock themselves into a re-
gional fortress.27
III. Non-Equity Forms of Globalised Production
The previous analysis of recent trends in FDI revealed that the widening and
deepening of integration at the regional level have added to the attractiveness
of member states for internationally mobile capital, notably in the EU. How-
ever, there is hardly any evidence on investment diversion at the expense of
countries that remained outside major integration schemes. Furthermore, sig-
nificant FDI flows between different regions indicate that investors did not con-
sider their stronger regional engagement to be an alternative to worldwide pro-
duction, sourcing and marketing. The investment behaviour of TNCs suggests
that the formation of antagonistic regional blocs would run counter to their ef-
forts for globalised production patterns. Economic policies directed at closed-
shop regionalism can, therefore, be expected to be resisted by worldwide oper-
ating firms, though the reaction of producers and investors may depend on their
current competitive position in world markets.
2
6 The effectiveness of such poli-
cies may suffer from entrepreneurial evasion activities. FDI provides a means
to jump over protectionist fences, thereby eroding the effectiveness of dis-
criminating trade policies against foreign competitors. Similarly, non-equity
forms of international cooperation may be referred to if FDI is controlled and
regulated. In the following, we complement the analysis of FDI by an assess-
ment of non-equity forms of international cooperation (NEC).
1. The Relationship to FDI
The argument that FDI is not the only means by which the production chain
may be fragmented on a worldwide scale suggests that the degree of globalisa-
tion is underestimated unless NEC is taken into account. NEC stands for "inter-
corporate, international business operations that lie in a grey area between




6 In this context, it is interesting to note that General Motors did no longer support
the US automobile industry's demand for an export restraint agreement with Japan
after this company had concluded a joint venture with Toyota [Bhagwati et al.,
1992, p. 187].
In the literature, the term new forms of investment is frequently used for such op-
erations [for example, Oman, 1984; 1989]. NEC is preferred here, as the so-called
new forms have a fairly long tradition in some industries, for example, in textiles28
covers a broad and heterogeneous range of cross-border activities of compa-
nies. It includes in particular: joint ventures with minor foreign equity stakes,
2
8
the supply of technology or trademarks through licensing agreements, produc-
tion sharing arrangements, international subcontracting that involves firms with




The common denominator of the various types of NEC is that tangible or in-
tangible assets are supplied by a foreign company to a local enterprise, while
local interests in the host country retain majority or full ownership. The foreign
company's equity stake, if any, does not constitute ownership control, though
NEC may entail a significant degree of effective control by other means. The
foreign company's interest in the local enterprise goes beyond immediate profit
to be derived from selling goods. The company is interested, rather, in the abil-
ity of the local partner to generate a surplus in the longer run, on which the re-
turns on its asset depend.
From an analytical point of view, the relation between NEC and FDI is not
straightforward. The ambiguities are similar to those known from the trade-FDI
nexus and largely stem from economic policy interventions. The positive effect
of past and present exports on FDI, postulated by the theory of optimal timing
of FDI, may be neutralised if large and important markets are not accessible via
exports and FDI is undertaken to overcome protectionist trade barriers.
3
0 Trade
liberalisation may then have even a negative effect on FDI. Similarly, NEC
and clothing (Section IV.3). It should be noted, however, that minor foreign equity
stakes in joint ventures are included in NEC. The subsequent paragraphs draw on
Oman [1989, pp. 10 ff.].
2
8 An unanimous border line of foreign equity stakes that would adequately serve to
distinguish FDI from NEC does not exist [see also IMF, d, pp. 136 ff.]. Analyti-
cally, the relevant criterion for FDI is that the foreign investor has an effective
voice in the management of an enterprise. However effective ownership control
does not only depend on the proportion of foreign equity stakes, but also on
whether the remaining shares are widely dispersed or rather concentrated. The in-
formation required for an analytically sound differentiation between FDI and NEC
is generally not available. Consequently, there is no alternative but to refer to the
proportion of foreign ownership in defining FDI. The border line applied differs
considerably between different sources. While the percentage chosen is typically
quite low in balance-of-payments statistics (ranging from 25 per cent down to 10
per cent), FDI is restricted to foreign majority ownership according to Oman
[1989]. For the specific criteria applied in the empirical studies referred to below,
see Section IU..2.
2
9 See also Contractor, Lorange [1988, pp. 5 ff.]; Business International Corp. [1987,
pp. 21 ff.].
3
0 For a detailed analysis, see Chapter V; for an empirical analysis of German FDI,
see Agarwaletal. [1991].29
may be a second-best alternative to FDI if the latter is regulated or even prohib-




Substitution effects between NEC and FDI (as well as trade and FDI) reflect
that corporate strategies and government regulations are intertwined. Until the
early 1980s, many countries were concerned about "foreign dominance" by
TNCs in their economies. Globalisation through FDI was hindered by a host of
restrictions, ranging from the closure of strategic industries to any foreign eq-
uity investment to performance requirements in terms of local content and ex-
port obligations.
3
2 Such a restrictive policy stance left no alternative but to
globalise via NEC, or at least increased the attractiveness of NEC relative to
FDI.
3
3 At the same time, a recourse to NEC suggests that entrepreneurial adap-
tation to policy interventions reduced the effectiveness of the latter in achieving
the host country's objective to limit foreign involvement in the economy.
Given that NEC, too, involved effective control by foreign companies, majority
ownership by the host countries was insufficient to guarantee exclusive local
control. Host countries, especially in the Third World, continued to depend on
TNCs for gaining access to technology and world markets. The complexity of
corporate behaviour and the variety of innovative globalisation strategies may
easily overcharge the government's administrative and regulatory capacity.
Particularly in DCs with less advanced structures of public governance, the ac-
tions of TNCs constrain "an individual nation state's degrees of economic free-
dom — its economic autonomy" [Dicken, 1992, p. 149].
The limited effectiveness of government regulations may have contributed to
the more liberal stance towards FDI since the 1980s.
3
4 In many DCs, however,
the significant relaxation of FDI restrictions was an attempt to overcome for-
Exogenous factors may further complicate the relation between FDI and NEC. Low
or even negative real interest rates in the 1970s may provide a case in point. Many
DCs had easy access to low cost credits, which led them to rely more on interna-
tional borrowing and less on FDI. NEC was stimulated by this financial restructur-
ing to the extent that DCs used cheap credits to finance imports, and concluded
contractual arrangements with foreign companies which went beyond arm's length
trade relations, e.g. in order to get access to technology.
FDI was heavily regulated by many DCs in the first place; for an overview on the
types and coverage of regulations in selected DCs, see Agarwal et al. [1991] and
the literature given there. However, restrictions were applied by industrialised
countries as well, and some of them are still in place; for the case of Europe, see
for example, Welfens [1992, p. 38]. High local content requirements for Japanese
FDI in the automobile sector of the EU (reportedly up to 80 per cent in the case of
investments in the United Kingdom) provide a prominent example.
3
3 For a similar reasoning, see Contractor [1989].
3
4 For empirical evidence on FDI liberalisation, see ERT [1993] and UNCTC [a].30
eign exchange constraints and to improve the chances for a closer integration
into the world economy. Even if higher FDI inflows were induced by such a
move, the effectiveness of the policy change may again suffer from substitution
effects. A rise in FDI would then go hand in hand with less globalisation
through NEC; an earlier rise in NEC would turn out to be temporary.
Policy-induced substitution effects notwithstanding, we can maintain the
above proposition that the degree of globalisation is underestimated when NEC
is ignored. Two factors are of particular relevance with respect to the growth of
NEC: (i) general changes in TNC perceptions on the advantages of NEC, which
are of a longer-term nature and independentjrf policy-induced biases in corpo-
rate decision making, and (ii) industry characteristics that have as a conse-
quence that NEC is the superior way of globalisation in certain sectors, while
there may be no alternative to FDI in other sectors.
As concerns corporate views, risk considerations figure prominently in shap-
ing the growth of NEC. While FDI provides a way for the host country to share
economic risks with foreign investors, TNCs may aim at risk diversification by
unravelling the FDI package. NEC offers various options to this effect. Political
risks in general and expropriation risks in particular can be contained in the
case of joint ventures with local majority stakes. By providing intangible assets
through licensing, investment and operation costs are shifted to local or other
foreign partners. Subcontracting implies that the effects of fluctuations in final
demand are shared with the subcontracting firm in the host country. Financial
risks can be diversified by delegating the financing of investment projects to
commercial banks.
The favourable risk properties of NEC render it easier for newcomers to go
global, especially in the case of smaller companies for which the potential of
intra-firm diversification of risks is limited.
3
5 NEC helps overcoming a major
dilemma of these companies. On the one hand, the earlier globalisation of
competing TNCs adds to the pressure to follow suit, in order to remain com-
petitive by participating in international production sharing according to com-
parative advantages. On the other hand, such a move could entail unmanage-
able risks for smaller newcomers if they had no alternative to FDI with its in-
herent threat of considerable sunk costs. This reasoning suggests that NEC of-
fers more opportunities and better chances to compete with established TNCs in
world markets, and that more FDI by market leaders is likely to provoke more
NEC by market followers. The development of FDI and NEC can thus be ex-
pected to be on a rising trend in the longer run.
3
5 See also Contractor, Lorange [1988, pp. 14-15]; Oman [1989, p. 15] argues that
newcomer TNCs based in Japan, Europe and DCs tended to favour NEC; for earlier
evidence on ownership patterns of Japanese investment abroad, see Ozawa [1984].31
The proposition that different globalisation avenues will be followed at the
same time can be further substantiated by considering the relevance of industry
characteristics for corporate strategies. It is well known from the eclectic theory
of FDI [Dunning, 1977] that owners of intangible assets prefer to internalise,
i.e., to maintain control over the use of such assets, if external markets are inef-
ficient and the transfer of assets through market exchange involves high trans-
action costs. The asset-specific significance of market imperfections and trans-
action costs may also have an effect on the way in which internalisation occurs.
Hence, it can reasonably be assumed that the suitability of different globalisa-
tion strategies depends on the intangible asset in question. For example, market
inefficiencies are supposed to be particularly pronounced as concerns owner-
ship advantages related to products and markets so that internalisation is most
likely to occur through FDI [Kumar, 1989]. As concerns ownership advantages
related to process technology, the propensity to FDI is expected to be relatively
high in the case of innovative technologies, whose management requires par-
ticular skills of the owner's employees. By contrast, licensing is expected to be
a prime vehicle of globalisation if standardisation is well advanced [Caves,
1974; Teece, 1981].
The importance of intangible assets related to products and markets and the
technologies applied vary across industries. Hence, the propensity to internalise
and the preferred mode of internalisation will be industry-specific [Dunning,
1981; Kumar, 1989]. Globalisation may be dominated by FDI in industries pro-
ducing differentiated goods, for the sale of which brand names and quality con-
trol feature prominently. The same applies when globalisation necessitates the
transfer of highly skilled personnel, for example, for purposes of management
and organisation, marketing, and research. By contrast, NEC may be favoured
in industries with the following characteristics: knowledge is embodied in capi-
tal goods, production processes are easier to manage, and the R&D intensity of
production is low.
Apart from corporate adaptation to industry characteristics, industry-specific
globalisation strategies may also result from DC hosts preferring FDI in some
industries and NEC in others. Many DCs have built up considerable domestic
capacities in management, technological development and marketing. Depend-
ing on the advances made in these areas, they may rely on local resources to the
largest extent possible in order to reduce foreign exchange costs [Oman, 1989,
p. 17]. Consequently, they will prefer NEC in industries that can be run locally
once specific assets are supplied from abroad, for example, through licensing.
By contrast, FDI will be welcomed particularly in industries where the opera-
tions would put too much strain on local resources and which, therefore, require
the package of foreign assets typically embodied in FDI.32
2. Empirical Evidence
An empirical assessment of the aforementioned propositions on the significance
of NEC and its relation to FDI suffers from serious data shortcomings. In con-
trast to the comprehensive, though not always consistent data collection on
FDI, the available statistical information on NEC is fragmentary and incom-
plete. Contractual arrangements between companies of different legislations
largely escape balance-of-payments statistics. The flow of goods, services and
income induced by such arrangements is typically hard to identify, as the rele-
vant items are included in more broadly defined statistical categories. Finally,
FDI and NEC are sometimes difficult to disentangle.
Notwithstanding the lack of comprehensive data on NEC, there appears to be
a fairly broad consensus that globalisation has not only been pursued via FDI
but also increasingly so through various forms of collaborative ventures.
3
6 Em-
pirical support for this view is mainly derived from two sources:
— The INSEAD Business School in Fontaihebleau compiled information
on 839 collaborative agreements as of mid-1986. Major results are
summarised by Hergert and Morris [1988].
— The Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Tech-
nology (MERIT) runs a data base on more than 10,000 ventures [Hage-
doorn, Schakenraad, 1990, Appendix I].
Both sources basically rely on newspaper reports on business events. Hence
they suffer from similar limitations, though the coverage of MERIT is much
broader. Smaller deals are likely to go unrecorded, especially in the case of
INSEAD, which draws on only two sources (The Economist and The Financial
Times). The same applies to the dissolution of agreements, which is generally
not published. Collaborative agreements considered by INSEAD and MERIT
are not necessarily identical to what is labelled NEC in this study. For example,
only those inter-firm deals that contain some arrangements for transfering tech-
nology or research are included in MERIT'S data base; mere production or
marketing joint ventures are not taken into account. Both data bases are likely
to include cases for which equity participation is sufficiently large to classify
them as FDI, though partnerships involving majority ownership are explicitly
excluded by MERIT. Nonetheless, the approach of both institutions comes
close to the NEC concept. Hergert and Morris [1988, p. 100] define collabora-
tive agreements "as an intermediate position along a spectrum of inter-firm
3
6 See, for example. Business International Corp. [1987]; Hergert, Morris [1988];
Oman [1989]; Dicken [1992, pp. 213 ff.]; The Economist [1993, pp. 18 ff.].33
dealings encompassing arms-length transactions at one end and full mergers at
the other". The main attributes of such agreements also reveal strong similari-
ties to the above characterisation of NEC. They include risk sharing as the main
purpose of collaborative agreements, the concentration on specific activities,
and the provision of assets (for example, funding, skills, personnel) to the pro-
ject on a continuing basis.
The INSEAD data base reveals a significant growth of collaborative agree-
ments in the period 1975-1986. Although more recent information was not
available from this source, the subsequent findings are noteworthy [Hergert and
Morris, 1988]. First, cooperative behaviour gained prominence in the relations
between all major actors in the world economy. The increase of collaborative
agreements was most pronounced in EU-US relations. However, the number of
such arrangements also increased steadily between Japanese companies on the
one hand and US and EU companies on the other hand. Second, 31 per cent of
all collaborative agreements were struck between partners within the EU and 8
per cent between US companies.
3
7 The majority of arrangements (about 60 per
cent) was between partners located in different regions, which underscores our
above reasoning that international cooperation is global rather than purely re-
gional. Third, surprisingly few collaborative agreements involved partners on
different vertical stages of the production process. About 71 per cent of all
deals were made between competitors in the same market.
Fourth, collaborative agreements were heavily concentrated on the automo-
bile industry, aerospace, telecommunication and computers. At first sight, this
concentration on relatively human-capital-intensive industries appears to con-
flict with the hypothesis that FDI would be the preferred mode of globalisation
under such conditions. However, the sectoral distribution of NEC does not al-
low conclusions as to the relative importance of NEC and FDI. As a matter of
fact, a closer analysis of the automobile industry will show that FDI is still of
utmost importance, although NEC is widely used at the same time (Section
IV. 1). Rather, the significant role of NEC in human-capital-intensive industries
is to be attributed to its risk sharing properties. This interpretation is consistent
with the finding of Hergert and Morris [1988] that risk diversification and cost
sharing were major motivations underlying the cooperation of competitors in
industries in which potentially high sunk costs and considerable operating risks
are typical. While risk considerations encouraged globalisation through NEC,
particularly in early stages of product development, a go-it-alone strategy with
FDI may well be pursued at the same time for other purposes, for example, to
3
7 EU companies are likely to be overrepresented in the data set, as the announce-
ments made in The Economist and The Financial Times may tend to have a weaker
coverage of deals between non-European companies.34
globalise brand names and transfer human skills. This supports the view that
the growth of FDI and NEC will proceed hand in hand.
More recent and comprehensive information provided by MERIT confirms
that cooperative alliances increased because companies accepted their geo-
graphical, financial or technological limitations [The Economist, 1993, pp. 18
ff.]. When a go-it-alone strategy was considered too risky and too costly, coop-
eration offered a way to close the gap between ambition and ability and, at the
same time, to lessen the uncertainty associated with arm's length transactions.
The survey by Hagedoorn and Schakenraad [1990] reveals that the most com-
monly cited reasons for strategic alliances were to gain access to a market, to
exploit complementary technologies and to reduce the time required for inno-
vation (Figure 4). Especially technology cooperation gained in importance, by
which companies attempted "to cope with the complexity and inter-relatedness
of different fields of technology and ... to gain time and reduce uncertainty in
joint undertakings during a period of growing technological intricacy" [ibid., p.
14]. It is interesting to note, however, that basic R&D is rarely found to be a
subject of cooperation. This is probably because basic R&D concerns the core
activity of companies, which they are reluctant to share with other independent
firms. This finding again suggests that different globalisation strategies are
complementary to each other, the mode of globalisation depending on the im-
portance and specificity of particular corporate assets and the asset-specific
transaction costs involved.
The relative importance of different motives to enter strategic alliances var-
ies between sectors.
3
8 Technological complementarity and reduced innovation
periods are less relevant in motivating cooperation in mature industries. The
latter comprise chemicals, consumer electronics, food and, to a certain extent,
also the automobile industry, which together account for 17 per cent of the total
number of alliances (Figure 5).
3
9 Market-related motivations dominate in these
industries.
4
0 By contrast, technology-related motivations dominate in biotech-
nology, new materials, industrial automation and software (which are subsumed
under information technology in Figure 5), and partly also in aviation. How-
The sectoral classification of Figure 5 differs considerably from that presented by
Hergert and Morris [1988]. Most importantly, Figure 5 lists both specific industries
and different fields of technology.
As a consequence, these industries are likely to be underrepresented in the study by
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad [1990], who focus on technology cooperation and dis-
regard pure production and marketing joint ventures.
The same applies to computers and microelectronics, which are subsectors of in-
formation technology. A major purpose of strategic alliances in these branches is
that they may help the restructuring and adjustment of firms confronted by fierce
competition and excess capacity.35
ever, alliances with respect to basic R&D activities are of minor relevance in
most of these sectors, too. This supports the view that cooperation is not the
preferred globalisation strategy when it comes to highly firm-specific assets
and the core activities of companies.















aTotal number of alliances: 4,986; alliances are sometimes motivated by more than one
factor.
Source: Hagedoom, Schakenraad [1990, Table 3].
On the relation between different approaches to globalisation, additional in-
formation is available for individual host and home countries. Kumar [1989]
presents a regression analysis on the determinants of equity and non-equity
forms of foreign investment in Indian manufacturing, based on firm-specific
data for 1,720 companies in 49 industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Foreign equity stakes of 25 per cent or more are defined as FDI; the transfer of
royalties, technical and professional fees is taken as an indication of NEC. The
regression results support the hypothesis that industry-specific characteristics
explain whether the foreign engagement is mainly in equity or non-equity
terms. FDI is the dominant mode of operation in industries characterised by
significant product differentiation and human-capital-intensive production pro-36
cesses. By contrast, NEC is particularly important in industries whose produc-
tion is physical-capital-intensive and technologically less sophisticated. Finally,
there are some indications that the effectiveness of policy interventions in
directing the globalisation strategies of TNCs remained limited. Neither FDI
nor NEC were significantly influenced by effective rates of import protection.
Earmarking priority industries for investment did induce more NEC, but proved
ineffective in encouraging FDI.













aTotal number of alliances: 4,182.
Source: Hagedoorn, Schakenraad [1990, Table 4].
Among major home countries of TNCs, the United States offer detailed in-
formation on the relevance of different globalisation strategies.
4
1 In the late
1970s, the vast majority of US engagements abroad consisted of ventures with
41 However, the data are published with a considerable time lag and at fairly large
intervals only [USDOC, b]. The latest benchmark survey on US investment abroad
was published in 1992 and presents data for 1989. Moreover, the comparability of
the results of different benchmark surveys is limited because of changing data
collection criteria [Contractor, Lorange, 1988, pp. 29-30].37
minority stakes or no equity participation at all [USDOC, b, 1981].
4
2 These
ventures were typically very small affairs.
4
3 Smaller US firms appeared to be
particularly prone to engage in minority joint ventures and NEC-type arrange-
ments. This supports the notion that the propensity to form such ventures is
negatively correlated with the size of the foreign investor [Contractor, Lorange,
1988, p. 30].
4
4 Most of the small ventures were no longer considered in subse-
quent benchmark surveys, which adopted different criteria for mandatory filing
of data with the Department of Commerce. The decline in the ratio of minority
affiliates of non-bank parent companies (US equity stake: 10-50 per cent) to
majority and fully owned affiliates of nonrbank parents from 0.98 in 1977 to
0.19 in 1982 is thus a statistical artefact in the first place. Nevertheless, a trend
towards majority and fully owned affiliates can be observed. The data pre-
sented in the latest benchmark survey [USDOC, b, 1992] are comparable to
1982-data, as similar criteria for filing were applied. It turns out that the ratio
of minority affiliates to majority and fully owned affiliates was lower in 1989
(0.16) than in 1982.
A change in the relative importance of majority versus minority ownership
may result from changing host country regulations concerning the activities of
TNCs. This hypothesis has been tested by Contractor [1990], who made use of
US benchmark survey results. Cross-section regression analysis was applied to
clarify whether variations in ownership patterns were a function of host country
regulations, or rather a function of local market conditions and other factors.
This exercise was motivated by several observations. FDI regulations had been
liberalised in many host countries in the early 1980s. At the same time, the
number of minority affiliates declined relative to fully owned and majority




2 The number of fully owned and majority affiliates was about the same as the num-
ber of minority affiliates (about 12,000 each). In addition, there were some 30,000
overseas licensees in which US firms or their affiliates had negligible (up to 10 per
cent) or no equity stakes.
4
3 Fully owned subsidiaries, though vastly outnumbered by other ventures, accounted
for over two thirds of the value of US investments abroad.
4
4 At first sight, this appears to be in contrast to Hagedoorn and Schakenraad [1990,
pp. 18 ff.], who found that large companies are more cooperation-intensive. How-
ever, their conclusion is based on comparing the number of cooperation agree-
ments between firms of different size, ratfier than on addressing the question which
avenue of globalisation was favoured by small companies. Furthermore, the move
of large companies towards a more intensive use of collaborative arrangements is
of a recent nature, so that earlier US benchmark survey results were not yet af-
fected.
Statistical discrepancies between the benchmark survey results for 1977 and 1982
were removed, as Contractor [1990] had access to recomputed results for the 1977
results. As Contractor [1990] does not consider NEC, for example, in the form of38




The regression analysis supported the first impression that less restrictive
ownership regulations induced US companies to increase the proportion of ma-
jority affiliates. Similarly, this proportion was higher when performance re-
quirements (for example, in terms of local content and export targets) were less
restrictive. However, the relevance of the respective variables in explaining
ownership patterns was largely restricted to DCs hosting US investment. The
results suggest that host country regulations affected the way in which US
companies integrated Third World economies into their globalised operations.
Substitution effects after FDI liberalisation may, in turn, have reduced the ef-
fectiveness of regulatory changes in inducing a stronger overall engagement of
foreign investors. The study by Contractor [1990] does not provide conclusive
evidence on this issue, however, as the dependent variable (the share of minor-
ity affiliates in all affiliates) is defined in relative terms.
In contrast to DCs, the variables reflecting ownership regulations were gen-
erally not significant in the case of industrialised host countries. US ownership
patterns in these countries were determined by market-related variables in the
first place. On the one hand, the higher the industrialised host country's relative
importance to US investors (proxied by the sales of all US affiliates in that
country, relative to total sales in all host countries), the lower the propensity to
form minority affiliates was. This is attributed to stronger incentives for inter-
nalisation in more important host countries. On the other hand, market size
(proxied by the host country's GDP) was negatively correlated with the propor-
tion of majority affiliates. Minority ventures in large industrialised countries
appear to be "motivated by the need for local help, synergy, and minimum
scale" [Contractor, 1990, p. 65]. This result may be interpreted as an indication
of emerging changes in TNC perceptions on the relative advantages of different
globalisation strategies, a trend that was rather independent of host country
regulations.
More recent evidence on this issue may be gained from balance-of-payments
data [IMF, a]. The proposition of an increased recourse to NEC implies that the
income earned from such ventures should have increased over time. Moreover,
the development of these income streams to and from major home and host
licensing, the relative decline of minority affiliates does not necessarily imply a
decline of NEC relative to FDI.
The sales of minority affiliates accounted for 3 per cent of the sales of all US af-
filiates in Switzerland in both 1982 and 1989, while this share amounted to 90 per
cent (1982) and 76 per cent (1989) in the case of South Korea. Because of data
shortcomings, it was impossible to test the hypothesis that such differences were
partly attributable to industry-specific variables.39
countries, relative to income derived from FDI, may reveal cross-country varia-
tions in globalisation strategies. The subsequent analysis, too, suffers from data
shortcomings. NEC-related income probably escapes statistical identification to
a large extent. As a proxy, we consider non-financial property income in the
following. This item of balance-of-payments statistics mainly comprises royal-
ties and license fees paid to foreign owners of intangible assets.
4
7 To assess the
relative importance of property income, we consider FDI-related income as a
reference measure. The latter comprises two elements: (i) transfered income
that accrues to a direct investor from FDI ownership, and (ii) the direct inves-
tor's portion of reinvested earnings.
4
8
Figure 6 shows a significant growth of NEC, as revealed by cross-border in-
come streams from intangible assets, in the period 1984-1992. Total receipts of
property income soared from $10.3 billion in 1984 to $36.9 billion in 1992
[IMF, a]. The United States alone accounted for 55 per cent of total receipts in
both years. US companies were thus not only leading foreign direct investors,
but also the most important recipients of property income [see also Welfens,
1992, pp. 24-25]. While the initial level of receipts was significantly lower for
all other countries, the growth rate in the period 1984-1992 was about the same
across countries. Above average growth was recorded for Japan and DCs,
though from extremely low starting levels in the case of DCs.
As concerns the payments side of property income transfered to foreign
owners of intangible assets, the worldwide totals are more evenly distributed
across host countries. Japan was the largest payer with $2.3 billion in 1984 and
$7.2 billion in 1992, i.e., 20 per cent of the respective totals. This indicates that
NEC was a major instrument to integrate Japan into the globalisation strategies
of non-Japanese TNCs. Among industrialised countries, expenditures increased
most significantly in the United States (by a factor of 5.3 when comparing 1992
and 1984)
4
9 and in Germany (by a factor of 4.0). These two countries appar-
ently became relatively more important targets of globalisation through NEC.
The increase of payments by all DCs to $4.3 billion in 1992 was slightly above
average expenditure growth. However, the average figure for DCs obscures re-
4
7 For statistical details, see IMF [d, pp. 109-110]. This item does not cover income
from leasing and management contracts. It should be noted that a significant share
of property income is likely to be an intra-firm phenomenon. According to Welfens
[1992, p. 24], about three-fourths of all technology payments accrue on a parent-
affiliate basis in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.
4
8 In some instances, data on reinvested earnings are not available (for example, for
Japan).
4
9 Nonetheless, the net position (receipts minus payments) of the US remained sig-
nificantly positive.40
Figure 6 — Receipts and Payments of Property Income for Selected Countries
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ICs: industrialised countries; Jap: Japan; Fra: France; Ger: Germany; Afr: DCs in Af-
rica; As: DCs in Asia; LA: DCs in Latin America.
Source: IMF [a].41
markable differences at the regional level. Payments increased only slightly in
the case of Latin America and Africa, whereas they soared by a factor of 6.2 (to
$1.6 billion in 1992) in Asia. The high growth of NEC in Asian DCs was asso-
ciated with a similarly impressive growth of FDI inflows [Nunnenkamp, Agar-
wal, 1993, Table 1], indicating that this region became integrated into the
globalisation strategies of TNCs in various ways at the same time. For Latin
America, which had accounted for 60 per cent of total Third World payments
of property income in 1984, the picture is less clear.
Payments exceeded receipts of property income in all countries but the
United States and the United Kingdom (Figure 6). The positive net position of
the two largest owners of FDI stocks abroad may be interpreted as another indi-
cation that the globalisation of major TNCs by means of FDI and NEC went
hand in hand. However, the relative importance of the two approaches differed
considerably between the United States and the United Kingdom, as shown in
the first part of Table 5, which portrays receipts of property income in per cent
of direct investment income. The 1984-ratio of the United Kingdom was the
lowest among all countries considered, and the discrepancy became even wider
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By contrast, the United States reported the
sharpest increase of receipts of property income relative to direct investment
income.
On average, the figures on receipts and payments suggest that globalisation
through, for example, licensing and production sharing has gained in impor-
tance relative to FDI. This supports our proposition that NEC has to be consid-
ered in addition to FDI to draw a complete picture on globalisation. Receipts of
property income amounted to more than one-third of direct investment income
of industrialised countries in 1992, which is fairly high given the partial nature
of this proxy for NEC.
5
0 The payments side of property income indicates that
the way in which different locations have been integrated into globalised pro-
duction patterns varied considerably. It is evident from the second part of Table
5 that TNCs have adapted their globalisation strategies to specific host country
conditions. However, we can only speculate on the role that economic funda-
mentals, on the one hand, and host country regulations, on the other hand, have
played in shaping TNC behaviour. The cases of Japan and Germany are most
interesting in this respect.
It should be noted that Japanese figures are overstated because of lacking data on
reinvested earnings. The relatively low figures for DCs appear to contradict the hy-
pothesis that the globalisation of newcomer TNCs proceeds by means of NEC in
the first place. However, property income is probably a flawed indicator in this re-
spect. Royalties and license fees mainly stem from the transfer of technologies that
are mainly developed in industrialised countries. If NEC is favoured by TNCs
based in DCs, it is likely to be in forms not covered here.42
Table 5 — The Relative Importance of Property Income, 1984,1988 and 1992



































































aDirect investment income includes reinvested earnings whenever available (not
available, for example, for Japan).
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The ratio of payments of property income relative to income payments for
FDI is exceptionally high in Japan.
5
1 This fits into the common understanding
that a go-it-alone strategy is much more difficult in Japan than elsewhere. Close
ties with Japanese firms and local support are considered essential to enter
Japanese markets successfully. Hence, TNCs may have favoured NEC over FDI
(see also Section II.4). At the same time, their strategic choices were con-
strained by restrictive foreign ownership regulations in Japan [Contractor,
1990, p. 56]. By contrast, FDI regulations cannot be blamed for the compara-
tively intensive use of NEC by TNCs in Germany, where the ratio of payments
for, for example, foreign licences and production sharing arrangements is also
relatively high. Notwithstanding its liberal policy stance, Germany's role as a
host of FDI has declined over time (Table 1). This is probably because of its
reputation as a high-cost location.
51 The huge discrepancy between Japan and the average figure for industrialised
countries cannot be attributed to the data-enforced neglect of reinvested earnings in
calculating the Japanese ratio. The discrepancy is only slightly reduced when the
average figure is recalculated by excluding reinvested earnings; the ratio for all in-
dustrialised countries then rises from 39.7 to 46.4 per cent (1988).43
Although on a rising trend, the relative importance of payments of property
income is fairly low in the United States, the United Kingdom and also in DCs.
This suggests that globalisation continued to be mainly in terms of FDI in these
countries. What may be surprising is that FDI liberalisation in many DCs did
not prevent a relative increase of payments of property income for all DCs,
though regional developments were widely apart. There is no evidence whatso-
ever on negative effects on NEC after FDI liberalisation in Asian DCs. This is
in contrast to Latin America, where economic and political instability in the
early 1980s may have contributed to the relatively high ratio of payments for
foreign licences, etc. (20.4 per cent in 1984). Licensing offered an easier and
less costly option for scaling down corporate activities in Latin America once
instability became unmanageable. Subsequent efforts for economic stabilisa-
tion, together with FDI liberalisation, may induce TNCs to reconsider their ear-
lier preference for NEC in this region.
All in all, the evidence presented so far supports the view that NEC plays an
important role in the globalisation strategies of foreign investors. Substitution
between different forms of globalisation that may result from changing policy
regulations was of minor relevance. The dominant feature was a parallel growth
of both FDI and NEC. Furthermore, the analysis provided first hints to
industry-specific globalisation strategies and to different approaches taken by
investors from various home countries.44
IV. Globalisation at the Sectoral Level
The sectoral perspective provides insights into the effects of industry character-
istics, such as factor intensities and the competitive environment, on globalisa-
tion strategies. The sector studies deal with traditional and new forms of global-
ised production in the automobile industry (Section IV. 1), the chemical indus-
try (Section IV.2) and textiles and clothing (Section IV.3):
— The production of automobiles is representative of a technologically ad-
vanced and human-capital-intensive sector, in which especially Euro-
pean suppliers are under heavy competitive pressure from Japan.
— Chemicals stand for a physical-capital-intensive industry that has been
among the frontrunners of globalisation in terms of European and US
FDI.
— Textiles and clothing provide an example for a highly competitive and
relatively labour-intensive sector, in which policy interventions, com-
plex institutional arrangements and NEC have a long tradition.
The focus of the sector studies is on the globalisation strategies of EU com-
panies. Major competitors based in Japan and the United States are considered
as reference cases. Thereby, globalisation strategies can be compared across
countries. Furthermore, the international perspective helps clarifying the appro-
priate responses of EU policymakers to changes in enterprise behaviour, which
will be a central topic in Chapter VII.
1. The Automobile Industry
Worldwide production of automobiles is heavily concentrated on EU member
countries, Japan and the United States. These countries accounted for 77 per
cent of the total volume of production of passenger and commercial vehicles in
1992 (Figure 7).
5
2 Globalisation in the automobile industry is thus mainly the
result of corporate strategies pursued by a limited number of TNCs based in the
EU, Japan and the United States.
The share of automobile producers based in these countries is even higher if the
production of subsidiaries in other regions is taken into account.45












aNumber of passenger and commercial vehicles in per cent of total production volume.
LA: Latin America; ROW: rest of world.
Source: VDA [a, 1993, pp. 360-361].
Japan is clearly the most important automobile-producing country, followed
by the United States and Germany. It also reveals a world market orientation
which is much stronger than that of its major competitors (Table 6). The export
share of Japanese production was about five times as high as the export share of
the United States, where the huge domestic market absorbed around 90 per cent
of production. Total exports accounted for more than half of production in
France and Germany as well. However, the exports of EU countries are pre-
dominantly an intra-EU phenomenon. The share of extra-EU exports in total
production was typically below 20 per cent and has declined since the mid-
1980s.
The different size of local and regional markets for automobiles is, of
course, a crucially important factor accounting for variations in export intensity
across countries. Table 6 may also indicate, however, that major automobile
producers pursued different strategies in penetrating world markets. Early at-
tempts at globalisation via FDI by US companies may have contributed to low
export shares. The subsequent move in this direction by Japanese competitors
may have resulted in declining export shares, starting from a high level.
5
3
53 The proposition of a negative effect of FDI by automobile producers on automobile
exports does not imply that overall exports are negatively affected by FDI. For a46





















































aNumber of exported passenger and commercial vehicles in per cent of total produc-
tion volume. Figures in parentheses refer to extra-EU
Italy and the United Kingdom. Intra-EU exports of EU





and Spain throughout the period under consideration.
Source: VDA [a].
FDI data support the hypothesis of strategic peculiarities of TNCs located in
the EU,
5
4 Japan and the United States.
5
5 The country-specific significance of
FDI outflows in transport equipment is revealed by two ratios presented in
Figure 8:
— The share of transport equipment in total FDI outflows is extremely low
in the case of the United Kingdom. In sharp contrast, transport equip-
ment was among the most important manufacturing industries in terms
discussion of the FDI-trade nexus beyond the sector-specific perspective of this
section, see Chapter V.
As concerns the EU, the focus is on France, Germany and the United Kingdom in
the following paragraphs. Data shortcomings rendered it impossible to include
Italy, which ranked third within the EU in terms of automobile production in 1992
(not considering Spain the production of which is mainly by companies based out-
side the country) [VDA, b, 1993, pp. 414-415].
5
5 In most cases, FDI of the automobile industry is not available as a separate item.
We thus refer to FDI flows reported by the OECD [e] for the transport equipment
sector. As the OECD does not present sectoral FDI flows for Germany, we use un-
published data on FDI of the automobile industry provided by the Deutsche Bun-
desbank. US data suggest that the distortions that may result from not strictly com-
parable sector definitions remain marginal. US FDI of the automobile industry ac-
counted for 97 per cent of FDI flows reported for the transport equipment sector in
1986-1991.47
of the sectoral contribution to overall FDI in Germany and the United
States.
— The globalisation of the transport equipment sector was most advanced
in the United States when FDI outflows are related to exports.
5
6 A me-
dium position is shown for Germany and Japan. The United Kingdom
and France, where the FDI-to-exports ratio is only about half the US-ra-
tio, rank at the bottom.
The development of FDI outflows by major producer countries reveals sig-
nificant changes over time, however. The United States were clearly the most
important foreign investor country in terms of FDI outflows of the, transport
equipment sector in 1986-1988 [OECD, e].
5
7 A major change occurred in the
early 1990s. US FDI declined significantly to $284 and 980 million in 1990 and
1991 respectively. By contrast, Japanese FDI soared to about $2 billion per an-
num, which points to intensified efforts to globalise automobile production.
Figure 8 — The Significance of FDI Outflows in Transport Equipment for







D FDI outflows in transport equipment in per cent of Q FDI outflows in transport equipment in per cent of
total FDI outflows exports of transport equipment
aPeriod average; for FDI outflows in per cent of exports: 1986-1990. German data refer
to the automobile industry, rather than to transport equipment.
Source: OECD [e]; UN [a; b]; Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data.
The ratio of FDI outflows to production may be a superior measure of globalisa-
tion. However, data on the value of production are not available.
Annual outflows averaged $1.7 billion as compared with $1.2 billion for Japan,
$610 million for Germany and about $250 million for France and the United King-
dom.48
Considerably higher FDI outflows were also reported by France and Ger-
many in the early 1990s.
5
8 In contrast to Japan, it would be mistaken to equate
this increase with considerably advanced globalisation of French and German
automobile producers. In the case of France, the increase was mainly due to ex-
ceptionally high FDI outflows in 1991 ($2.1 billion). The 1991 figure must be
attributed to cross-shareholding arrangements of Renault and Volvo. While an
agreement on financial relations came into force on 1 January 1991 [EIU, 1992,
p. 14], the envisaged strategic alliance was finally rejected by Volvo in late
1993. Moreover, the two companies decided in early 1994 to dissolve cross-
ownership relations. Significant disinvestment of the French automobile indus-
try is thus likely to be reported once updated FDI statistics will be available. In
the case of Germany, increased FDI has mainly been directed to other EU
countries. In the early 1990s, the automobile industry reported declining FDI
stocks in industrialised and developing host countries outside Europe [Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1993].
5
9 Higher FDI stocks held within the EU (DM 3.8 billion in
1989 and DM 6 billion in 1991) point to intensified production sharing at the
regional level, rather than to worldwide globalisation.
More detailed insights on globalisation strategies may be gained from pro-
duction statistics. The automobile industry can be isolated from other segments
of the transport equipment sector. Furthermore, firm-specific information on
production volumes and on the regional pattern of TNC production is easily
available [VDA, a; b]. Consequently, strategic differences can be identified and
integration effects at the regional level can be separated from worldwide
globalisation.
The latter is, of course, most relevant for EU producers who had to decide on
how to respond to the deepening and widening of integration in Europe.
6
0 Re-
gional integration was expected to reduce the costs of production and distribu-
tion, and to improve the competitiveness of the EU's automobile industry. The
Internal Market programme was considered to be a catalyst for technological
5
8 Comparing period averages of 1990-1991 and 1986-1988, French FDI outflows
increased by a factor of 6 and German FDI outflows by a factor of 2.7 [OECD, e].
^ We refer to FDI stock data here, as information on sector-specific FDI flows to
particular host countries is not available.
6
0 According to Salvadori [1991, p. 62], "the automobile industry is one of the most
delicate areas in the programme of European harmonisation"; see also Smith,
Venables [1990]. The Internal Market programme involved: (i) the reduction of
fiscal trade barriers stemming from large intra-regional disparities in taxes im-
posed on the purchase of vehicles (different VAT rates, country-specific sales and
registration taxes); (ii) the removal of physical barriers impeding the free circula-
tion of vehicles (custom controls, national import quotas, regulations concerning
type approval); and (iii) the development of EU-wide technical standards replacing
national specifications [for details, see Pemberton, 1988, pp. 60 ff.].49
change. However, the expected unit cost reductions of about 5 per cent
[Emerson et al., 1988, p. 73] are insufficient to overcome the seriously im-
paired cost and productivity situation of the EU's automobile industry. In 1989,
the average productivity of assembly plants of European producers (35.5 hours
of worker input per unit) was only half the productivity of their competitors in
Japan (16.8 hours per unit) [Womack et al., 1990, Graph 4.3]. In other words,
the challenges faced by EU automobile producers went far beyond redefining
corporate strategies at the regional level [see also Smith and Venables, 1990, p.
144]. While regional integration may have created incentives to further concen-
trate activities within Europe, fiercer worldwide competition should have en-




Table 7 points to strikingly different strategies of major EU producers prior
to the Internal Market programme.
6
2 Rover, on the one hand, and Renault and
Volkswagen (VW), on the other hand, represent the extremes. Rover produced
in the United Kingdom exclusively, whereas nearly 30 per cent of Renault's
and VW's production took place outside the respective home countries in 1985.
This share was substantially above the corresponding shares for Japanese com-
petitors, though significantly below the contribution of overseas production to
overall production of Ford and General Motors (GM). US companies, espe-
cially Ford, were clearly the frontrunners with regard to globalisation, and
Japanese producers followed suit only in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Overseas production gained in importance until 1992 for all companies but
Rover. Nevertheless, pronounced differences in the degree of globalisation per-
sisted. About half the production of US companies stemmed from affiliates lo-
cated outside North America. Except in Japan, Ford and GM were engaged in
all locations considered in Table 7. They further strengthened their presence in
the EU and in Latin America Among the Japanese producers under considera-
6
1 The subsequent evaluation of the globalisation strategies of major EU car manufac-
turers ignores commercial vehicles (buses and trucks) and automobile components;
on the European components industry, see Sleigh [1991]. It is also beyond the
scope of this section to consider the relations between car manufacturers and com-
ponent suppliers; on the effect of the Internal Market programme on these rela-
tions, see Haraldsen [1993], who argues that regional integration has fostered the
trend towards outsourcing (i.e., reducing the degree of vertical integration) and
greater autonomy of component suppliers; on US and Japanese supplier relations,
see Bensaou [1993].
6
2 The figures given in Table 7 differ from the degree of intemationalisation of car
manufacturers as calculated by Womack et al. [1990, Table 8.5]. Apart from dif-
ferences in country coverage, this is because Womack et al. refer to assembly
whereas the present analysis is principally based on production data. Furthermore,
the coverage of operations by some producers is not strictly comparable; for de-
tails, see the notes to Table 7.50
tion, globalisation is most advanced in the case of Honda. In the United States
and the EU, the establishment of Japanese production facilities was stimulated
by increasing opposition towards the growth of Japan's automobile exports
[Dicken, 1992, pp. 294 ff.; Flam, 1994]. Typically, the globalisation of Japa-
nese automobile companies started with relocating production to North Amer-
ica. Although production in the EU is of a more recent nature, it has gained
Table 7 — Car Production by Major Producers in Different Regions,
a
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considerable weight particularly in the case of Nissan (which has significant
stakes in Latin America as well).
Compared with US and Japanese competitors, the decline in domestic pro-
duction shares in the period 1985-1992 remained limited for most EU compa-
nies (Table 7). This suggests relatively weak efforts towards globalisation. As a
matter of fact, none of the major EU companies was producing in the United
States in the early 1990s (not to speak of production in Japan). In sharp contrast
to TNCs based in Japan, Renault and more recently also VW pulled out of
North America [Dicken, 1992, p. 304]. Earlier expectations of lower cost pro-
duction for the US market were frustrated [Womack et al., 1990, pp. 225-226],
and VW's production was relocated to Mexico.
Foreign production by the EU-based automobile companies considered in
Table 7 is restricted to Europe and Latin America. The relevance of Latin
America as a production location was subject to some fluctuation,
6
3 which has
to be attributed to economic stagnation and policy failure in important host
countries in this region in the first place. The relative decline of domestic pro-
duction of EU companies was mainly attributable to relocation within Europe
[see also Diekmann, 1992a]. Rising shares of intra-EU production are observed
for Renault and, particularly, for VW. Production in Europe outside the EU was
still marginal in most instances, but it increased considerably for Renault (until
1991) and Fiat.
Table 7 thus supports the notion that major EU companies "are far narrower
in global terms than the United States and, increasingly, the Japanese firms"
[Dicken, 1992, p. 304]. Less advanced globalisation cannot be attributed to the
recent move towards the deepening and widening of integration in Europe,
however. The Internal Market programme did not affect the EU car manufac-
turers' efforts in other regions, but, rather, induced a relocation of production
within the region which was at the expense of domestic production. Longer-
term evidence for German automobile producers underscores this reasoning
(Table 8). The share of domestic plus intra-EU production increased from 80
per cent in 1980 to 89 per cent in 1985, i.e., prior to the announcement of the
Internal Market programme. Frustrated expectations in specific overseas loca-
tions, particularly in the United States and Brazil, accounted for this rise.
64
Subsequently, the share of production in Germany and other EU countries re-
mained at about 90 per cent. Since 1985, production has shifted from Germany
6
3 This refers particularly to Renault and VW. Fiat's engagement in Latin America
was significantly enlarged in the early 1990s.
6
4 Table 8 reveals that the (relative) decline of car production by German companies
in Latin America (especially in Brazil) was particularly pronounced in the first half
of the 1980s, i.e., during the climax of the debt crisis.53
































































































































to Spain. The relevance of overseas production outside the EU, which contin-
ued to depend on country-specific market developments in the first place,
6
5
was low by US and Japanese standards.
Both FDI and production data may not fully reveal the fact that fiercer
worldwide competition has led car manufacturers to consider new options for
globalisation. The above picture on globalisation may be biased if the propen-
65 The clearest indication is the opposing trend in Brazil and Mexico. While market
stagnation and reform deficits persisted in Brazil, Mexico embarked on compre-
hensive economic reforms and offered locational advantages as an export outlet for
penetrating North American markets.54
sity to engage in NEC differed significantly between EU, US and Japanese pro-
ducers. The available information on the role of NEC in the automobile indus-
try does indeed suggest some qualifications. However, there is no conclusive
counterevidence to the proposition that EU companies were latecomers with re-
spect to globalisation beyond regional boundaries.
A fairly comprehensive overview on the engagement of 21 automobile TNCs
in 46 DCs is presented by Oman [1989, pp. 167 ff.]. More than 300 ventures
with and without equity participation by TNCs were in operation at the end of
1987. The majority of these ventures (58 per cent) were of a non-equity type,
and an additional 25 per cent were minority foreign-owned joint ventures.
Measured by the number of automobiles produced and assembled, NEC-type
arrangements were of considerably less importance. Ventures without any for-
eign equity participation accounted for 14 per cent of total TNC production and
assembly in DCs.
The propensity to enter into NEC with DCs differed significantly between
TNCs of different origin. US firms were most reluctant in this respect; only 3
per cent of their output in DCs was accounted for by ventures without any US
equity participation. TNCs based in Japan ranked at the opposite end of the
spectrum; the corresponding share amounted to 24 per cent. European compa-
nies held a medium position; ventures without European equity participation
contributed 12 per cent to the output of European TNCs in DCs. Moreover,
Oman [1989, p. 168] found "a remarkably strong inverse correlation between a
firm's total vehicle output (market share) and the share of NFI (new forms of
investment) in its total output in DCs". This supports the proposition that late-
comers or market followers have a higher propensity to use NEC than market
leaders.
However, the findings of the Oman study do not contradict our conclusion
that the globalisation of automobile companies based in the EU is less ad-
vanced than that of their major competitors. The (relative) degree of globalisa-
tion achieved by US companies is only slightly overstated when ignoring NEC
in DCs, while that of Japanese companies is even understated. In terms of
worldwide production, NEC-related production in DCs was of marginal rele-
vance.
6
6 Furthermore, NEC was mainly used in smaller assembly operations
"that are essentially uncompetitive in international markets and unintegrated
into the multinationals' global networks" [ibid., p. 168]. By contrast, TNCs
typically held significant equity stakes in major production centres in the Third
World. Such engagements, which were often part of the TNCs' globalisation
strategies, did not escape the statistics on FDI and production presented above.
6
6 The number of vehicles produced and assembled by non-equity ventures of US,
Japanese and European TNCs amounted to about 0.5 million in 1986 [Oman, 1989,
pp. 204-205], which was slightly more than 1 per cent of worldwide production.55
The trend to improve the competitive position through various forms of NEC
— including licensing, joint production of components and for serving niche
markets, R&D partnerships and distribution agreements — is, of course, not re-
stricted to the TNCs' engagement in DCs [Salvadori, 1991, pp. 82 ff.; Urban,
Vendemini, 1992, p. 40]. Nearly all car manufacturers (and major part suppli-
ers) are interrelated in one way or another [OECD, d, p. 71; Dicken, 1992, pp.
291 ff.]. EU-based producers contributed to this trend to a considerable extent
(Table A4).
6
7 However, recent information on alliances and cooperation agree-
ments involving major EU automobile companies reveals a pattern that is
largely in line with production data, i.e., closer intra-regional links dominating
over globalisation beyond European boundaries:
— Outstanding examples of closer intra-EU links are VW's acquisition of
SEAT, the formation of Sevel by Fiat and Peugeot and, most recently,
the takeover of Rover by BMW. Furthermore, several producers (parti-
cularly Renault and Peugeot) are involved in intra-EU research partner-
ships and cooperation concerning the production of major components
(engines, transmissions).
— Not surprisingly, the cooperation network has been extended to compa-
nies based in countries which have applied for EU membership (for ex-
ample, Austria, Sweden). The cross shareholding of Renault and Volvo
represented the most prominent case in point, until the envisaged alli-
ance failed in late 1993.
— Since the fall of the communist regime, major EU car producers have
moved into Central and Eastern Europe and strengthened their links with
local companies [see also Scholfield, Henry, 1992, p. 164; OECD, d, p.
74]. The motivation appears to be twofold: (i) to reduce production costs
in the respective home country by means of outsourcing parts and com-
ponents (the cooperation between VW and BAZ in Slovakia may pro-
vide an example), and (ii) to establish regional production outlets early
in the transition of post-socialist economies in order to supply newly
emerging automobile markets.
Closer links within Europe did not prevent cooperation of EU companies
with non-European partners and in other regions. Traditional links were main-
tained (for example, in Latin America)
6
8 and new ones were formed, for exam-
ple, to penetrate promising markets (as in China). Joint ventures of EU- and
6
7 For an earlier overview on joint ventures and cooperation agreements in the Euro-
pean automobile industry, see Pearce [1987].
°° The joint venture of VW and Ford (Autolatina) is a prominent example.56
US-based TNCs were established in Spain and Portugal. With few exceptions,
however, the attempts to globalise through intensified cooperation are of a very
recent nature. Most strikingly, few links had been established between Euro-
pean and Japanese car producers until the late 1980s, which was in contrast to
the strategic behaviour of US companies [Pearce, 1987, p. 27]. Moreover, co-
operative ventures between European and Japanese partners for joint produc-
tion in niche segments of the automobile market and for exploiting technologi-
cal complementarity are still relatively few (Table A4).
6
9
All in all, it can be concluded that the EU's automobile industry has relo-
cated production and intensified cooperation at the regional level in the first
place, whereas it has been a latecomer in terms of worldwide globalisation. At
the same time, the EU as the largest automobile market has become the princi-
pal battlefield of the world's main car manufacturers [see also Salvadori, 1991,
p. 73]. The relocation of production by US and Japanese TNCs to the EU indi-
cates that European integration benefits not only EU producers but also exter-
nal competitors. The trend of non-European automobile producers moving into
the EU is likely to continue. This refers to Japanese TNCs in the first place.
7
0
Honda, for example, announced to penetrate EU markets by relying more
strongly on own production facilities after cross-shareholding arrangements
with Rover were dissolved in early 1994 [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22
February 1994, p. 13]. Likewise, the trend towards cooperation between Japa-
nese and European companies in niche segments of the automobile market is
expected to continue [Scholfield, Henry, 1992, p. ii].
The Internal Market programme did not reduce, but, rather, amplified the
pressure for the EU's automobile industry to improve productivity through in-
ternal restructuring, worldwide sourcing and technological innovation, and to
globalise production and marketing.
7
1 Fiercer competition among TNCs threat-
ens the survival of major EU car manufacturers as independent companies.
7
2
This raises two questions concerning the appropriateness of EU policies in
helping European companies to withstand this competition. First, government
involvement in the automobile industry and restrictive trade policies with re-
6
9 Cases in point are the Mercedes-Benz/Mitsubishi agreement [see also Salvadori,
1991, pp. 84 ff.] and the joint production of the 'Taro" by VW and Toyota.
7
0 Apart from further market penetration by Japanese car manufacturers, South
Korean producers are refocusing their attention away from North America and tar-
geting the European market [Scholfield, Henry, 1992, pp. 41 ff.].
7
1 Similar conclusions are presented by Diekmann [1992b], Salvadori [1991, pp. 55,
89], Smith and Venables [1990, pp. 146-147] and Urban and Vendemini [1992, p.
70].
7
2 Scholfield and Henry [1992, p. i] expect further alliances and mergers, for exam-
ple, of Fiat and Peugeot.57
gard to automobile imports may have contributed to the reluctance of EU pro-
ducers to go global. Second, the effectiveness of recent policy initiatives to
strengthen cooperation among EU producers is open to question.
It is probably not just by pure coincidence that strong government involve-
ment in the EU's automobile industry went hand in hand with weak globalisa-
tion and impaired international competitiveness.
7
3 Major companies such as
Renault and Rover were state owned until recently. Furthermore, European
governments — especially in France, Italy and the United Kingdom — granted
large-scale financial support to domestic car manufacturers which were under
heavy competitive pressure [Dicken, 1992, pp. 286-287]. It is reasonable to ar-
gue that public ownership and the access to huge subsidies have reduced the in-
centives to adjust and restructure. Likewise, massive financial incentives to lo-
cate production facilities in backward regions of EU member countries pro-
vided disincentives to globalise.
As concerns trade policies, several EU countries have traditionally taken a
restrictive stance against automobile exports shipped from Japan to Europe.
7
4
The Community concluded a "voluntary" export restraint arrangement with Ja-
pan in 1991.
7
5 Japan accepted to restrict its automobile exports to the EU until
1999. The originally agreed export figures largely resembled annual exports by
Japan in the late 1980s [GATT, a, p. 218]. The EU pressed for further restraint
in subsequent negotiations. Furthermore, some EU countries seem to insist on
targeted market shares of Japanese car suppliers in their national markets. As a
consequence, EU markets for automobiles would remain segmented although
this is inconsistent with the Internal Market programme.
Arguably, persistent trade restrictions have added to the difficulties of EU
automobile producers in meeting the Japanese challenge. On the one hand, im-
port barriers impaired the incentives of EU companies for adjustment and re-
structuring and discouraged them to go global. On the other hand, direct in-
vestment in the EU by Japanese car producers was encouraged, as it provided a
means to circumvent export restraints. Attempts by the EU to contain FDI by
7
3 Government interference was fairly strong in Japan as well [Dicken, 1992, pp.
286-287]. Tight protective barriers were placed around the domestic automobile
industry in the 1950s and 1960s. Direct involvement of foreign companies was pro-
hibited for a long period. Overseas marketing and exports of Japanese car manu-
facturers were financially assisted by the government. However, most of these
measures are no longer in force. Presently, the government's "guidance" is largely
restricted to negotiating export restraint agreements with trading partners.
7
4 Italy accepted only 2500 direct car imports annually from Japan in the late 1980s.
The respective number for Spain was 1000. In France, the market share of Japanese
cars was limited to about 3 per cent.
7^ For a detailed analysis of the welfare implications of the combination of an export
restraint agreement and Japanese FDI in the EU, see Flam [1994].58
Japan's automobile industry were twofold: (i) high local content requirements
had to be met, reportedly up to 80 per cent in the case of investments in the
United Kingdom [GATT, a, p. 219], and (ii) rumours continued that targeted
market shares of Japanese producers were to include cars delivered from Japa-
nese transplants in the EU or elsewhere. While such attempts may have re-
tarded the establishment of production facilities in the EU, the production fig-
ures presented above suggest that policy interventions were rather ineffective in
halting the move towards globalisation by Japanese car producers.
Recent policy initiatives by the Commission focused on assisting coopera-
tion among EU producers. For example, the. Commission announced to encour-
age and support coordinated efforts by car manufacturers (and input suppliers)
to strengthen their innovative capacity through joint R&D projects, training
programmes and the dissemination of new production techniques [Kommission,
1992]. Again, the effectiveness of EU policies is likely to remain limited.
7
6 If
EU car manufacturers strengthen their cooperation with US and Japanese com-
panies, in order to catch up with the globalisation achieved by their competi-
tors, the targeting of policy incentives will become increasingly difficult. Once
a close net of interlinkages among TNCs of different origin exists, it is no
longer possible to decide which company will be the main beneficiary of subsi-
dies, promotion schemes and similar policy incentives. The' foreign partner may
benefit to the same extent as the EU company that entered a cooperative ven-
ture.
7
7 If, however, closer intra-EU cooperation were considered by the Com-
mission to be an alternative to worldwide globalisation, it would probably re-
main insufficient to meet the challenge of fiercer worldwide competition in
general and greater cost efficiency of Japanese producers in particular.
2. The Chemical Industry
Similar to the automobile industry, worldwide production of chemicals is heav-




6 For a discussion on how international strategic alliances impair the effectiveness of
national R&D policies, see Krakowski [1993, pp. 61 ff.].
7
7 Similarly, incentive schemes designed for automobile suppliers in the EU may
benefit Japanese transplants that, because of high local content requirements, rely
on the supplies of the promoted industries to a considerable extent.
° Another similarity to the automobile industry concerns the dominance of huge
TNCs. It is beyond the scope of this section to analyse in detail the wide range of
diverse activities within the chemical industry; a more comprehensive assessment
of major segments of this industry is provided by de Ghellinck [1991].59
early 1990s, these countries accounted for 70 and 75 per cent of the chemical
industry's turnover and exports (Figure 9). However, some DCs such as Brazil,
India, and newly industrialising countries in Asia have already established sub-
stantial production capacities in selected branches of the chemical industry, for
example, in fibres, fertilisers and petrochemicals [see also UNIDO, 1990].
Chemical exports of Asian DCs reached Japanese dimensions in 1991. Like-
wise, Central and East European countries have emerged as new competitors in
chemical markets.
Figure 9 — Regional Distribution of Turnover and Exports of the Chemical
Industry,
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aIn per cent of worldwide turnover and exports in DM. The definition of the chemical
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America; EE: Eastern Europe. — "Greece not included in EU; new Lander not included
in Germany and EU; fibres not included in several EU and EFTA countries and Japan.
—
 C1991; EU: intra-EU exports included.
Source: Verband der Chemischen Industrie [1993].
In terms of turnover, the US chemical industry is clearly the most important
player, while Japan and Germany ranked second and third in 1992. However,
Germany was the leading exporter of chemicals. Its share in world exports was
nearly twice as high as its contribution to worldwide turnover of the chemical
industry (Figure 9). This is in sharp contrast to Japan, whose export share was
only half its share in turnover. Table 9 underscores the striking differences be-60






































aExports of chemicals in per cent of turnover of the chemical industry (based on data
in ecus); period average; 1992 data are frequently provisional.
chemical industry is not strictly comparable across countries.
eluded. —
 cFibres not included. — "New Lander not included.
The definition of the
— "Greece not in-
Source: European Chemical Industry Council [1993].
tween the chemical and automobile industries as concerns-the world-market
orientation of major producer countries. In the chemical industry, the export in
tensity of EU countries, particularly of Germany and the United Kingdom, was
strongest even when intra-EU exports are excluded; Japan reveals an export in-
tensity which was even lower than that of the United States, huge domestic US
markets notwithstanding.
This suggests that the competitive position of EU countries in chemicals,
which is an example of a physical-capital-intensive industry, is much better
than in the human-capital-intensive production of automobiles.
7
9 Moreover,
FDI data indicate that chemical producers in the EU have been among the
frontrunners of globalisation, although world-market strategies continued to be
dominated by exports (Figure 10). The chemical industry accounted for 10-12
per cent of total FDI outflows in Germany and the United Kingdom in 1986-
1991, which was comparable with the United States. The corresponding share
of France was still significantly higher than that of Japan.
Japan's approach towards penetrating world markets reveals an interesting
difference between chemicals and automobiles (Figures 8 and 10). While the
contribution of both industries to overall FDI outflows was modest (3.2 and 3.5
per cent), the FDI-to-exports ratio in chemicals amounted to nearly five times
See also Thomsen and Woolcock [1993, p. 28], who argue that European chemical
firms are "the largest and most competitive in the world".61
Figure 10 —The Significance of FDI Outflows in the Chemical Industry for
Major Investor Countries, 1986—1991
a (per cent)
11.3
France Germany United Japan Unitt
• FDI outflows in the chemical industry in per cent of E3FDI outflows in the chemical industry in per cent of
total FDI outflows exports of chemicals
aPeriod average.
Source: OECD [e]; UN [b]; Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data.
the ratio for automobiles. The world-market strategy of the chemical industry
did not rely as strongly on exports as did automobile producers, whose globali-
sation through FDI has gathered momentum only recently. Nevertheless, Japan
was not among the frontrunners of globalisation in chemicals either, which is
indicated by the following observations:
— The relatively high FDI-to-exports ratio was largely due to a significant
rise that occurred only recently.
8
0 Moreover, the contribution of chemi-
cals to overall FDI outflows remained virtually stagnant when compar-
ing 1989-1991 and 1982-1984 [OECD, e].
8
1
— Japanese FDI, relative to total (domestic and foreign) investment of the
chemical industry, was fairly low by international standards (Table 10).
Japan was not only surpassed by EU countries, among which Germany
and the United Kingdom invested between one third and more than half
of their total investment in foreign countries, but also by the extremely
large US economy.
8
0 This ratio increased from 7.4 per cent in 1986-1988 to 12.5 per cent in 1989-1991
[OECD, e; UN, b].
1 After a decline to 2.6 per cent in the second half of the 1980s, this share recovered
to 3.6 per cent in 1989-1991.62
Table 10 — Share of FDI Outflows in Total (Domestic and Foreign) Investment















































Source: OECD [e]; Verband der Chemischen Industrie [var. issues]; European
Chemical Industry Council [var. issues]; IMF [c, 1993].
For two reasons, the strategies of EU-based chemical companies deserve fur-
ther scrutiny. First, it is striking that both indicators presented in Figure 10 de-
clined over time in most EU countries and the United States (not shown).
8
2
This seems to suggest that the globalisation efforts of the frontrunners have
slackened. Second, it has to be assessed to which extent the foreign engagement
of EU companies is regional rather than global. These questions are addressed
in the following by referring to regionally disaggregated FDI, firm-specific
production patterns and NEC-type arrangements.
The regional distribution of FDI in chemicals by three major EU countries
reveals an increasing share of intra-EU investment, which was most pro-
nounced in France (Figure II).
8
3 Nonetheless, the EU's chemical industry
maintained its globalisation beyond regional boundaries. Its engagement in
non-EU host countries continued to dominate clearly over intra-EU investment.
In absolute amounts, FDI in both non-EU industrialised countries and DCs in-
creased over time.
8
4 For example, German FDI stocks in the chemical industry
8
2 Comparing 1986-1988 and 1989-1991, the FDI-to-exports ratio declined in Ger-
many, the United States and, most significantly, in the United Kingdom [OECD,
1993b; UN, b]. A declining trend was also observed for the contribution of FDI in
chemicals to overall FDI outflows of a group of seven EU countries (Table A5).
8
3 Regionally disaggregated FDI outflows are not available for Germany. Hence, Fig-
ure 11 refers to FDI stocks in this case.
8
4 FDI by the United Kingdom in non-EU industrialised countries was the only ex-
ception. However, the diversion of FDI outflows was hardly in favour of EU coun-
tries, but rather in favour of DCs.63
Figure 11 — The Regional Distribution of FDI in Chemicals by France, Ger-
many and the United Kingdom, 1985-1987 and 1990-1992
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Source: Banque de France [var. issues]; Deutsche Bundesbank [var. issues];
Central Statistical Office [var. issues].64
of industrialised host countries outside the EU were enlarged by more than 50
per cent within six years. FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, though impres-
sive in terms of growth rates, remained marginal until the early 1990s. There-
fore, it did not significantly affect the pattern of globalisation. This is not sur-
prising given that the regime change and the opening up of post-socialist coun-
tries towards FDI occurred only recently. The regional focus of the foreign en-
gagement of EU chemical companies may become somewhat more pronounced
once economic transformation is more advanced in Central and Eastern Europe.
The absence of significant FDI diversion at the expense of EU outsiders may
be attributed to the fact that the chemical industry did not face considerable in-
ternal market barriers even before the Internal Market programme was
launched. The benefits in terms of reduced transaction costs and greater
economies of scale resulting from the deepening of integration were considered
to be smaller in chemicals than in other manufacturing industries [de Ghellinck,
1991, p. 346; Bradley et al., 1989]. Consequently, EU chemical producers had
rather weak incentives to focus their attention on the emerging Single European
Market.
8
5 At the same time, the need for restructuring chemical production en-
couraged worldwide globalisation. Geographic expansion figured high on the
strategic agenda of chemical TNCs based in Europe [de Ghellinck, 1991, p.
345]. Third World economies offered favourable opportunities to develop basic
chemical products (frequently in collaboration with local partners), while prod-
ucts with higher value added could be developed in the United States and Ja-
pan.
EU chemical producers seem to have been eager to strengthen their presence
particularly in the US market.
8
6 Firm-specific data confirm that EU firms have
strongly raised their production in North America (Table II).
8
7 BASF was the
only exception among nine leading European TNCs in chemicals. On average,
Firm-specific production data show that companies reporting a higher share of
foreign operations within Europe typically reveal a steep (relative) decline of do-
mestic production at the same time (Table 11). Hence, regional integration was at
the expense of domestic production, rather than at the expense of globalisation be-
yond Europe. This result largely resembles earlier findings on relocation in the
automobile industry.
8
6 Table A5 supports the view that the United States has become the principal target
for foreign investors in the chemical industry. This sector's share in total FDI in-
flows into the United States increased tremendously in 1982-1992. By contrast, the
share of chemicals in total EU inflows of FDI decreased by more than 40 per cent
in the same period.
Data refer to the companies' net sales, which are reported according to final mar-
kets and production areas in annual company reports. Sales by production areas are
presented in Table 11. They are assumed to represent the value of production, al-
though problems regarding fluctuations in stocks may be involved.65
North America accounted for 20 per cent of total production of EU-based TNCs
in 1991. Foreign production in regions other than Europe and the United States
was typically of minor relevance. No clear trend exists as concerns the relative
importance of Latin America as a production location. This is probably due to
firm-specific locational preferences and host country-specific economic devel-
opments. In the case of Rhone-Poulenc, for example, the significant fall in
Latin America's share of production is not surprising in view of persistent pol-
icy failures and unfavourable investment conditions in Brazil. DCs in other re-
gions have attracted a constant or increasing portion of TNC production of
chemicals since the mid-1980s, though base levels were typically very low. A
Table 11 — Regional Distribution of Production
8 by Major European Chemical
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''Totals may exceed 100 per cent
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Source: Annual reports by the companies under consideration, various years.





8 The production share of Japan and Australia was more or less constant in the case
of BASF (about 0.8 per cent), Henkel (1.2-1.5 per cent) and Hochst (around 3 per
cent), whereas their share increased from 3.3 per cent in 1987 to 5.8 per cent in
1992 in the case of Bayer (Table 11).67
Oligopolistic competition among TNCs in the chemical industry has resulted
in a large number of mergers and acquisitions. The overriding role of this form
of FDI is evident from Table A6. Specifically, the establishment of EU compa-
nies in the United States has been achieved through acquisitions of existing lo-
cal firms in the first place.
8
9 This trend is likely to continue under NAFTA
conditions. Elsewhere, however, NEC appears to have gained weight in the
globalisation strategies of EU chemical producers. The farther away from the
United States and the EU the recent extension of international production, the
greater the resort to NEC by investors seems to have been. Especially in DCs,
NEC is the preferred form of investment (Table A6). This evidence is sup-
ported by studies that deal with specific host DCs:
— In a number of cases, TNCs have participated in establishing petro-
chemical plants in the Third World through technical cooperation
agreements, turnkey projects, management and marketing contracts, and
licensing. Examples are: Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia
and South Korea [Oman, 1989].
— In Bangladesh, Pharmaceuticals and other chemicals accounted for
nearly one third of all non-equity investments during the 1980s [Reza,
1992].
— In Turkey, the government-owned petrochemical company Petkim has
wide-ranging licensing and engineering agreements with foreign compa-
nies (Solvic, ICI, Mitsubishi) for the supply of technology [UNCTC, c,
pp. 87 ff.].
— Non-equity investments accounted for 70 per cent of the total number of
foreign engagements approved by the Indian government in 1985-1990
[IIPO, 1993].
— Franchising is considered to be a flexible instrument of globalisation,
which TNCs increasingly referred to, for example, in Central and East-
ern Europe, where business risks and bureaucratic hurdles are still high
[UNECE, 1993].
All in all, the chemical industry has been a frontrunner with regard to
globalisation, and it is likely to continue on this path. Regional integration did
not significantly affect the trend towards global sourcing and marketing.
9
0 EU-
9 Mergers and acquisitions were also a common feature in intra-EU relations among
chemical TNCs. As a matter of fact, the chemical industry reported by far the larg-
est number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions within the EU (1984—1991:
300); its share in total mergers and acquisitions in EU manufacturing industries
amounted to 33 per cent [Thomsen, Woolcock, 1993, p. 23].68
based chemical TNCs seem much more worried about the need to strengthen
their presence in the United States, in Japan and in DCs than being concerned
about the effects of the Single European Market. The large number of mergers
and acquisitions and the intensive use of cooperation agreements, observed
since the late 1970s, can hardly be attributed to the deepening of integration
within Europe [see also de Ghellinck, 1991, pp. 369-370].
As concerns the instruments applied by TNCs in the chemical industry, FDI
by means of mergers and acquisitions dominated in industrialised countries,
particularly in entering US markets, whereas NEC figures prominently in DCs.
Recent forecasts suggest that the Asian-Pacific region has the best chances to
expand production and exports in the chemical industry [UNIDO, 1990, p.
187]. South Korea, Taiwan, China and leading ASEAN countries are building
up major petrochemical bases with the participation of foreign capital and
technology [Ward, 1992, p. 7]. Hence, the role of NEC in the globalisation
strategies of TNCs in the chemical industry can be expected to gain further
momentum.
3. Textiles and Clothing
In sharp contrast to automobile and chemical production, textiles and clothing
are among the geographically most dispersed manufacturing industries. On the
one hand, the production of textiles and clothing has undergone significant re-
structuring during the last decades. It represents an ideal candidate for globali-
sation. Different stages of the production process have their specific techno-
logical and organisational characteristics, which encourages a division of la-
bour by means of international fragmentation of production. On the other hand,
the sector has been subject to intense political interference since decades, not-
ably under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). Policy interventions may have
alleviated the adjustment needs of the textile and clothing industries in devel-
oped countries for the time being, but they did not halt and sometimes even in-
duced globalisation.
Compared with the automobile and chemical industries, the textile and
clothing industry is labour-intensive. Furthermore, this sector is neither domi-
nated by a few huge TNCs nor by a small number of major production loca-
See also Thomsen and Woolcock [1993, p. 28], who conclude with regard to Euro-
pean companies: "To the extent that there is restructuring under way in the chemi-
cal industry, it is global, not regional".69
tions. Many DCs have started their industrialisation in this sector, particularly
in clothing. Their comparative advantage in doing so is evident from Figure 12.
The world-market share of textile and clothing exports by DCs in 1991 ex-
ceeded their export share in chemicals (12.9 per cent) [UN, b] by a factor of 3.3
(textiles) and 4.5 (clothing).
9
1
While DCs contributed the larger part to worldwide clothing exports in 1991
(58.6 per cent), industrialised economies still accounted for more than half of
textile exports (56.3 per cent) [UN, b].
9
2 This points to structural differences
between the two subsectors, though they appear rather similar compared with
automobiles and chemicals. Among such differences, the following are most
relevant with regard to globalisation strategies [Dicken, 1992, pp. 233 ff.;
Oman, 1989, pp. 207 ff.]:
— The manufacture of clothing is highly labour-intensive and mainly relies
on low-skilled labour. It is "footloose" in the sense that the production
process can be fragmented and geographically separated. Sewing and
garment assembly are typically located where labour costs are low,
whereas design (and often cutting) is performed in more advanced
economies. Textile production is capital-intensive, relative to clothing,
and does not fit as easily into an international fragmentation of produc-
tion processes. This explains why the dispersion of exporting countries is
lower in textiles than in clothing [Dicken, 1992, p. 242].
9
3
— The textile industry is much more sophisticated technologically than
clothing. Traditional textile suppliers tried to overcome their compara-
tive disadvantage with respect to labour costs by process innovations and
have reduced production costs by applying state-of-the-art equipment
such as CAD and CIM. Technology-related ownership advantages are
thus comparatively strong, which is likely to affect globalisation strate-
gies (Section III. 1).
9
1 Not surprisingly, the export performance of DCs in textiles and clothing is even
more impressive when compared with their export share in the human-capital-
intensive automobile industry. While DCs contributed less than 5 per cent to
worldwide exports of passenger road vehicles and automobile parts, their share in
aggregated textile and clothing exports exceeded 50 per cent in 1991 [UN, b].
9
2 Germany was the leading exporter of textiles in 1991, and Italy ranked third (after
Hong Kong).
9
3 The 1991 share of EU countries, Japan and the United States in worldwide exports
was 51 per cent for textiles, but only 37 per cent for clothing (Figure 12).70










aEE: Eastern Europe; Afr.: DCs in Africa; LA: Latin America; As: DCs in Asia
(excluding Middle East); ROW: rest of world.
Source: UN [b].71
— As a consequence of different factor intensities and production tech-
nologies, the textile and the clothing industries reveal different competi-
tive structures: oligopolistic competition among large firms prevails in
textile production, while the manufacture of clothing is least dominated
by large firms and comes close to a textbook case of a perfectly com-
petitive industry with a large number of small sellers and buyers.
9
4
Certain industry characteristics suggesting relatively favourable conditions
for textile production in advanced economies did not prevent newcomers, espe-
cially Asian newcomers, from creating fierce competition for traditional sup-
pliers during the 1980s and early 1990s. Starting from a 1980 level, which was
low by clothing standards, Asian DCs succeeded to expand their world-market
share in textile exports by 16 percentage points until 1991, which was slightly
above the increase in clothing (Figure 12).
The challenge confronting producers of textiles and clothing in industrialised
countries is also evident from regional trends in production (Figure 13). DCs in
Asia have clearly outperformed all other regions. Their production of clothing
more than doubled between 1978 and 1990, and textile production soared by
nearly 60 per cent. During the same period, the production of clothing declined
considerably in industrialised countries.
9
5 In view of the above reasoning, it is
not surprising that production losses in textiles remained modest or were
avoided. Textile production was on a clear downward trend only in Japan. EU
production fluctuated moderately, experiencing a low mark of 93 index points
in 1983 and a peak of 103 in 1989. Most remarkably, North America has re-
covered from significantly depressed textile production since 1982; the index
value of 1990 was about 10 points above the 1978-1980 average.
Figure 13 provides support for the notion that productivity growth was of
greater importance in textiles than in clothing, indicated by the typically larger
divergence between production and employment trends. But the increase in la-
bour productivity differed across regions. It was highest in Asia (in both textiles
and clothing) and lowest in the EU. This suggests that European producers are
facing the most serious adjustment needs. Their competitive situation is likely
9
4 For the world's largest companies in textiles and clothing, see Table A7.
9
5 The decline was most pronounced in the EU (21 per cent in 1978-1990) and rela-
tively modest in North America (10 per cent) and Japan (6 per cent). Clothing pro-
ducers in the EU and the United States appear to have followed different adjust-
ment strategies. In contrast to the EU, labour productivity in the North American
clothing industry has improved considerably (Figure 13). In the EU, the focus was
on moving to the high quality/fashion segment of the market, for example, by
establishing brand names; for a detailed analysis of corporate strategies in
Germany, see Piatti and Spinanger [1992].72


































aTextiles: ISIC 321; clothing: ISIC 322-324, i.e., including leather and footwear. —
"Footwear excluded; data on employment not available. —
 cExcluding Israel and
Japan, as well as China, North Korea and Vietnam. — ^Including former USSR.
Source: UN [c].73
to deteriorate once trade in textiles and clothing is reintegrated into the GATT
framework.
9
6 Furthermore, EU-based companies will receive another blow
from new competitors emerging in Central and Eastern Europe. The rather
modest increase of textile and clothing production in this region until 1990
(Figure 13) will, in all likelihood, gather momentum with economic transfor-
mation proceeding. Respective concerns on the part of the EU had as a conse-
quence that textiles and clothing are considered "sensitive" in the Europe
Agreements, which the EU concluded with several post-socialist countries in
the early 1990s. Although the Central European partner countries were granted
preferential treatment in this sector, too, quantitative trade restrictions remained
essentially in place (for details, see Langhammer [i992a]).
The inroads made by new competitors into the world markets for textiles and
clothing have rendered indispensable the adjustment and restructuring of tradi-
tional suppliers, especially those based in Europe.
9
7 Their reaction to fiercer
competition was threefold; it comprised internal restructuring, demand for pro-
tection, and globalisation.
9
8 The demand for protection resulted in an ex-
tremely complex system of government interference. During successive phases
of MFA, an intricate pattern of country-specific and product-specific import
quotas governed trade in textiles and clothing [Spinanger, 1993]." In addition,
anti-dumping procedures were launched against new competitors by the EU and
the United States. Trade restrictions were supplemented by large-scale financial




Yet persistent protection and government supported internal adjustment have
been insufficient for traditional suppliers to remain competitive in textiles and
9
6 Among the results of the Uruguay Round, concluded in late 1993, the agreement
on phasing out the MFA figures prominently; for details, see Langhammer [1994].
9
7 According to Dicken [1992, p. 245], problems of competition are most severe for
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while being
somewhat less severe for Italy, Japan and the United States.
9
8 Internal restructuring is largely ignored in the following. In the European textile
and clothing industries, internal adjustment comprised quality improvements,
product differentiation and process innovation. The clothing industry concentrated
on high quality and fashionable products, established brand names and tightened
the control of distribution channels. Textile companies intensified their cooperation
with producers of textile machinery and chemicals, in order to develop new mar-
kets (industrial textiles); for details, see, for example, Piatti and Spinanger [1992].
9
9 In the case of the EU, each member country had traditionally applied its specific
quota system on a bilateral basis. These quotas were aggregated to an EU-wide
quota only recently. EU quotas were roughly equivalent to the sum of country
quotas.
100 Xhe exception was Germany; for details, see Dicken [1992, p. 254].74
clothing. Consequently, the globalisation of these industries has been driven
primarily by firms based in industrialised countries that aimed at bolstering
their competitive position [Dicken, 1992, p. 257]. The strategies pursued dif-
fered considerably between textiles and clothing, on the one hand, and between
major industrialised countries, on the other hand.
First moves towards globalisation in textiles were triggered by policy inter-
ference and date back to the 1960s [Oman, 1989]. Trade restrictions imposed
by the United States on Japanese textile exports caused evasion by Japanese
textile firms and trading companies (sogo shosha). In order to circumvent quo-
tas, they established subcontracting links in East and Southeast Asian DCs.
10
1
By 1980, nine leading "sogo shosha" were engaged in 150 textile ventures out-
side Japan. Major textile companies such as Toray were involved in a vast array
of international operations. Subcontracting arrangements were dominant, but
FDI was also used as a means of globalisation. The early move towards globali-
sation by Japan in textiles may account for the fact that the FDI-to-exports ratio
was significantly higher than in other industrialised countries (Figure 14).
10
2
As in the case of textiles, Japan was the frontrunner with respect to globalis-
ing the manufacture of clothing [Dicken, 1992, pp. 259-260]. During the 1960s
and 1970s, Japanese companies established a close net of subcontracting ar-
rangements in Asia (especially in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and
Taiwan).
10
3 Dicken [1992] has estimated that about 90 per cent of overseas
clothing operations by Japan are still located in East and Southeast Asia. This
regional bias is at least partly attributable to the relative important role of
transportation costs involved in subcontracting arrangements with respect to
clothing.
10
1 More recently, the increased restrictiveness of MFA regulations has induced eva-
sion by newly industrialising countries, whose textile and clothing exports were
most seriously affected (for example, Hong Kong and South Korea). Relocation by
leading exporters, suffering from tight quota ceilings, to a number of "second-tier"
producers, whose quotas were not exhausted by local producers or which were not
signatories to the MFA, has enhanced the globalisation of textile and clothing in-
dustries, notably in Asia [Oman, 1989, p. 237]. Hong Kong, for example, set up
plants in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Mauritius already in the 1970s
and, subsequently, in China, Indonesia and Sri Lanka; for a detailed analysis of
Hong Kong's reactions to MFA regulations, see Spinanger [1992].
10
2 Similar to other industrialised countries, Japanese FDI in textiles and clothing
contributed only marginally to overall FDI outflows. Hence, the high FDI-to-ex-
ports ratio, which was nearly six times the average ratio for the remaining coun-
tries in Figure IS, has to be attributed to the replacement of Japanese textile and
clothing exports triggered by subcontracting and licensing in the fust place.
10
3 The first to make extensive use of this instrument were again Japan's "sogo
shosha" [Oman, 1989, p. 227].75
Figure 14 — The Significance of FDI Outflows in Textiles and Clothing for
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aPeriod average. Leather is included, except in the United States.
Source: OECD [e]; UN [b]; Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data.
Although Japan was the first to move towards relocating production in both
subsectors, its clothing industry is less internationalised than its textile industry
[Oman, 1989, p. 231]. The opposite pattern prevails in other industrialised
countries. The United States and major EU countries, notably Germany [Piatti
and Spinanger, 1992], have focused strongly on offshore processing of clothing
products.
10
4 The initial US emphasis on Mexico and the Philippines has shifted
to subcontracting activity in the Caribbean region. This underlines the crucial
importance of labour costs and transportation costs in deciding on the location
of offshore processing in the clothing industry.
Offshore processing and contractual agreements were also the principal
means by which EU producers of clothing went international. Offshore process-
ing was made attractive by special quotas and tariff provisions in the MFA
10
5
and the possibility to tap labour markets of low-wage countries without losing
control over design and distribution. Similar advantages are derived from con-
tractual agreements on the production and delivery of finished products by in-
104 jjjjs contrasts sharply with Japanese firms, which have not turned to offshore proc-
essing for their home market as much as US and German clothing manufacturers.
This applies to the United States and Germany in the first place [Oman, 1989, p.
213].
10576
dependent overseas suppliers. Industry sources [BBI, 1991] show that overseas
processing and contractual agreements accounted for about 50 per cent of Ger-
man clothing imports in 1990.
10
6
The partner countries for the globalisation strategies of EU clothing produc-
ers reveal a distinct pattern. Contractual agreements with independent suppliers
of finished products play an important role in imports from Turkey, Hong Kong
and, increasingly, from China, which are the leading sources of extra-EU im-
ports [EIU, 1993, p. 82]. The fragmentation of production by means of offshore
processing has followed the pattern established by the preferential trade agree-
ments signed by the EU with both DCs and neighbouring countries.
10
7 Because
of relatively low transportation costs, North African and Mediterranean coun-
tries (and especially former Yugoslavia) became preferred partners particularly
in offshore processing of the German clothing industry. Economic liberalisation
in post-socialist countries and cooperation agreements with the EU made Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe another attractive location for offshore processing.
10
8
In 1989-1992, processed clothing imports from Central and East European
countries increased from ECU 0.6 billion to ECU 1.3 billion.
10
9 Poland was the
most important supplier, accounting for a share of 44 per cent in 1992, fol-
lowed by Hungary (20 per cent) and Romania (16 per cent).
FDI played a marginal role in the globalisation strategies of major EU (and
US) producers.
11
0 The fragmentation of production patterns in clothing did not
10
6 These options were used much less by other European suppliers, notably in France
and Italy, which have focussed on quality improvements and the establishment of
brand names. A major reason for these differences in globalisation strategies may
be the higher degree of openness of the German clothing market to international
competition, which is reflected in increasing and above average penetration ratios
[Piatti, Spinanger, 1992, p. 26].
10
7 These agreements provide ACP countries with free access to EU clothing markets
and allow for self-monitoring of clothing exports by North African countries and
the former Yugoslavia [Stiiven, 1993].
108 gv J992_ this region provided almost 11 per cent of total EU clothing imports
compared with 10 per cent from each North Africa and Turkey, while China and
Hong Kong together accounted for 23 per cent [EIU, 1993, p. 46].
10
9 This information is based on EUROSTAT, EEC External Trade (Combined No-
menclature), CD-ROM. The authors appreciate the cooperation of Jens Oliver
Lorz, who compiled the data, which will be published in a report by the Kiel Insti-
tute of World Economics to the German Ministry of Economics.
11
0 This is in sharp contrast to the automobile and chemical industries, where FDI was
a major means of globalisation, as technology-related ownership advantages are
relatively strong. The vastly different role of FDI in the globalisation strategies of
EU suppliers of automobiles and chemicals on the one hand, and of textiles and
clothing on the other hand is highlighted by comparing Figure 14 with Figures 8
and 10 above.77
involve transaction-cost-intensive transfers of intangible assets, so that NEC-
type arrangements were favoured. Firm-specific ownership advantages are
more important in the textile industry, though definitely less relevant than in
the automobile and chemical sectors. Consequently, more recent moves to-
wards globalisation in the textile industry resulted in an increasing, though still
low contribution of this sector to overall FDI outflows and in a rising FDI-to-
exports ratio (Table A8).
1 •'
The degree to which globalisation has been pursued in the textile industry is
difficult to establish on an EU-wide basis.
11
2 Tentative conclusions may be de-
rived from Tables 12 and A9, which provide firm-specific information on some
large European suppliers. The typical pattern was a relative decline of domestic
production and a corresponding expansion of foreign-activities in 1986-1992
(Table 12). The latter seems to have been driven primarily by an extended en-
gagement in other industrialised countries, notably in North America. This re-
sult is confirmed by the recent major acquisitions and joint ventures of Euro-
pean companies listed in Table A9.
The focus on other industrialised countries in relocating textile production is
strikingly different to the dominant role of DCs in globalising the manufacture
of clothing. The three leading countries of origin for extra-EU imports of MFA
textiles in 1992 included Austria, Switzerland and the United States.
11
3 In other
words, EU producers of textiles still competed to a large extent with suppliers
from industrialised countries, which explains why EU producers established
production facilities in the markets of their major competitors and in geo-
graphical proximity to overseas customers.
11
4 However, there is no evidence on
investment diversion at the expense of DCs. Another similarity to earlier find-
ings on the automobile and chemical industries relates to the effect of European
integration on corporate strategies: relocation at the regional level was at the
expense of domestic production, rather than at the expense of globalisation.
It has mainly been the synthetic fibre segment of the textile industry that has con-
tributed to this increase recently. The transfer of intangible assets with regard to
synthetic fibres involves higher transaction costs than in all other segments of the
textile and clothing complex: "And it is precisely here that the bulk of foreign
equity investment by US and European multinationals is concentrated" [Oman,
1989, p. 235].
11
2 German FDI stock data reveal that the textile industry accounted for more than two
thirds of total assets held abroad by the textile and clothing sector in 1990 [Piatti,
Spinanger, 1992, Table 9]. FDI stocks in textiles increased by a factor of 3.6 dur-
ing 1978-1990, while FDI stocks in clothing increased by a factor of 2.4.
11
3 They accounted for roughly 30 per cent of total extra-EU imports in this category
[EIU, 1993, Table 16].
11
4 Further support to this effect is provided by Piatti and Spinanger [1992, p. 11], who
show that German FDI in textiles is largely located in industrialised countries.78
Table 12 — Production of European Textile and Clothing Companies in Differ-








































































































































































































aTotals may exceed 100 per cent because of the inclusion of intra-firm exports. —








































Source: Annual reports of the companies under consideration, various years;
Stopford [1992].79
To summarise, favourable conditions for fragmented production patterns
with regard to textiles and, especially, clothing explain why globalisation has a
fairly long history in this sector. NEC such as subcontracting and licensing has
been the preferred instrument. FDI, though still of minor importance as com-
pared with leading human and physical-capital-intensive sectors, appears to be
on the rise, especially in the textile industry, which is more capital-intensive
than the clothing industry. As concerns the prospects for globalised networking
of EU textile and clothing industries, several factors have to be taken into ac-
count:
— Many DCs in Asia have emerged as successful suppliers not only in
clothing but also in textiles [EIU, 1993, p. 80]. India, China, Pakistan
and Indonesia had already been ranking among the top ten sources of ex-
tra-EU textile imports in 1992.
— Supply of clothing from Asia will continue to increase, due to unprece-
dented economic growth in China and the emergence of new competi-
tive suppliers such as Indonesia and, possibly, Vietnam.
11
5
— Production capacities in Central and Eastern Europe, where textiles and
clothing have a long tradition, have not been fully used so far. The com-
petitive position of this region will depend on progress in economic
transformation and political consolidation.
— The MFA will continue to influence the worldwide distribution of pro-
duction for the time being. However, the competitive position of EU
firms will decline and imports expand once MFA trade is reintegrated
into the GATT framework, as was agreed upon in the Uruguay Round.
The completion of the Internal Market is of marginal importance as concerns
future developments in the EU textile and clothing industries. The major com-
petitors threatening the viability of these industries are located in other indus-
trialised countries, in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia. The gradual
opening of European textile and clothing markets is likely to further increase
the importance of globalisation. Central and East European countries may be-
come major partners of EU suppliers following the lead of German companies
with respect to NEC, notably offshore processing. This may help EU firms to
reduce production costs, but it is unlikely that closer cooperation within Europe
could seriously dislodge imports from other regions.
11
6 Labour costs in Central
*" Indonesia jumped from position 19 to 8 in the ranking of suppliers of EU clothing
imports in 1988-1992 [EIU, 1993, p. 82].
11
6 According to survey results [Piatti, Spinanger, 1992], German clothing companies
operating in Central and Eastern Europe expect that further tapping the potential of80
and Eastern Europe may be low compared with Western Europe, but not com-
pared with India or China. Rather, world-market conditions will force EU pro-
ducers to invest not only in Europe and North America, but also in Asian




From the sector studies, we can conclude that globalisation is a common fea-
ture across various manufacturing industries. What differs across industries is
the way in which globalisation proceeds. FDI continues to be of overriding im-
portance in human-capital-intensive industries. By contrast, NEC-type arrange-
ments play a prominent role in labour-intensive industries such as clothing, in
which traditional producers are under heavy competitive pressure from DCs.
NEC is often preferred as a means to integrate DCs into the globalisation
strategies of TNCs. Notwithstanding the general rise in NEC, FDI seems still to
be the dominant feature as concerns the TNCs' engagement in industrialised
countries.
Producers based in the EU, Japan and the United States all went global,
though to a different degree and by different means. EU-based companies are
lagging behind their major competitors in important industries such as car
manufacturing. This cannot be attributed to European integration, however; the
relocation of production at the regional level was typically at the expense of
domestic production, while it hardly affected globalisation. All in all, the sector
studies support the hypothesis that policy interventions are ineffective in
halting the trend towards globalisation, which is, therefore, likely to continue.
this region will affect activities in other parts of the world. By contrast, textile
companies do not perceive that activities outside Europe will be affected.
First indications for such an engagement are the many subsidiaries and joint ven-
tures that the largest European textile producer, Coats Viyella PLC, has established
in Asia (Table A9).81
V. The Effects of Globalisation on the Pattern of
International Trade
The globalisation of economic activities implies an international fragmentation
of production and a closer integration of markets. One indicator of this process
is the strong increase in. FDI flows as compared with trade flows and produc-
tion that can be observed for approximately the last ten years. Chapters II and
III have shown that this relatively new trend does indeed reflect globalisation,
and not merely regional isation. While it is true that FDI flows generally have a
strong regional component, recent regional economic integration schemes in
Europe and North America have not diverted FDI flows away from DCs, espe-
cially not from DCs in Southeast Asia.
11
8 Although FDI is not the only instru-
ment that can be used to achieve a globalised production structure, rising FDI
flows can be interpreted as a leading indicator of globalisation strategies,
mainly because of strong linkages with other forms of international investment
cooperation (Chapter III).
On the basis of these empirical findings, it is tempting to speculate about the
likely consequences of globalised production strategies on international trade
flows between countries and within industries and firms. The traditional pattern
of international trade dealt with in standard textbooks is of the arm's length in-
ter-industry type, i.e., it is mainly considered as the exchange of raw materials
and manufactured products between otherwise unrelated parties. The magni-
tude of this type of trade is declining in relative terms, however, while other
forms such as intra-industry and intra-firm trade, which highlight the role of in-
termediate products, have become more important. This chapter attempts to
identify whether the structural change in the pattern of international trade can
be related to globalisation strategies of TNCs.
Three main hypotheses will be advanced. First, it is argued that the trend
towards globalisation should imply a positive correlation between bilateral FDI
flows and trade flows. Globalised production means that firms are subdividing
the production process, including all the necessary complementary services, in
order to make use of international differences in locational comparative advan-
tages. FDI flows and other forms of investment cooperation are needed to im-
plement this strategy, and the respective trade flows necessary to sell a final
product on world markets are likely to follow suit. Second, the trend towards
11
8 For the effects of European economic integration on FDI flows and DCs, see
Agarwaletal. [1994].82
globalisation can be expected to result in the increase of intra-industry trade
flows — not only among developed countries, but also between developed and
developing countries — the reason for this being that geographical dissolution
of the production process within an industry and the increase in the volume of
intra-industry trade are two sides of the same coin. Accordingly, a third hy-
pothesis is that the fraction of intra-firm trade flows could grow as a conse-
quence of globalisation strategies. Intra-firm trade, however, is not necessarily
of the intra-industry type, but may occur at the inter-industry level, too.
1. Trade and FDI Flows
Globalisation strategies of TNCs imply a distinct relation between international
trade and FDI flows. FDI and other forms of investment cooperation are the in-
struments to implement an international partition of the production process and
its accompanying services. The aim of this strategy is to make use of interna-
tional differences in production costs for certain product-specific components.
If so, the marketing of a final product requires international trade, mainly in in-
termediate products. As seen from a country perspective, total bilateral FDI
flows could, therefore, be positively correlated with bilateral trade flows.
Yet globalisation strategies do not call for a unidirectional pattern of trade
flows. International investors seeking to minimise production costs need not
necessarily be the assembler of the final product, especially if this stage of the
production process exhibits a low value-added content. Hence, depending on
the specific product considered, bilateral FDI flows may be positively corre-
lated with both exports and imports as a result of globalisation strategies.
Identifying a simple correlation between trade and FDI flows is a purely sta-
tistical exercise, while its interpretation requires an economic theory. In the
theoretical literature, trade or trade imperfections are frequently considered to
be determinants of FDI, and FDI, in turn, is sometimes considered as promoting
international specialisation, i.e., trade. The snag is that it is not clear from a
theoretical point of view whether a positive or a negative correlation between
trade and FDI flows should be expected a priori.
11
9 Yet, without a well-formu-
lated theory, it is difficult to interpret a given statistical correlation with regard
to the direction of causality. Notwithstanding the more or less eclectic theoreti-
cal background, simple statistical correlations of bilateral trade and FDI flows
For recent reviews of the theoretical literature, see, for example, Agarwal et al.
[1991] and Stehn [1992].83
may be used to give some hints on the empirical relevance of alternative inter-
pretations.
The theory of optimal timing of FDI states that once a company has devel-
oped a certain market share by exporting to a foreign market, it is likely to be-
come a foreign direct investor. This hypothesis implies that exports are a pre-
condition of FDI and that causality runs from exports to FDI. As a conse-
quence, it predicts a substitution of exports by output from the affiliated com-
pany, and, therefore, a negative correlation between exports and FDI flows.
However, such a negative correlation between firm-specific trade and FDI
flows need not necessarily reappear on the level of aggregate data: The estab-
lishment of a new company abroad might as well cause an increase in domestic
exports as investment goods are exported to the foreign subsidiary. In this case,
FDI would act as an engine of trade because of imputed complementarities. An
alternative hypothesis is that a large fraction of FDI is directed towards the
service sector in the host country in order to provide the necessary "infrastruc-
ture" for imports and exports of the home country, i.e., for a globalisation of
production and markets. According to this hypothesis both aggregated FDI and
trade flows are driven by a common set of factors motivated by globalisation
strategies and may at the same time reflect the circumvention of trade barriers,
complementarities between the establishment of foreign production capacities
and specific investment goods, and the international fragmentation of produc-
tion resulting in trade in intermediate goods. In that case, the search for causal-
ity from trade to FDI and vice versa would be entirely misleading.
Disregarding the question of causality, a positive correlation of bilateral na-
tional FDI flows, on the one hand, and exports and imports, on the other hand,
would support the globalisation hypothesis. By contrast, the pure substitution
hypothesis would imply a negative correlation between exports and FDI, and
the augmented substitution hypotheses would imply a positive correlation with
exports only, but not with imports.
The following analysis is confined to a purely statistical investigation of the
relation between trade and FDI flows, thereby ignoring the issue whether FDI
actually drives trade or is driven by trade. The question of interest is whether
trade and FDI flows are positively or negatively correlated and whether such a
correlation can be considered to be robust. To clarify this issue, recent bilateral
trade and FDI data for three major suppliers of FDI (Germany, Japan, the
United States) are examined. In each sample, other industrialised countries
(including the two other home countries) and DCs represent the host countries.
If a common pattern for all three sending countries can be identified, some
generalisations seem to be possible. Therefore, first, we compare the correla-
tion between trade and FDI flows for the three sending countries. Second, again84
in a purely statistical sense, we check the robustness of this correlation by in-
troducing an additional explanatory variable.
Table 13 presents simple cross-section correlation coefficients for bilateral
trade and FDI flows for Germany, Japan and the United States for recent years.
German and Japanese FDI flows to host countries, including developing and
industrialised countries, are positively correlated in a statistically significant
way with exports and imports to and from these countries; and the same broad
picture holds for lagged FDI flows (one and two years, respectively). Hence,
the higher contemporary and past FDI flows to foreign countries in absolute
value, the higher German and Japanese exports to the host countries and the
higher imports from these countries. This finding provides evidence against the
substitution hypothesis and supports the globalisation hypothesis.
For the United States the statistical correlation between FDI and trade flows
is much weaker. Two reasons can be considered for the different pattern of
trade and FDI flows of the United States, on the one hand, and Germany and'
Japan, on the other hand. First, FDI flows of the United States are not only
more volatile, but also have a different sectoral distribution as compared with
the other two home countries. A relatively large part of US FDI flows focuses
on the primary sector. While FDI in resource-based industries, such as mining
and quarrying, and oil, amounts to about 2 per cent of total FDI in the case of
Japan, and even less in the case of Germany, this share averaged about 5 per
cent for the United States between 1981 and 1991, even excluding extreme
years when it reached 75 per cent (1984) and 35 per cent (1987) [OECD, e].
Obviously, globalisation strategies do not aim at the primary sector. The rela-
tively strong role of US FDI flows in this segment is, therefore, likely to distort
the expected positive correlation of trade and FDI flows. In the case of the
United States, a more appropriate test of the globalisation hypothesis would be
to correlate trade flows with bilateral FDI flows for manufacturing industries
rather than with total FDI flows. Yet sectorally disaggregated data on FDI
flows by host countries are not available from official statistical sources.
12
0
The second reason for the different patterns of FDI and trade flows is that
US FDI also displays a different regional composition as compared with the
other two home countries. Although all three investors focus on the OECD area
as their main target of FDI, this share is lowest for the United States with about
65 per cent of total FDI, while the respective shares for Germany and Japan
range between 70-80 per cent and more than 90 per cent [OECD, e]. With re-
gard to remaining FDI flows, Japanese investors prefer the Asian region to
12
0 OECD statistics report FDI flows either by regional or sectoral disaggregation; US
statistics report disaggregated FDI stocks but not FDI flows.85
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Latin America by a factor of 2, while US investors prefer Latin America to the
Asian region by a factor of S; German investors also prefer Latin America, but
less than US investors. Yet, FDI in Latin America is more likely to have been86
determined by substitution motives to secure market shares in the wake of entry
barriers and extremely volatile exchange rates [Agarwal et al., 1991].
Hence, both the sectoral and the regional specialisation of US investors can
be expected to weaken the positive correlation between trade and FDI flows
expected from the globalisation hypothesis. A similar reasoning could be ap-
plied for the case of Germany. The resulting effects should be smaller, though,
because the share of German FDI flows directed to DCs is smaller than the US
share and because German investors do not prefer as strongly as US investors
Latin America as a host among DCs.
To get some information on the empirical relevance of sectoral and regional
specialisation of US investors weakening the positive correlation between trade
and FDI flows, the robustness of the previous trade-FDI correlation is tested by
introducing an additional explanatory variable. As is almost self-evident,
market size can be regarded as an additional important factor explaining trade
patterns. Therefore, this variable should prove to be correlated with bilateral
trade flows. From a statistical point of view, the question arises whether market
size, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) in the host country, or FDI
flows have a larger statistical effect on trade flows. If globalisation strategies
are the main driving force behind the trade-FDI correlation, market size should
not have a dominating effect on trade flows. This hypothesis can be checked by
regression analysis. Specifically, it can be checked whether FDI flows or the
host country's GDP have a statistically larger effect on bilateral trade flows.
If globalisation strategies explain the positive link between FDI and trade
flows, it follows that for Japan, with a sectoral and regional structure of FDI
flows most compatible with globalisation, market size should not dominate the
effect of FDI on trade flows. By contrast, if a larger fraction of FDI flows is
devoted to resource-based industries and FDI flows show a regional pattern that
is unlikely to be motivated by globalisation strategies in the first place, the ef-
fect of market size should dominate the effect of FDI. Such an outcome can be
expected for the United States. For the case of Germany, something in between
these two extremes should result.
Table 14 presents beta coefficients that were derived from a cross-country
regression of bilateral exports (imports) on bilateral FDI flows and GDP in the
host country.
12
1 The beta coefficients measure the change in exports (imports)
in standard deviation units for a unit change in each explanatory variable in
standard deviation units, holding constant the other variable. Since beta coeffi-
cients are independent of the units of measurement, they can be used to com-
The detailed statistical results are presented in Table A10.Table 14
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pare the relative effect of the explanatory variables. The results are largely in
line with a priori expectations. For a statistical explanation of bilateral Japanese
trade data, FDI flows seem to be more important than market size. This finding
strongly confirms the globalisation hypothesis. Not surprisingly, market size
seems to be more important than FDI flows in most calculations for the United
States. This finding means that given the data at hand, the globalisation hy-
pothesis can neither be confirmed nor falsified for the United States. However,
it cannot be concluded that globalisation is irrelevant for US investors, as the
results for the United States, too, point to a positive correlation of FDI and
trade flows. For Germany market size and FDI flows seem to be important de-
terminants of trade, but the weight of FDI has increased in recent years.
The regression results can be taken as further evidence confirming the posi-
tive link between trade and investment flows. But they also demonstrate that
there is no clear-cut pattern regarding trade and investment flows that can be88
identified by a simple cross-section analysis. The different results for the three
major investor countries indicate that the positive correlation between FDI and
trade flows should be carefully interpreted. Obviously, other variables such as
different productivity levels, different sectoral and regional preferences of in-
vestors, and the sometimes volatile character of FDI flows should be taken into
account for a more comprehensive description of cross-country trade flows.
With these qualifications in mind, our findings support the consensus result
of most empirical research in this field: FDI and trade flows are positively cor-
related.
12
2 Hence, the empirical evidence is in line with the globalisation hy-
pothesis according to which both FDI and trade flows are driven by a common
set of determinants. Rather than FDI causing trade or trade causing FDI in a
unidirectional way, globalisation strategies determine the direction and extent
of trade and FDI flows simultaneously. As a consequence, FDI is positively
correlated not only with exports of home countries but also with exports of host
countries. The emerging question is in which way globalisation strategies will
change the pattern of international trade.
2. The Changing Pattern of World Trade
Between 1980 and 1991, the volume of international trade increased by 72 per
cent. This increase was accompanied by a significant change in the structure of
world trade: the share of manufactures in world trade increased from 50 to 70
per cent because of a growth rate of 140 per cent [UN, b].
The changing structure of international trade reflects the effects of globalisa-
tion strategies, which mainly focus on the manufacturing sector. It also under-
lines the potential adjustment problems that may result in industrialised coun-
tries. Growth and structural change necessarily go hand in hand. An increase in
the number of competitive suppliers, which is suggested by the findings of the
case studies in Chapter IV, means that established suppliers will have to in-
crease their productivity to remain in business. This may happen either by an
upgrading of production structures towards more technology-intensive and hu-
man-capital-intensive goods, or by cuts in labour costs which may have to be
substantial in order to restore competitiveness. Yet, the competitive pressure
prompted by the globalisation of production and markets will not only be felt in
labour-intensive and physical-capital-intensive industries with fairly ubiquitous
12
2 This result is also confirmed by a recent empirical analysis that focuses on extra-
EU trade and investment flows [Greenaway, 1993].89
technologies, but also in industries that were once thought to be relatively im-
mobile internationally because of their high human capital requirements.
Since trade and FDI flows have grown considerably in recent years and are
positively correlated for the three major suppliers of FDI, the world economy
has become more integrated. Given that globalisation is a major reason for the
positive correlation and is targeted on manufactures, there should be two dis-
tinct changes in the structure of world trade: one with respect to the regional
pattern and the other with respect to the pattern of specialisation within manu-
facturing.
a. Changes in the Regional Pattern
An increasing interdependence of markets and production in different countries
through trade in goods and services, cross-border flows of FDI and exchanges
of technology should result in a catching-up of DCs in terms of per capita in-
come, and, therefore, in a simultaneous increase in their share in world trade of
manufactures. Those countries, however, that do not participate in globalisation
because of protectionist policies, an unstable macroeconomic environment or
an export supply focusing mainly on natural resources, can be expected to lose
in terms of worldwide trade shares. This implies that the picture for DCs as a
whole may be blurred, as the suggested trade gains for world-market-oriented
DCs could be offset by those DCs experiencing severe adjustment problems
during the last decade.
But globalisation strategies not only offer opportunities for closer economic
cooperation between countries with different factor endowments and different
per capita incomes. Increasingly fragmented production processes also offer the
opportunity of closer economic cooperation between countries with similar fac-
tor endowments as large FDI flows within the Triad indicate. As we have
shown before (Figure 3), there are substantial in- and outflows of FDI in the
case of the United States and the EU, and there is a large amount of Japanese
FDI flowing to these hosts. It can be argued that the Triad's share of world
trade is unlikely to fall as long as globalisation strategies are largely confined
to a relatively small number of competitive suppliers, and other potential hosts
of international production have to cope with internal and external adjustment
problems.
These considerations are confirmed by a comparison of the regional struc-
ture of world trade in manufactures in 1980 and 1991 (Table 15). The stylised
facts are as follows. Intra-EU trade accounts for more than 25 per cent of world
trade in manufactures. Trade within the Triad, i.e., trade between the EU, the
United States and Japan contributes about 15 per cent to world trade. Trade of90
the Triad with other industrialised countries such as Canada (in the case of the
United States) or EFTA members (in the case of the EU) accounts for about 20
per cent. Taken together, more than 60 per cent of world trade in manufactures
occurred between relatively rich countries in 1991. This fact is at odds with a
simple factor proportion explanation of international trade.
Table 15 — The Regional Structure of World Trade in Manufactures, 1980 and
1991
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In 1991, DCs' trade in manufactures with the Triad accounted for no more
than 26 per cent of world trade; for DCs taken as a whole, this share has not in-
creased since 1980. As was expected, this relative stagnation hides that DCs
have followed very different economic developments during the last decade.
Asian DCs have strongly increased their share in trade of manufactures with the
Triad by 6 percentage points. Additionally, trade among Asian DCs has grown
stronger than total intra-DC trade in manufactures. These relative gains by rap-
idly advancing Asian DCs has not occurred at the expense of the Triad's trade
share, despite its high degree of integration already reached in 1980. To the
contrary, the Triad's trade share increased by about 2 percentage points in
1980-1991, and the same applies to intra-EU trade.
In summary, the pattern of international trade has changed in a profound
way over approximately the last 10 years. First, trade in manufactures between
the most important industrialised countries further increased despite their rela-
tively similar factor endowments and per capita incomes; therefore, this kind of
trade is likely to be of an intra-industry type. Second, DCs from Asia have
emerged as competitive suppliers on world markets. This trend may spread to91
DCs in other regions, especially in Latin America, as many of them have em-
barked on economic reforms towards macroeconomic stability and trade liber-
alisation. As a result, a larger number of DCs may become integrated into
globalisation strategies of TNCs. It is open to question, however, whether the
resulting increase in trade will be of the more traditional inter-industry type
alone, or also of the intra-industry type.
b. Changes in the Pattern of International Specialisation
According to standard economic textbook reasoning, an exchange of goods be-
tween countries with different factor endowments is most likely to be of the in-
ter-industry type. By contrast, an increase in trade between countries with simi-
lar factor endowments is likely to be an exchange of differentiated goods that
fall into the same product category (intra-industry trade). In the literature, vari-
ous hypotheses are discussed that try to explain intra-industry trade.
12
3 Basi-
cally, preference diversity (product differentiation) and economies of scale are
taken to be necessary and sufficient conditions for the generation of intra-in-
dustry trade. In contrast to standardised products, trade in differentiated prod-
ucts requires accompanying information on the very characteristics of the prod-
ucts. This seems to point to countries with high per capita incomes as the main
players in intra-industry trade. Yet, as new technologies reduce the costs of in-
formation, globalisation strategies may cloud this clear-cut distinction. With
technology and financial capital increasingly becoming mobile, DCs will not
only be able to penetrate markets for standardised goods, but also for differen-
tiated goods including intermediate goods where industrialised countries should
possess a comparative advantage.
If so, the need for adjusting the production structure in industrialised coun-
tries is twofold: first towards upgrading the production structure in the case of
inter-industry competition, and second, towards more product differentiation in
the case of intra-industry competition. These adjustment pressures require a
high degree of flexibility to avoid welfare losses and unemployment (Chapter
VI). They will be felt most severely where trade expansion is mainly due to an
increase in inter-industry specialisation. An example is the increased competi-
tion from low-cost suppliers in standardised goods. Such competition will raise
the demand for protection of declining industries. Arguably, a move towards
protectionism in these sectors will shift part of the adjustment burden towards
sectors in which developed countries have comparative advantages. To circum-
vent existing or anticipated protectionistic practices of industrialised countries
For overviews, see, for example, Greenaway and Milner [1986] and Gray [1988].92
for certain~"sensitive" goods, DCs are more or less forced to compete on mar-
kets for more differentiated goods, which in turn is made possible by easier ac-
cess to financial capital and technology.
Especially Asian DCs may increase their engagement in intra-industry trade,
rather than exclusively relying on inter-industry specialisation. Globalisation
strategies of TNCs can reasonably be expected to foster this development As a
result, competition in relatively technology-intensive and human-capital-inten-
sive industries will increasingly occur in terms of the production costs of the
least mobile factor. Correspondingly, competitive parameters related to the
generation of differentiated products and the exploitation of scale economies
will lose in importance as they will become fairly ubiquitous.
Together with the increase in trade in manufactures between industrialised
countries, the growing role of Asian DCs should result in an overall increase of
intra-industry trade. An empirical identification of such a trend is fraught with
conceptual and statistical difficulties, though. The most popular concept to
measure intra-industry trade is the Grubel-Lloyd index [Grubel, Lloyd, 1975].
If exports of a certain product category equal imports of that category, the
Grubel-Lloyd index indicates 100 per cent intra-industry trade; and if either ex-
ports or imports equal zero, intra-industry trade does not exist, i.e., all trade is
net trade.
The problem with this index is that if the total trade of a country is not bal-
anced, the amount of intra-industry trade is underestimated. To adjust for the
trade imbalance effect, Aquino [1978] has suggested a modified index by as-
suming that the balancing effect is equiproportional to all categories consid-
ered. Although this assumption can be questioned in the context of highly
disaggregated analyses, for the present purpose of comparing rather broad
product categories the Aquino index seems to be better suited than the Grubel-
Lloyd index, and is, therefore, used in the following.
The identifying characteristic of intra-industry trade is two-way trade of
products that are produced with equal factor intensities. Practically, the actual
amount of intra-industry trade identified empirically depends on the chosen
level of aggregation. The higher the level of aggregation, the higher the risk
that intra-industry trade is overestimated, because within rather broadly defined
categories not all goods will be produced with equal factor intensities. For ex-
ample, inter-industry specialisation according to different factor intensities is
likely to occur within the 2-digit standard international trade classification
(SITC).
Even if the "true" amount of intra-industry trade is overestimated, there is
evidence that the ranking of countries and industries according to the intensity
of intra-industry trade is not very sensitive to the degree of industry disaggrega-93
tion [Greenaway, Hine, 1991].
12
4 Hence, at the 2-digit SITC level, the level of
intra-industry trade shown probably is too high, but changes in the share of in-
tra-industry trade may be adequately captured. The focus of this analysis is on
the changes of the share of intra-industry trade. Therefore, Aquino indices for
selected SITC categories have been computed
12
5 at this level of disaggregation
and compared with the results of previous estimates of intra-industry trade
given in the literature.
Greenaway and Hine [1991] have found that there was a general and sus-
tained increase in intra-industry trade among developed countries from 1970 to
1985. They measure intra-industry trade by the unweighted Grubel-Lloyd in-
dex for 28 manufacturing industries (SIC) of 22 OECD countries. The un-
weighted average index rose from 0.55 in 1970 to 0.59 in 1978 and 0.65 in
1985. This trend was broadly shared: 18 of the 22 countries increased intra-in-
dustry trade in 1970-78 and 19 in 1978-85. Taken as a whole, these findings
provide evidence against the proposition favoured by Globerman and Dean
[1990] that the expansion of intra-industry trade may have ended in the 1980s,
which would contradict the hypothesis of increasing effects of globalisation on
the pattern of international trade. The detailed results reported by Greenaway
and Hine [1991] show, however, that the increase in intra-industry trade was
much weaker in 1980-1985 than in the 1970s. Moreover, intra-industry trade
for Japan and the United States seems to have declined in the first half of the
1980s, at least when measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index.
The latter qualifications notwithstanding, the globalisation hypothesis can be
maintained. First, the first half of the 1980s was a period of exceptionally slow
growth of world trade. Since intra-industry trade results from a simultaneous
increase in exports and imports, a general slowdown of trade growth might be
expected to retard the expansion of intra-industry trade, too. Therefore, the
For the case of Korea, Kim [1992] shows that the 3-digit level is a fairly appropri-
ate level to measure the amount of intra-industry trade and that disaggregation be-
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The formula used to compute the Aquino index is given by ft
where JC,- and Mt are exports and imports of a given country in a specific product
category i. As the correcting device, X' = X,- • 1 / 2 £ (X,- + M,-) / £X-t and
M' = M,: • 1 / 2 S (X, + M,•)/ ZM; , i.e., the total multilateral trade imbalance,
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early 1980s were probably a very special period, which does not provide a rea-
sonable basis for comparison. Second, the Grubel-Lloyd index tends to give
downward biased results in case of trade imbalances. The early 1980s, which
witnessed increasing trade imbalances among the Triad, provide a case in
point. Applying the unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd index in such a situation results
in an underestimated amount of intra-industry trade as compared with a period
of balanced trade.
These considerations are largely confirmed by the results presented in Table
16. The share of intra-industry trade
12
6 for each member of the Triad is meas-
ured by Aquino indices. The index values should be interpreted in terms of
changes over time in the first place. Additional insights may gained from the
ranking between countries and between product categories within countries,
whereas the absolute values are distorted because of the high level of aggrega-
tion. Although no clear-cut picture emerges from the computation, some fea-
tures are worth mentioning.
Table 16 — The Triad's Share of Intra-industry Trade in Manufactures, Se-
lected Products, 1980-1992























































































































The EU displays the highest level of intra-industry trade, followed by the
United States and Japan. Japan has witnessed the strongest increase in intra-in-
12
6 SITC 5-8, excluding 68.95
dustry specialisation in percentage terms and reveals the highest standard de-
viation, i.e., the largest difference in the amount of intra-industry trade between
different product categories. The strong increase in intra-industry specialisation
points to an extremely successful integration of Japan into the international di-
vision of labour. Hence, Japan's strong per capita income growth comes as no
surprise. The increase of the Aquino index at a comparatively high level of
standard deviation indicates that the trend towards intra-industry specialisation
has not occurred across the board. More intra-industry specialisation seems to
be concentrated on a specific set of products, while inter-industry specialisation
apparently has continued in other product categories. There is a similar but less
accentuated picture for the United States. Surprisingly, however, the EU dis-
plays a comparatively high and almost constant level of intra-industry trade,
which is accompanied by a relatively low standard deviation.
Within manufactures, some distinct aspects with respect to globalisation of
markets and production can be identified, at least for Japan and the United
States. Globalisation strategies will affect intra-industry trade in different ways,
depending on the factor intensity of the industries or product categories consid-
ered. In physical-capital-intensive industries such as the chemical industry,
globalisation is likely to result in a considerable increase of intra-industry trade,
because production processes can be relatively easily relocated on an interna-
tional scale, which should result in an increase in trade intermediate products.
For instance, basic production processes can be transferred to low-cost loca-
tions, whereas research and development activities may remain at locations that
provide the necessary amount of human capital.
12
7 These properties explain
why such industries are increasingly engaged in intra-industry trade. Especially
in the chemical industry, they also explain the large sectoral FDI flows among
members of the Triad, which are seemingly directed at capturing R&D capaci-
ties.
Production and R&D activities are more closely interrelated in human-capi-
tal-intensive industries. Therefore, globalisation strategies in these industries
may have a tendency to substitute trade by overseas production, as seems to be
the case for Japanese FDI in car manufacturing (Section IV. 1). Such a strategy
would possibly amount to a decrease of intra-industry trade if measured at a
highly disaggregated level. However, no declining trend in intra-industry trade
can be observed for relatively human-capital-intensive product categories when
they are broadly defined as in Table 16:
12
8 for the United States, the share of
12
7 If these industries are also resource-intensive, there are some natural limits for a
further increase of intra-industry specialisation.
12
8 It should be noted that the 2-digit SITC category road vehicles as given in Table 16
includes, for example, motor vehicles for the transport of passengers, motor vehi-
cles for the transport of goods or materials, motor busses, tractors, motor cycles96
intra-industry trade has substantially increased for both office machines and
road vehicles; for Japan, the share of intra-industry trade in road vehicles has
more than doubled.
FDI has been the dominating instrument of globalisation in both human-
capital-intensive and physical-capital-intensive industries, though increasingly
complemented by non-equity forms of investment (Chapter IV). Intra-industry
trade is then likely to gain in prominence as long as FDI flows are not purely
motivated by protectionist trade measures of host countries. The positive corre-
lation between FDI and trade flows also supports this interpretation. By con-
trast, NEC figures prominently in the globalisation of labour-intensive indus-
tries such as clothing (Section IV.3). The effect on intra-industry trade remains
highly ambiguous under such conditions.
Globalisation will result in inter-industry specialisation, rather than in intra-
industry trade, if foreign subcontractors supply finished labour-intensive goods
in the first place. Japan's extremely low and declining shares of intra-industry
trade in labour-intensive industries are a case in point (Table 16). Subcontract-
ing was extensively used by trading companies (sogo shosha), which procure
finished goods rather than being engaged in intra-industry trade. Moreover,
subcontracting contributed to the replacement of Japanese clothing exports at
an early stage of globalisation, after such exports raised the resistance espe-
cially of US producers (Figure 12). EU countries represent the opposite ex-
treme. Countries such as Germany and Italy remain leading exporters of cloth-
ing.
12
9 Intra-industry trade was high for two reasons. Production and exports of
Italy and France moved into the higher quality/fashion segment of the industry,
while more standardised clothing products were imported. In Germany, off-
shore processing was of an overriding importance, which results in consider-
able intra-industry trade by its very nature.
The results for the EU suggest that, measured by Aquino indices, there was
not much change in the pattern of intra-industry trade in manufactures between
1980 and 1991. Hence, it may be tempting to argue that globalisation is less
relevant, and what matters for the EU is regionalisation and the pattern of intra-
EU trade. This impression is misleading, however. The example of clothing
provided a first indication to the contrary, and further insights may be gained
from a more disaggregated analysis of trade flows.
and the respective parts and components. By contrast, Section IV.l was confined to
passenger car manufacturing.
12
9 In 1991, Germany and Italy together accounted for about half of the EU exports of
clothing, which roughly equals one sixth of world exports (16 per cent). This is a
little bit higher than Hong Kong's share of world exports of clothing and more than
twice the share of South Korea. The United States accounted for about 2.5 per cent
of world exports of textiles [UN, b; d].97
Table 17 highlights intra- and extra-EU trade in manufactures. The structure
of EU trade with the rest of the world apparently does not fully match factor
endowments, but can at least partly be explained by the interplay of EU trade
policies and globalisation strategies. Relatively human-capital-intensive prod-
ucts increasingly dominate extra-EU imports, and trade in standardised
"sensitive" products is larger in absolute value in intra-EU trade than in extra-
EU imports. Intra-EU trade and extra-EU imports of manufactures have grown
faster than the volume of extra-EU exports, thereby providing opportunities for
competitive suppliers from third countries on the one hand and increasing com-
petitive pressures on EU markets for more differentiated goods on the other.





































































1986 and 1992 in per cent. — ^ntra-EU exports (fob).
Source: EUROSTAT [var. issues].
By and large, the share of extra-EU imports of manufactures in total EU
trade in manufactures remained constant between 1980 and 1992 (Table 18).
Most notably, there is no decline in the share of extra-EU imports of manufac-
tures despite the EU enlargement in 1986. Similar to the findings based on Ta-
ble 15, however, the relative stability of extra-EU import shares hides recent
changes in international competitiveness among external suppliers.98
Among extra-EU suppliers of manufactures, DCs as a whole have increased
their share since 1986. Correspondingly, the United States have lost their lead-
ing position as the largest extra-EU supplier of manufactures. Thus, not only
Japan but also DCs have established themselves as serious competitors on EU
markets during the last decade. Within manufactures, their largest relative gain
can be observed in the fastest growing segment: for relatively human-capital-
intensive products such as machinery and transport equipment This develop-
ment may have been indirectly supported by EU trade policies in "sensitive"
products, where market access for low-cost suppliers was restricted or de facto
prohibited. Differential factor endowments were denied their role as an engine
of trade, and as a consequence, DCs have been forced to focus on product cate-
gories with less restrictive market access. It is just in these relatively human-
capital-intensive product categories, where industrial countries were once
thought to possess a comparative advantage, that DCs, not least thanks to
globalisation strategies, are increasingly gaining market shares.
A further regional disaggregation of EU imports from DCs makes clear that
the most successful competitors in human-capital-intensive goods are located in
East Asia, with the Asian NIEs as frontrunners and China and Southeast Asia as
followers (Table 18). By contrast, suppliers from ACP-countries, South Asia
and Latin America have not been able to increase their import shares on EU
markets in this product category. Their exports to the EU mainly consist of
physical-capital-intensive and labour-intensive products, as well as agricultural
products. The recent return of Latin America as a major host of FDI flows may
change this picture in the future, when macroeconomic stabilisation and struc-
tural adjustment will have made the region internationally competitive. The
same reasoning may apply for South Asian countries and especially for India if
reforms are sustained.
Turning to the export side, the share of extra-EU exports in total EU exports
of manufactures declined between 1980 and 1992. At present, roughly 60 per
cent
13
0 of EU exports of manufactures remain within the EU (Table 19), up
from 50 per cent a decade ago. This indicates that the scope for further intensi-
fication of intra-EU trade is limited. This aspect should be borne in mind when
assessing future redirections of worldwide FDI flows towards the manufactur-
ing sector of the EU, for example, as a consequence of regional integration.
The fact that the bulk of EU exports is already directed to member countries
may constrain the Single Market effects to be realised through further intensifi-
cation of intra-EU trade, which might require additional FDI. This is another
13
0 This share is similar to the figure for the share of world trade in manufactures be-
tween all industrial countries (see Table 15).99









































































































































aPer cent of total EU imports. — ''Per cent of extra-EU imports.
EU definition. —
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Pakistan, Sri Lanka. — ^Indonesia,
Source: EUROSTAT [var. issues].100
Table 19 — The Regional Structure of Extra-EU Exports of Manufactures,
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Kong, Singapore, South
— ^Indonesia, Malaysia,
Source: EUROSTAT [var. issues].101
reason why globalisation strategies are unlikely to be given up by EU compa-
nies in favour of regionalisation strategies.
A further regional disaggregation of EU exports to DCs reveals striking dif-
ferences between subgroups of DCs (Table 19). EU exports of manufactures to
the ACP countries continuously declined in relative terms in 1980-1992, re-
flecting the deep economic crisis of most of these countries. By contrast, EU
exports to Asian NIEs and to Southeast Asia (and to Japan) continuously in-
creased during the same period, highlighting strong economic growth in this
region. Relative exports to South Asia and China increased in the first half of
the 1980s and fell moderately afterwards. The experience of Latin America
with respect to EU exports can be best described by relative stagnation.
Taken together, there is little empirical support for the hypothesis that an in-
crease in intra-EU trade will generally worsen the competitive position of DC
suppliers on EU (and home) markets. Although FDI growth and an increase in
intra-EU trade flows seem to go hand in hand, as is suggested by the empirical
results in Section V.I, this does not necessarily mean that firms within the EU
have gained a competitive edge. Both aspects may reflect protectionist threats
rather than improved productivity, thereby having no negative effect on extra-
EU suppliers on third markets and their attractiveness for equity capital. Even
if the productivity of European firms increases as a result of the Single Market
programme, suppliers from outside the EU who will be able to respond in a
flexible way do not have to fear an erosion of market shares or a loss of FDI in-
flows. Especially East Asian DCs have emerged as successful competitors in
recent years even in relatively human-capital-intensive product categories de-
spite an increase of FDI inflows to the EU and a substantial increase of intra-
EU trade. Hence, they are likely to play an important role in the globalisation
strategies of TNCs in the future as well.
c. Japan's Trade with Its Asian Neighbours
The increasing competitiveness of Asian DCs is also reflected in the develop-
ment of their trade in manufactures with Japan (Table 20). Almost all Aquino
indices computed for Japan's trade with its Asian neighbours are higher than
for Japan's total trade in manufactures (Table 16). The two exceptions are road
vehicles and clothing. Yet even for road vehicles, the increase in intra-industry
trade with Asian DCs during the last decade has been similar to the increase in
Japan's total intra-industry trade in this product category. Almost no intra-in-
dustry trade between Japan and Asian DCs exists in clothing. Contrary to its
overall trade surplus, Japan is running a large trade deficit in clothing with the
Asian DCs. Hence, Japan's trade structure with rapidly growing DCs is heading102
towards intra-industry specialisation in relatively physical and human-capital-
intensive goods, while inter-industry specialisation prevails in labour-intensive
product categories. While the former trend was also observed in the EU, the
latter observation contrasts sharply with the evidence for the EU.
Table 20 — Japan's Intra-industry Trade in Manufactures with Asian DCs
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An obvious reason for Japan's above average share of intra-industry trade in
manufactures with Asian DCs is lower transportation costs compared with other
locations. Still, there must be more to it because Asian DCs have very different
factor endowments and demand structures than Japan, as can be concluded
from the relatively large differences in per capita incomes. The globalisation
hypothesis helps to fill this gap. The international fragmentation of production
processes of differentiated goods requires foreign investors to maintain a cer-
tain degree of control (see also Section III.l). Therefore, FDI is the preferred
mode of globalisation in human and physical-capital-intensive industries. A si-
multaneous increase of intra-industry trade is then likely to occur. By contrast,
NEC dominates in industries with highly standardised production processes.
Transaction and information costs are relatively low, and control by foreign in-
vestors is required less urgently. The emerging trade patterns may then be of
the intra-industry type or of the more traditional inter-industry type, depending
on the specific globalisation strategies pursued. For instance, in the EU, pro-
duction processes were internationally fragmented in labour-intensive indus-103
tries as well. Japan followed a different development. Production in labour-in-
tensive industries was relocated as a whole. As a result, an intra-industry spe-
cialisation in labour-intensive industries emerged in the case of the EU, while
Japan reveals an inter-industry specialisation.
3. From Intra-industry to Intra-Firm Trade?
13
1
Besides FDI and intra-industry trade, intra-firm trade is an integral part of the
process of globalisation of economic activities. Intra-firm trade can best be un-
derstood as basically reflecting integration of vertically linked activities within
a firm across national borders [Sleuwaegen, Yamawaki, 1991]. When upstream
and downstream activities are optimally located in different countries, vertical
integration can be expected to lead to the development of TNCs. Following this
line of reasoning, five basic motives for vertical integration are described in the
literature:
13
2 optimal appropriation of quasi rents from the exploitation of firm-
specific assets, avoiding incomplete contracts, eliminating abuse of sequential
and discriminatory market power, obtaining implicit insurance and minimising
transaction costs. Typically, these motives occur in technology-intensive and
human-capital-intensive industries, where transactions are related to the han-
dling of intangible assets or complex differentiated goods and services.
Apart from possible market imperfections that give rise to the development
of TNCs especially in technology-intensive and human-capital-intensive indus-
tries, there also exist a number of government created imperfections that en-
courage vertical integration, such as international differences in tax rates and
tariffs, licensing or investment regulations and local content rules, or interna-
tional differences in the macroeconomic environment created by diverging na-
tional economic policies. TNCs can exploit or circumvent these international
differences by intra-firm trade with transfer prices differing from arm's length
trade prices. As a consequence, intra-firm trade strategies by TNCs may lead to
trade behaviour different from market transactions between independent firms.
Market imperfections, government interventions and high transaction costs
provide incentives for the replacement of market transactions by internal trans-
actions within TNCs. Intra-firm trade opens up the possibility to derive benefits
from savings in transaction costs and a freer flow of information within an or-
ganisation than across markets. These potential benefits have generated the
13
1 This section heavily draws on Bonturi, Fukasaku [1993a; 1993b].
13
2 See, for example, Blair, Kaserman [1983].104
practise of production sharing, i.e., letting parent and subsidiaries in each coun-
try contribute to the final product according to the different cost structures in
the countries in which they are located. As a result, such a combinatory method
of manufacturing could be expected to increase the amount of intra-firm trade.
However, the recent increase in globalisation highlighted by soaring FDI
flows is not a sufficient condition for an increase in intra-firm trade. Declining
transaction and information costs and a more stable macroeconomic environ-
ment, which drive globalisation in the first place, may actually reduce the in-
centives for intra-firm trade, as natural and government created market imper-
fections lose in importance. Put differently, an increase in intra-firm trade is
more likely under the conditions of macroeconomic instability,
13
3 or as a re-
sponse to government interventions attempting to regulate TNC investment and
trade operations. The rising importance of NEC as compared with FDI (Chapter
III) is also a reason for globalisation proceeding without an increase in intra-
firm trade, since trade resulting from non-equity forms of investment coopera-
tion will be identified as arm's length trade. Hence, it is not self-evident that
the trend towards globalisation necessarily implies a trend towards intra-firm
trade. Notwithstanding, various aspects of globalisation strategies discussed so
far should show up in the structure of trade between parent companies and their
affiliates.
Up to now, relatively little is known about the empirical relevance of intra-
firm trade, however. The simple reason is that most international trade statistics
do not distinguish between intra-firm trade and arm's length trade. The avail-
able empirical evidence on intra-firm trade is confined to firm survey data for
the United States and Japan. These data have been summarised and interpreted





3 As an example, intra-firm trade seems to be less responsive to exchange rate
movements than arm's length trade, as can be seen from the experience of US-
based TNCs during the last decade. Despite the strong changes in the real exchange
rate of the dollar, the share of US-based TNCs' transactions with their foreign af-
filiates in total US merchandise trade was relative stabile over the whole period.
By contrast, their trade with non-affiliated foreigners showed a relative decline
during a strong dollar period (1982—1985) and a moderate recovering as the dollar
weakened [Bonturi, Fukasaku, 1993a].
13
4 In these studies, in both Japan and the United States, a company is defined as an
affiliate if the "parent" company owns 10 per cent or more of its voting stock. If
the parent company owns more than 50 per cent of the voting stock, the affiliate
company is considered a subsidiary of the parent company, and called a majority-
owned affiliate (MOFA). Notwithstanding, in the following text the terms affiliate
and subsidiary are used interchangeably.105
Exports and imports of TNCs have a large weight in international trade. US
data indicate that some 80 per cent of the country's external trade (exports to
imports) was undertaken by TNCs in 1989, including parent TNCs based in the
United States, their affiliates located in foreign countries, and affiliates of for-
eign TNCs located in the United States [UNCTC, e]. Not all of the trade asso-
ciated with TNCs is intra-firm trade, however. For TNCs based in the United
States, the United Kingdom and Japan, intra-firm trade is less important than
trade with non-affiliated companies. For example, intra-firm exports associated
with all TNCs, i.e., exports of parents and foreign owned affiliates together, ac-
counted for about one-third of total trade in these countries in 1985
[Sleuwaegen, Yamawaki, 1991].
Table 21 shows that in the case of the United States, the share of intra-firm
exports and the share of intra-firm imports in total trade were roughly stable be-
tween 1977 and 1989. Hence, the overall share of intra-firm trade did not in-
crease between 1977 and 1989, despite the undeniable trend towards globalisa-
tion. The fairly stable intra-firm import share disguises two diverging develop-
ments, though. Imports by affiliates located in the United States from their for-
eign parents increased by almost 6 percentage points between 1977 and 1989,
while the imports of US parents from their foreign affiliates declined.


















































and their foreign non-bank
— °In per cent of total US merchandise exports. —
 cIn per cent of
total US merchandise imports.
Source: Based on Bonturi, Fukasaku [1993a; 1993b].
Most of the increase in purchases of affiliates located in the United States
from their foreign parents was attributable to increased economic activity by
firms from Japan and "other countries" (Figure 15), where the latter mainly re-106
fleets purchases from South Korean parents. Figure 15 shows how the structure
of intra-firm imports of affiliates in the US changed over time: the share of Ca-
nadian and European parents declined, and the share of Japanese and "other"
(Korean) parents rose. This change in the regional structure of intra-firm im-
ports by foreign-owned affiliates in the United States mirrors the increased
competitiveness of Asian suppliers in a number of industries that are especially
relevant for intra-firm trade, as can be highlighted by a comparison of US and
Japanese intra-firm trade data.
Figure 15 — Intra-Firm Imports of TNC Affiliates in the United States, by
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Total intra-firm imports by foreign affiliates located in the United States equal 100 per
cent.
Source: Based on Bonturi, Fukasaku [1993a].
In the case of Japan, the coverage of the firm survey data is limited, both
across firms and over time. Therefore, the Japanese data are not fully compara-
ble with the US data. Notwithstanding, some discrepancies are worth mention-
ing. Figure 16 shows the sectoral structure of intra-firm exports and imports of
parent firms based in the United States and in Japan. US-based TNCs (parents)
almost exclusively focus on intra-firm exports and imports of manufactures,
while wholesale trade activities account for no more than 10 per cent of their
exports and imports to and from affiliates in foreign countries. By contrast,
Japanese parents exhibit a more balanced structure of their intra-firm exports
and a reverse structure of their intra-firm imports: wholesale trade activities ac-
count for more than two thirds of the intra-firm imports of Japanese parents.
Bonturi and Fukasaku [1993b] argue that the large percentage share of whole-107
sale trade of Japanese TNCs reflects the significance of corporate networks es-
tablished by Japanese trading firms, which are both an intermediary and an or-
ganiser of global chains of production and marketing operations (see Section
IV.3 on textiles). Their major task is to handle various primary commodities
and manufactured goods usually produced by small and medium-sized firms in
various industries at home and abroad.
Figure 16 — The Sectoral Structure of Intra-Firm Trade





















"Sectoral exports and imports of parents based in the United States and Japan to and
from their foreign affiliates; in per cent of total trade between parents and affiliates.
Source: Based on Bonturi, Fukasaku [1993a; 1993b].
Taking a somewhat broader look at the sectoral structure of TNC trade, Ta-
ble 22 reveals that intra-firm trade as compared with arm's length trade in both
the United States and Japan focuses on relatively technology-intensive and hu-
man-capital-intensive industries such as electrical and non-electrical machinery
and transport equipment. In these industries, the intra-firm trade ratios, i.e., the108
trade between parents and affiliates as a share of total trade of parents, are gen-
erally much higher than in physical- and labour-intensive industries, with ex-
ports of US-based TNCs in the chemical industry being an exception.
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Source: Based on Bonturi, Fukasaku [1993a].
This finding supports the earlier hypothesis that globalisation strategies may
follow alternative approaches: FDI and the ensuing intra-firm trade dominate in
relatively human-capital-intensive industries, where the international fragmen-
tation of the production process very often requires the handling of firm-spe-
cific assets such as basic R&D. The coordination of such transactions may be
achieved more easily within an organisation than across markets. All other
things being equal, FDI flows and intra-firm trade flows seem to be less useful
in the case of less complex activities, which are typical for relatively labour-in-
tensive industries, where non-equity forms of international investment coopera-
tion prevail.
The major difference between TNCs based in the United States and in Japan
is that for US parents the intra-firm import ratio is higher than the export ratio,
whereas for Japanese parents, the intra-firm export ratio is higher than the im-
port ratio. While US parent firms seem to rely more heavily on global sourcing
from their affiliates, Japanese parent firms apparently tend to export parts,109
components and services to their affiliates for final assembly and marketing.
Whether this finding can be interpreted as reflecting a somewhat more ad-
vanced stage of globalisation of US-based TNCs or the reaction of Japanese
TNCs to protectionistic measures in host countries, is an open question.
Changing the perspective from the trade pattern of parent firms to the trade
pattern of affiliates of foreign-owned parents located in the United States
13
5 re-
veals that most of their intra-firm imports and exports are related to wholesale
trade activities (Figure 17). A large fraction of these wholesale trade activities
is attributable to the distribution of motor vehicles and equipment by Japanese
and Korean TNCs. Manufacturing activities account for no more than about
one-sixth of total intra-firm sales from foreign parents to US affiliates. This
trade pattern reflects that intra-firm trade in the United States tends to concen-
trate on industries that produce complex manufactures requiring after-sales
services. As a consequence, these products are mainly marketed through
wholesale subsidiaries of foreign TNCs.
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aMerchandise trade associated with non-bank affiliates located in the United States. —
"Imports shipped to affiliates located in the United States by their foreign parents. —
cExports shipped by affiliates located in the United States to their foreign parents.
Source: Based on Bonturi, Fukasaku [1993a].
Comparable data for the trade pattern of affiliates of TNCs in other countries than
the United States are currently not available.110
Summarising, the case of the United States reveals that intra-firm trade
amounts to a substantial fraction of total merchandise trade and is highly con-
centrated in relatively human-capital intensive industries like machinery and
transport equipment FDI in wholesale trade and distributional services seems
to be an important precondition for the promotion of intra-firm trade, as is
shown by the trade pattern of affiliates of foreign parents, notably affiliates of
Japanese and Korean TNCs located in the United States. The positive correla-
tion between bilateral trade and FDI flows discussed in Section V.I also fits
into this picture. Generally increasing FDI flows do not necessarily imply gen-
erally increasing intra-firm trade, however. In many industries, the internation-
alisation of markets and production can be expected to proceed through arm's
length trade as well, as long as the macroeconomic environment remains fairly
stable, information and transaction costs decline due to technology improve-
ments, and economic policies, especially in DCs, are changed in favour of
openness and become more reliable.
As a rough guideline, three distinct cases can be considered. For highly
complex manufactures, globalisation strategies are likely to require substantial
FDI and intra-firm trade flows. For less complex manufactures, globalisation
strategies seem to result in an intra-industry specialisation, leaving open the ac-
tual form of international investment cooperation. Depending on the form of
investment cooperation actually chosen, the resulting trade flows are likely to
be identified as intra-firm trade in the case of FDI and inter-firm trade in the
case of NEC. For fairly standardised products, globalisation strategies are ap-
parently based on non-equity forms of international investment cooperation.
Therefore, the resulting trade flows are most likely to be of the inter-firm type,
leaving open the specific kind of industry specialisation in the pattern of trade.
Still, there is a common theme for all different globalisation strategies. In a
world economy heading towards integration of factor and goods markets, the
relative wage of the least mobile and least qualified factor of production, i.e.,
low-skilled labour, will tend to decline. At least this is what standard trade the-
ory would predict: an increase in the international division of labour between
countries with different per capita incomes tends to reduce the wage of the rela-
tively scarce factor in the rich countries, because globalisation increases its
worldwide supply.Ill
VI. Globalisation and Relative Wages in Advanced
Countries
Globalisation of production and markets implies an increase in the international
division of labour, which is welfare-improving through a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources. This means that in many countries, new opportunities for
production and employment emerge, enabling incomes to rise and standards of
living to increase. Yet, a more efficient allocation of resources requires struc-
tural change. Producers in the United States and the EU increasingly face inter-
national competition from two sources: from low-cost labour areas and from
Japan, which has taken the technological lead in many product categories in re-
cent years. Hence, competition within the Triad has intensified in a direct way
because of technological catching-up and overtaking by Japan, and in an indi-
rect way because of emerging highly flexible and productive suppliers in East
and Southeast Asia.
Differences in the speed of adjustment to changing world market conditions
and in the capability to generate and apply new technologies have produced
competitive pressures especially for the laggards within the Triad. At the same
time, more competition has opened up new possibilities to expand international
market shares and to exploit market niches. As a consequence, firms have been
forced to implement globalisation strategies. Booming international investment
cooperation has been the result.
As was shown in the preceding chapters, the Triad continues to account for
the bulk of trade and FDI flows. However, the relatively small amount of inter-
national trade and capital flows that is accounted for by transactions between
the Triad and DCs should not falsely be taken as indicating that their effect on
the need for structural adjustment in advanced countries is small. As will be
shown below, what matters most with respect to adjustment needs is whether
relative prices for internationally traded goods have changed because of chang-
ing factor supplies on world markets. Even relatively small trade and capital
flows between high- and low-cost areas may have a large effect since they
force established suppliers to reduce production costs or to increase productiv-
ity in order to remain competitive. In the age of globalisation, this not only
holds for standardised products, but for intermediate and differentiated products
as well.
Despite the overall positive welfare effects of globalisation, it is possible
that the gains from a more integrated world economy will not be distributed to
all factors of production at equal amounts; some parties may actually lose. This112
issue is important, not only from an economic point of view, because many
people fear that an increase in competition through globalisation will erode the
quality of social security systems, public education and health care, as well as
the quality of their working conditions [van Liemt, 1992]. Therefore, people in
countries with a high standard of living are concerned about how the larger
competitive forces of the world economy will affect them, and how they can
best react to the emerging challenges.
During approximately the last decade, European economies increasingly
have noticed the need to reform their labour markets towards more flexibility,
whereas a high degree of flexibility in the United States seems to have resulted
in stagnant or even declining standards of living. At present, it is an open ques-
tion whether these outcomes are a consequence of the advancing globalisation
of production and markets, or would have occurred in any case due to slow pro-
ductivity growth and labour-saving technological change.
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6 To come to grips
with this issue, we first look at the empirical record of labour markets, which
substantially differs among the members of the Triad. Second, the globalisation
hypothesis is scrutinised with respect to its conceptional backbone. It turns out
that the globalisation hypothesis would provide at least a partial explanation of
the labour market problems that most advanced countries are confronted with if
there is empirical support for a declining relative price of low-skilled labour-in-
tensive goods.
1. Globalisation, Convergence and Labour Markets
The surge in international investment (Chapters II and III) and increasing inter-
national trade flows (Chapter V) during the last decade have resulted in a ten-
dency towards convergence of output, physical capital and human capital
among major players in the world economy (Figure 18). Especially Japan dis-
plays a remarkable record in terms of output per capita and physical capital per
worker, where it has even surpassed the US level by more than 50 per cent.
Still, per capita incomes in the world economy are far away from being equal-
ised. The differences between leading industrialised countries and even the
most advanced Asian DCs remain considerable, not to speak of countries such
So far, the current debate almost exclusively focuses on the US experience. See,
for example, Learner [1992] and Murphy and Welch [1991] vs. Lawrence and
Slaughter [1993] and Krugman and Lawrence [1994] for opposing views on the
role of globalisation for actual labour market outcomes in the United States.des Institute fur Weltwirtschaft
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 bUnited States=10O. —
 cReal
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Thailand. — ^Average years of schooling.
Source: Barro, Lee [1993]; Summers, Heston [1991]; own calculations.114




This is why Figure 18 can also be interpreted as presenting glimpses of the
challenges especially for the EU and the United States that lie ahead. Differ-
ences in capital intensities between advanced countries and large international
differences in per capita incomes provide strong incentives for further globali-
sation. This process is likely to gain momentum as more and more DCs emerge
as attractive locations for production and as competitive suppliers on world
markets. Particularly the improved educational attainment of the labour force in
many Asian DCs seems to be responsible for the increasing international com-
petitiveness of these countries in many product categories (Table 18). As many
DCs currently embark on economic reforms, these competitive pressures can be
expected to increase in the future.
Increasing trade flows and international competition for risk capital were al-
ready a stylised feature of the 1980s. What is remarkable in this respect is that
major players in the world economy experienced very different labour market
outcomes. Figure 19 shows changes in employment and unemployment for se-
lected advanced countries between 1979 and 1990.
13
8 The contrast between
France and Germany,
13
9 on the one hand, and Japan and the United States, on
the other hand, is striking. In Europe, unemployment rose sharply, while em-
ployment remained unchanged or fell. In Japan and the United States, employ-
ment rose, and unemployment remained unchanged or even slightly declined.
At first sight, these diverging trends seem to be incompatible with a general
tendency towards globalisation, since all major players should have been con-
fronted with comparable adjustment pressure.
It has to be noted, however, that although Japan has caught up with Europe
and the United States only very recently,
14
0 capital per worker is much higher
than in most other advanced countries. As a result, Japanese firms achieved
technological leadership in certain areas. Moreover, Japan's pattern of speciali-
sation in the international division of labour seems to better suit factor endow-
ments than the patterns of its major rivals (Table 16). Hence, Japan can be
13' According to recent World Bank estimates, GDP per capita in China reached 7.6
per cent and in India 5.2 per cent of the US level in 1991 [World Bank, 1993].
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8 This period has been chosen in order to compare two years that represent similar
stages of the international business cycle.
13
9 Comparable data for other European economies are not available from OECD
sources.
14
0 For example, output per capita in Japan only reached half of the level of France
and Germany in 1960. Until 1980, Japan's output per capita improved to about 85
per cent of the level of France and Germany [Summers, Heston, 1991].115
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a1979=100. — "Average hours actually worked per person per year times dependent
employment. — Percentage of the labour force. —"No change in the rate of unem-
ployment.
Source: OECD [b].
expected to cope more successfully than Europe and the United States with the
challenges raised by globalisation. Notwithstanding, some European economies
and the United States provide examples for the most pronounced differences in
labour market outcomes.
Figure 20 further adds to this puzzling picture by depicting at changes in the
structure of unemployment with respect to skill levels. Since internationally
comparable statistics on unemployment by skill levels are not readily available,
one is confined to use proxies in order to identify shifts in the share of skilled
and unskilled workers in total unemployment. As a general rule, it can be main-
tained that the bulk of low-skilled workers in advanced countries is relatively
young and runs a higher probability to remain unemployed than skilled work-
ers. Hence, changes in youth unemployment and long-term unemployment can
be used as a rough indicator of changes in the unemployment of low-skilled
workers. Differences among the members of the Triad are striking again. Long-
term unemployment and youth unemployment have increased much faster in
Europe than in Japan, where it started from extremely low levels, and in the
United States, where the youth unemployment rate actually fell. So the ques-
tion arises why increasing unemployment of low-skilled workers has been
avoided in Japan and the United States.116











aAs a percentage of total unemployment; unemployed for at least 12 months. —
b1979=100. —
cFrance, Germany, Japan: age 15-24; Italy: age 14-24; United
Kingdom, United States: age 16-24. — Changes in the youth unemployment rate are
not available because of a break in the series.
Source: OECD [b].
A recent OECD study [OECD, b, 1993] provides internationally comparable
empirical evidence, which can be read as providing just the complementary
story to the unemployment puzzle. Consider that the higher end of the earnings
distribution within an economy represents the wages of high-skilled workers
and the lower end the wages of low-skilled workers. If so, changes in the over-
all distribution of earnings relative to the mean can be approximately translated
into changes of the wages of high-skilled workers relative to the wages of low-
skilled workers. Hence, Figure 21 suggests that in European economies, except
in the United Kingdom, the wage of low-skilled workers did not decline rela-
tive to the wage of high-skilled workers during the 1980s; in Germany and in
France, it actually improved. By contrast, in Japan and particularly in the
United States, the wage gap increased. By and large, unemployment of low-
skilled workers rose more slowly or even declined in countries where the dis-
persion of wages for different skill groups has substantially widened. In this re-
spect, the experience of the United Kingdom is more similar to that of the
United States than to other European countries. Therefore, rising unemploy-
ment, especially rising unemployment of low-skilled workers, seems to be the
price that has to be paid for insufficient relative wage flexibility.117
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Source: OECD [b, 1993].
The finding that there was a large increase in earnings differentials in the
United States is not a result of the specific measurement applied in Figure 21,
namely the change in the overall earnings distribution relative to the mean.
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For example, Bound and Johnson [1992] found that the ratio of the average
wage of a college graduate to the average wage of a high school graduate rose
by 15 per cent between 1979 and 1988. Lawrence and Slaughter [1993] calcu-
lated that in US manufacturing, the ratio of mean annual wages of non-produc-
tion workers to production workers rose by nearly 10 per cent between 1979
and 1989. Using micro-data, Davis [1992] estimated that between 1979 and
1987, the ratio of weakly earnings of males in their forties to weakly earnings
of males in their twenties rose by 25 per cent. For France, however, he found
that the earnings distribution remained remakable stable in the 1980s.
Taken together, advanced countries seem to have faced fairly similar labour
market problems, but have reacted differently. Low-skilled labour has obvi-
ously lost in terms of competitiveness. In Europe, the result was rising unem-
ployment and a basically unchanged wage dispersion (except for the United
Kingdom). In Japan and especially in the United States, the wages for low-
skilled workers have substantially declined relative to wages for skilled work-
14
1 For a brief discussion of the distinction between skilled and unskilled workers and
their empirical identification, see Lawrence, Slaughter [1993].118
ers but the rate of unemployment has remained unchanged by and large. While
these empirical facts are largely undisputed, there is no consensus as to how to
explain them. Obviously, at least part of the widening of wage differentials in
Japan and the United States and of the rising unemployment in the EU can be
attributed to a slowdown of the growth of skilled labour relative to increasing
demand. Yet, such a reasoning fails to account for the sources of the relative
growth in this demand. The most plausible explanations are increasing interna-
tional competition as a result of globalisation or unskilled labour-saving tech-
nological change, which would have occurred even in the absence of globalisa-
tion.
2. Globalisation and Structural Change
The hypothesis favoured throughout this study is that globalisation implies a
trend towards factor price equalisation. The two direct avenues to achieve fac-
tor price equalisation are labour migration from poor to rich countries, which
influences labour supply, and capital flows from rich to poor countries, which
influence labour demand. Quantitatively, the latter seems to be more relevant,
as is indicated by soaring international FDI flows and sharp restrictions on im-
migration in most advanced countries.
Notwithstanding, physical capital mobility between countries with different
per capita incomes is surprisingly low, as can be seen from their respective
trade balances, which mirror net physical capital flows [Lucas, 1990]. More-
over, more than 60 per cent of world trade and capital flows occur between
countries with fairly similar factor endowments (Table 15). Hence, the ob-
served pressure on relative wages in advanced countries that can be explained
directly by capital mobility does not seem to be overwhelmingly large at first
sight.
A more complex explanation for changes in the demand for labour rests on
shifts in the composition of the production structure, namely a shift towards la-
bour-intensive industries in low-wage countries and towards physical and hu-
man-capital-intensive industries in high-wage countries. The famous factor
price equalisation theorem of the standard trade theory is solely based on this
indirect avenue. It establishes the conditions under which changes in the pro-
duction structure would suffice to result in an international equalisation of
wages. Hence in theory, factor price equalisation can occur through balanced
trade, i.e., without making necessary net physical capital flows from rich to
poor countries.119
Under the conditions of globalisation such tendencies will be fortified.
Lower transaction and information costs allow for an international fragmenta-
tion of production. New technologies, the general availability of complemen-
tary financial services and booming international investment cooperation con-
tribute to the mobility of specific parts or of the complete production process
itself. This increased mobility is likely to destroy the natural protection for the
least mobile factors of production that may have existed because of possible
technological complementarities between skilled and unskilled workers in ad-
vanced countries. High-skilled workers in advanced countries benefit from the
integration of the world's labour market under globalisation, since they face
relatively fewer foreign competitors. But low-skilled workers face an almost
perfectly elastic supply of low-paid competitors around the world. Hence, a
possible consequence of globalisation is that low skilled workers are confronted
with a higher risk of being unemployed, or a relative decline in their wage.
Obviously, the real world is different from a model world where full factor
price equalisation is the predicted outcome. Trade barriers and restrictions on
international investment cooperation exist along threatened governmental
measures that tend to reduce the potential volume of international transactions,
too, not to mention country-specific factors like language barriers that hinder
globalisation, or high transaction costs and exchange rate volatility. However,
the 1980s were a decade where many of these factors lost in prominence. Full
factor price equalisation should of course not be taken as an accurate prediction
of the consequences of globalisation. But it can and should be applied as a
guiding principle for the analysis of the relation between relative wages and
globalisation in advanced countries.
This kind of reasoning is supported by the empirical evidence for the labour
market (Figures 19 to 21), and by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem [Stolper,
Samuelson, 1941], which can be applied in the context of globalisation as well.
The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem says that international trade between coun-
tries with different factor endowments will tend to reduce, in each country, the
real income of the relatively scarce factor of production. In industrial countries,
low-skilled labour is relatively scarce compared with capital and skilled labour.
If production can be fragmented and relocated piece by piece to the most at-
tractive locations because of high financial capital mobility and declining
transaction and information costs, the competitive pressures towards factor
price equalisation will work, i.e., wages for similar qualifications in different
locations will tend to converge. For such an outcome to be welfare-improving,
a substantial structural change and flexible labour markets are required in in-
dustrial countries to avoid unemployment. In this respect, the effects of trade
and globalisation are indistinguishable. Globalisation, however, tends to am-
plify the adjustment pressures that would result from international trade alone.120
We have outlined the theoretical framework underlying this interpretation in
a simple diagram (Figure 22).
14
2 The axes denote quantities of capital (physical
and human) and labour (unskilled). The right angles represent the so-called unit
value isoquants, i.e., combinations of capital and labour that are required to
produce, say, one dollar's worth of output.
14
3 The unit value isoquants are
drawn for three different sectors: automobiles, which uses human and physical
capital relatively intensively; textiles, with an intermediate degree of capital in-
tensity; and clothing, which clearly is the most labour-intensive industry in this
illustrative example.
Figure 22 — Hypothetical Effects of Globalisation on the Structure of Produc-
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Source: Based on Learner [1992].
The following paragraphs heavily draw on Learner [1992].
'
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3 The isoquants are drawn with right angles to indicate that the ratio of capital to la-
bour is assumed to be technologically fixed. This assumption is immaterial for the
qualitative results derived below.121
The figure also displays two unit isocost lines, which represent combinations
of capital and labour that cost just one dollar to employ. It turns out that the
wage for (unskilled) labour is given by the inverse of the intersection of the
isocost line with the labour axis.
14
4
In the initial situation, the isocost line is drawn tangential to the unit value
isoquants of all three sectors. If this line falls below of one of the unit value
isoquants, the costs of production in this industry exceed the value of the output
and hence, no output would be produced. By contrast, if the isocost line crosses
a unit isoquant, production costs are lower than the value of output in this in-
dustry and hence, excess profits attract a resource inflow thereby either raising
the factor prices or reducing the product prices so that finally the tangency
condition is restored.
The effect of globalisation for advanced countries can be demonstrated by an
outward shift of the unit value isoquants for textiles and clothing. Globalisation
means first of all an increase in the worldwide supply of a relatively low-skilled
workforce and second, the general availability of relatively ubiquitous tech-
nologies. According to the Rybczynsky Theorem [Rybczynsky, 1955], this
should lead to an increase in the supply of low-skilled labour-intensive goods
and of goods that can be produced with standardised technologies. In turn, this
increase in supply should reduce the relative price of such goods. A declining
product price implies an increase in quantities of inputs to keep the unit value
constant, and, therefore, the outward shift of the unit value isoquants. From the
point of view of advanced countries, this shift will be strongest where the un-
derlying supply effects can be expected to have the strongest effect on the rela-
tive product prices.
In the diagram, we have assumed the strongest shift in relative prices for
clothing, which is the most low-skilled labour-intensive industry. The new
theoretical equilibrium is given by a new isocost curve, which is only tangen-
tial to automobiles and textiles. Hence, according to the diagram, the advanced
countries would not produce clothing any longer and instead specialise on the
more human and physical-capital-intensive production of automobiles and tex-
tiles. However, the new equilibrium implies a reduced wage for unskilled la-
bour, relative to the factor reward for human and physical capital. This is indi-
cated by the new intersection of the isocost line with the labour axis at 1 / w*.
The upshot of all this is that the wage for unskilled labour will tend to fall if
globalisation reduces product prices in the labour-intensive industries relative
14
4 The equation for the isocost line reads 1 = wL + rK , where W is the wage for un-
skilled labour L and r is the factor reward for physical and human capital K. At
the intersection of the isocost line with the labour axis, K equals zero. Therefore,
L = l/w at this point.122
to the prices in the capital-intensive industries. Hence, low-skilled workers in
advanced countries would be worse off under globalisation than under nation-
ally segmented production and markets.
Some of the assumptions underlying this purely theoretical argumentation
are that (i) international prices of the products are given, (ii) the advanced
countries' factor supplies actually are in the high-wage cone and (iii) DCs,
which are labour-rich, are in the low-wage cone. In the absence of any barriers
that hinder international transactions, there would be no output of low-skilled
labour-intensive goods in advanced countries, and, correspondingly, no output
of human-capital-intensive goods in DCs. Yet, the theoretical framework is
only meant to establish a tendency. In reality transport costs, temporary
economies of scale and immobile inputs contribute to maintaining an industry
structure that would be obsolete otherwise. The message from the theory we
want to stress is that, in the presence of globalisation, there are economic forces
that push for moving the production of low-skilled labour-intensive final and
intermediate goods to DCs, with the consequence of widening the wage gap be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers in advanced countries. The question is
whether the empirical evidence confirms such a prediction beyond the pre-
sented labour market data, and if so, how strong these forces actually are. Put
differently, we are looking for evidence on changes in relative prices that are
associated with a loss of comparative advantage in low-skilled labour-intensive
industries in advanced countries.
3. Empirical Evidence on Stolper-Samuelson
So far, surprisingly few recent empirical studies have taken explicit recourse to
the outlined theoretical framework to analyse the relation between globalisation
and relative wages. Instead, some studies that take into account international
aspects focus on trade volumes and trade deficits, but not on relative price
changes.
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5 The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem suggests that even if trade flows
are small, changes in the prices of traded goods could have large effects on the
prices of domestic substitutes, and thus on wages [Lawrence, Slaughter, 1993].
Domestic suppliers may indeed be able to defend their market shares against
foreign competitors even after a fall in their product prices if domestic wages
are flexible enough. But such an outcome should not obscure that international
competition has brought about the change in relative wages despite apparently
14
5 See, for example, Borjas et al. [1991].123
small trade flows. Therefore, it is not trade volumes nor trade deficits, but rela-
tive price changes that are the critical intervening variable in the chain of cau-
sation from globalisation to relative wages.
Two studies that explicitly consider Stolper-Samuelson effects differ with
respect to the empirical facts about changes in relative prices of low-skilled la-
bour-intensive goods. Learner [1992] argues that the data for the United States
offer substantial support for the simple model of wage equalisation suggested
by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. He found that compared with the average
price increase between 1972 and 1985, the relative price of clothing fell by
about 44 per cent, and the relative price of textiles fell by about 22 per cent.
This is in line with the assumed shift of the unit value isoquants for clothing
and textiles in Figure 22, and therefore, supports the hypothesis that interna-
tional competition is at least partly responsible for the observed changes in
relative wages in the United States.
Lawrence and Slaughter [1993] disagree.
14
6 According to their empirical re-
sults, there is no evidence that the relative price of goods that use low-skilled
labour relatively intensively has declined. However, they do not present direct
empirical evidence on relative price changes during the 1980s. Instead, their
findings are based on a presumed cross-industry correlation between relative
price changes and the relation of skilled to unskilled workers. The outcome of
this exercise is that they do not detect a statistically robust positive correlation
between relative price changes and factor intensities at various levels of indus-
try disaggregation. Moreover, they argue that the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
would predict a decline in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers as a conse-
quence of the hypothesised price and wage effects of globalisation. Actually, an
upgrading of the manufacturing labour force can be observed in the United
States during the 1980s despite a rising relative wage for skilled workers.
Therefore, Lawrence and Slaughter concluded that US price, wage and em-
ployment data suggest that the Stolper-Samuelson process "did not have much
influence on America's relative wages in the 1980's" [ibid., p. 28], i.e., globali-
sation does not seem to matter that much for observed labour market outcomes
in the United States.
Yet this reasoning is open to debate, with respect to the theoretical back-
ground and the empirics. While it is true that, all other things being equal, the
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts a fall in factor intensities due to declining
relative wages for low-skilled workers, it is not clear whether this result carries
over to reality where technology constantly improves. For example, a recent
study for the United States by Berman et al. [1993] suggested that unskilled la-
bour-saving technological change is the most likely explanation for the ob-
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6 See also Krugman, Lawrence [1994].124
served shift in demand towards high-skilled workers in manufacturing indus-
tries. A change in labour demand within industries rather than a reallocation of
employment towards industries with higher shares of skilled labour seems to
have been responsible for the upgrading of the manufacturing workforce. At
first sight, this result would imply that globalisation cannot have caused the de-
clining relative wages of low-skilled workers through changes in the sectoral
composition of US manufacturing employment It should be noted, however,
that to some extent the adoption of new technology in itself may represent a re-
sponse to increased international competition. Berman et al. [1993] did not try
to test such an explanation.
Both the globalisation and the skill-biased technological change hypothesis
predict that the relative wage of low-skilled workers will tend to fall, but they
differ with respect to the predicted change of factor intensities and with respect
to the predicted changes of relative prices. To reject globalisation as a cause of
the relative decline of wages just because the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem pre-
dicts a declining factor intensity, which is not supported by the empirical facts,
is not very convincing. The reason is that it takes static trade theory too seri-
ously, i.e., rising factor intensities may occur because of technological change,




What matters for a test of the globalisation hypothesis is whether the relative
price of low-skilled labour-intensive goods has declined or not. Hence, a hier-
archy of industries according to factor intensities has to be established. Still,
there is a problem endemic in any attempt to identify a distinctive pattern of
factor intensities at the level of 2- or 3-digit industries. Most of these aggre-
gates display a large variance of factor intensities measured at their respective
subcategories [Learner, 1992]. Put differently, it is extremely difficult to iden-
tify uniformly human or physical-capital-intensive sectors. Therefore, we em-
ploy a much less ambitious approach to test the empirical relevance of Stolper-
Samuelson effects than implicitly assuming a clear-cut pattern of factor intensi-
ties across the whole spectrum of industries. We only look at the relative price
of clothing, which clearly is a low-skilled labour-intensive sector. Then, a com-
parison with the relative prices for other sectors may provide hints on the rele-
vance of globalisation for labour market outcomes, despite a certain degree of
ambiguity that might arise as to their classification as physical or human-capi-
tal-intensive.
The following tables present alternative attempts to identify relative price
changes for sectors that can be labelled as relatively human-capital-intensive,
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7 See Learner [1993] for a discussion of the balance between issues, theory and data
in the context of international trade theory.125
physical-capital-intensive and low-skilled labour-intensive. While single classi-
fications may be disputed, what is important for the present analysis is whether
the relative price of clothing has declined on world markets during the last dec-
ade. Such a finding would support our hypothesis that increasing globalisation
affects the labour market outcomes in advanced countries.
Table 23 presents changes in US producer price indexes between 1982 and
1992. Since the United States constitute a relatively large and open market, the
price data can be interpreted as rough indicators of relative world market
prices. The entries show that the relative price of clothing fell compared with
the prices of more human-capital-intensive goods. The evidence with respect to
physical-capital-intensive goods is mixed. Yet, if iron and steel as well as tex-
tiles are taken to be more standardised goods than chemicals which require
relatively more human capital for their production,
14
8 the US data tend to sup-
port the relative price changes predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.
This tendency is not a special feature of the time period chosen, as is shown by
a comparison with data taken from LUcke [1993] for 1978-1987.
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Source: Liicke [1993]; US Department of Labor [1993].
Table 24 presents an alternative view of the empirical evidence by looking
at changes in producer prices on the basis of industries. By and large, the pre-
vious results for US producer prices on a commodity basis are confirmed for
14
8 See Sections IV.2 and IV.3 for comparisons of chemicals and textiles and clothing
with respect to globalisation strategies.126
members of the Triad between 1985 and 1992. In most cases, the price of cloth-
ing fell relative to the prices of skill-intensive sectors such as machinery or mo-
tor vehicles. Japan provides a noteworthy exception. The clothing industry dis-
plays the strongest price increase of all sectors considered, and the physical and
human-capital-intensive sectors chemicals and motor vehicles show relatively
declining prices. While the latter points to the strong international competitive
position of Japanese producers in these sectors as compared with the other
members of the Triad, the rise in the relative price of clothing in Japan should
not be taken as evidence against Stolper-Samuelson effects, because the cloth-
ing industry in Japan has experienced a dramatic structural change in recent
years. For example, the value of Japan's exports of clothing (SITC 843) more
than doubled between 1980 and 1985, but fell to a paltry 5 per cent of its 1985
level in 1990 [OECD, a].
14
9 Hence, the measured improvement of the relative
price could reflect changes in the product mix, rather than actually improved
sectoral terms of trade.





























































Obviously, unmeasured quality improvements would bias relative price
changes upward. Such tendencies also play a role in the clothing industries of
other members of the Triad (see Section IV.3). However, comparable changes
See also Table 20 on changes in Japan's trade structure.127
in the value of exports cannot be observed. Therefore, we speculate that the
upward bias in the relative price change of clothing is strongest in the case of
Japan. Furthermore, it should be noted that the production of clothing in ad-
vanced countries benefits from the protection granted under the MFA. This arti-
ficial barrier to international trade prevents the relative price of clothing from
falling as strongly as it would fall under a free trade regime. Taking these
qualifications into account, the empirical evidence seems to be in line with the
relative price changes predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.
Hence, one may ask whether the data also support the Stolper-Samuelson
prediction that globalisation tends to move low-skilled labour-intensive produc-
tion out of advanced countries, which, in turn, can be expected to specialise in
the production of human-capital-intensive goods. Figure 23 presents glimpses
on the international empirical evidence for the three sectors considered in detail
in Chapter IV. Generally speaking, the a priori expectations are confirmed.
Textiles and clothing can be considered to employ comparatively more low-
skilled labour than the chemical industry, which is probably less human-capi-
tal-intensive but more physical-capital-intensive than the automobile industry.
If so, the structural change in advanced countries apparently favours capital-in-
tensive sectors at the expense of low-skilled labour-intensive ones. However,
the picture for the members of the Triad is not uniform, which is no surprise
given their very different labour market experiences and international competi-
tiveness during the last decade (Figures 19 to 21). Especially different devel-
opments at the lower end of the skill distribution point to the central role of
wage flexibility as an instrument to handle the structural change imposed by
increasing international competition.
The strongest structural change in manufacturing employment towards rela-
tively human-capital-intensive industries has occurred in Japan. Flexible wages
for different skill groups and a competitive level of real wages have ensured
that this structural change was handled without an increase in unemployment.
Such a flexible response to the price signals of world markets will help Japan to
meet the competitive challenges of the future, and puts it ahead of its competi-
tors in the Triad. The United States and the EU will have to cope with this new
competition from the top.
Extremely high wage flexibility has moderated the structural change within
manufacturing employment in the United States. To keep production profitable,
the US labour markets have responded to increasing globalisation by strongly
declining relative wages for low-skilled workers. Whether this strategy will
prove to be successful in the long run when still more competitive low-cost
suppliers will appear on world markets remains to be seen. Especially relative
employment losses in skill-intensive sectors such as automobiles should be a
matter of concern.128
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Source: OECD [c].
The picture for European countries is even less promising. In contrast to the
finding for Japan, there is a much stronger trend away from textiles and cloth-
ing, but the relative employment increase in skill-intensive automobiles is
weaker. Hence, the European employment pattern seems to have shifted to a
medium-skilled spectrum. Most importantly, this partial adjustment to interna-
tional competition has occurred at rising levels of unemployment, especially of
low-skilled workers. In terms of a successful handling of competitive chal-
lenges, Europe only ranks third in the Triad, because the structural change en-
forced by globalisation towards human-capital-intensive sectors is largely miss-
ing not least attributable to a comparatively low degree of relative wage flexi-
bility (Figure 21).
Taken together, we find empirical support for the predictions of the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem. Relative prices of low-skilled labour-intensive sectors
tend to decline, and advanced countries tend to lose low-skilled labour-inten-
sive production as highlighted by shifts in the employment structure of selected
manufacturing industries. As a consequence, low-skilled workers in advanced
countries have had and will have to face a relative, possibly even absolute de-
cline in their earnings, or an increase in unemployment. A continuing trend to-
wards globalisation will confront advanced countries with further adjustment129
pressures in the future. Given the experience of the past decade, Japan and the
United States seem better prepared than Europe to meet the challenges ahead.
Hence, the question of appropriate policy responses is most pressing for the
EU.130
VII. Economic Policy in the Era of Globalisation
1. The Policy Dilemma
As a consequence of the processes described in the preceding chapters, eco-
nomic policymakers in industrialised countries, notably in the EU, are facing a
major dilemma. On the one hand, consumers benefit from intensified trade and
investment relations, as fiercer competition creates positive welfare effects in
terms of lower product prices, higher quality and a larger variety of supply. On
the other hand, some domestic producers and workers will lose in terms of
competitiveness and, therefore, resist the increase in the international division
of labour. Political economy arguments and practical experience suggest that
governments are tempted to sacrifice consumer benefits in order to protect non-
competitive production factors. Since producer interests are generally much
better organised than consumer interests, globalisation provokes government
interventions requested by producers and workers for easing their adjustment
burden.
In the following, we discuss the effectiveness of such interventions. The risk
that traditional measures such as trade barriers will fail to achieve their stated
objectives increases under the conditions of globalised production and invest-
ment. The more companies operate on a worldwide scale, the smaller the po-
tential for effective national trade measures is, because evasion becomes easier.
Trade barriers can be circumvented by FDI and may induce more trade in non-
regulated areas (Chapter V). The effectiveness of restrictions imposed on for-
eign direct investors may be eroded by non-equity forms of international coop-
eration (Chapter III). As a consequence, governments may resort to innovative
protective instruments such as stricter common standards concerning social and
ecological production conditions and harmonised competition rules. While such
innovations may be effective in the short run and alleviate the adjustment pres-
sure for specific sectors, adverse second-round effects on other sectors and
longer-term costs have to be taken into account in assessing their overall wel-
fare implications.
This leads to the proposition that, if governments continue to react defen-
sively to globalised corporate strategies, economic welfare will be reduced at a
worldwide scale. The protected economy will be among the first to suffer from
policy-induced inflexibility, retarded adjustment and, ultimately, from impaired
attractiveness for (foreign and domestic) investment. Therefore, we consider
alternative policy responses to globalised production and investment patterns,131
which may tackle the causes rather than the symptoms of declining competi-
tiveness.
2. Trade Policy Responses to the Globalisation of
Production and Markets
Recent trends in trade policies provide a startling picture. While the long-last-
ing stalemate in multilateral trade negotiations has been overcome only re-
cently with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in late 1993, dozens of DCs
throughout the world have removed trade barriers unilaterally since the mid-
1980s [GATT, d]. Moreover, many DCs have liberalised FDI regulations at the
same time [UNCTC, a; ERT, 1993]. Apparently, DCs realised that they had no
choice but to open their markets for imports and FDI in order to participate
successfully in the global competition for risk capital. The steep decline in their
share in worldwide FDI flows during the 1980s
15
0 was a clear indication that
traditionally applied concepts were seriously flawed:
— Many DCs, especially in Latin America and Africa, had maintained sub-
stantial trade barriers until recently and granted foreign investors access
on a highly selective basis. According to survey results, FDI was some-
times undertaken to circumvent import barriers of host DCs offering
large domestic markets.
15
1 However, the strategy to attract FDI in this
way was bound to fail if applied by smaller DCs. An empirical investi-
gation of German FDI in DCs revealed that, on average, import restric-
tions negatively affected FDI flows [Agarwal et al., 1991].
— Trade policy interventions that aimed at encouraging domestic produc-
tion resulted in weak competition and a suboptimal structure of produc-
tion [Krueger, 1990, Part II]. Import substitution hindered the exploita-
tion of comparative advantages because export-oriented industries had to
rely on domestic inputs at prices above world-market levels. With inter-
15
0 The DC share dwindled from 29 per cent in 1979-1982 to 14 per cent in 1987-
1990 and recovered only in the early 1990s [Nunnenkamp, Agarwal, 1993, Table
1]; see also Section II. 1.
15
1 For details, see Agarwal et al. [1991] and the literature given there.132
national competitiveness being sacrificed, the incentives for FDI were
reduced and economic development was hindered.
15
2
The economic costs of not being integrated into the world economy rise un-
der the conditions of intensified globalisation at the corporate level. Hence,
widespread trade and FDI liberalisation in DCs has been the appropriate re-
sponse to changing corporate strategies. The removal of import barriers pro-
vided better opportunities to combine local factors of production with inputs
imported at internationally competitive prices. At the same time, FDI liberali-
sation offered TNCs more options to integrate DCs into their globalisation
strategies.
While it is still too early to fully assess the pay-off of economic reforms in
terms of improved locational attractiveness, first indications are that many DCs
have correctly perceived the signs of the times. The declining trend in their
share in worldwide FDI flows has been stopped. FDI flows to Latin America,
where the recent policy reversal has been most impressive, soared from $3.6
billion in 1986 to $17.5 billion in 1993 [World Bank, a, Vol. I, p. 186].
Mexico, which was among the frontrunners of economic reform in Latin
America, attracted FDI inflows of $5.4 billion in 1992, i.e., 11 times the
amount of 1985 [ibid., Vol. II, p. 298].
In contrast to the forward-looking approach applied by many DCs in recent
years, major industrialised countries have tended to react defensively to the
globalisation of production and markets. Defensive attitudes may have hindered
globalisation in some areas. However, the general trend continued. Further-
more, defensive reaction patterns may involve considerable costs under the
conditions of fierce international competition for risk capital. Before presenting
a forward-looking alternative, we discuss the strategies of industrialised coun-
tries and their effectiveness by referring to three major policy trends. First, bi-
lateralism and regionalism seem to have gained prominence in EU and US
trade policies. Second, multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT framework
continued to be a protracted struggle on balancing limited concessions in spe-
cific areas, while important policy challenges tended to be ignored. Third, new
initiatives launched with respect to common production standards and indus-
trial policy suggest that defensive attitudes will continue into the future.
For a detailed discussion and empirical verification, see Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et
al. [1991, pp. 31 ff.]. For example, FDI was shown to be significantly lower when
import penetration in the host country was low and trade taxes were relatively
high.133
a. The European Union
As concerns the EU, multilateral trade issues have taken second place behind
the deepening and widening of integration within Europe [Hiemenz et al.,
1994; Nunnenkamp, 1993a]. At times of increasing globalisation, the EU ap-
parently had no clear strategy for the GAIT negotiations in the Uruguay
Round; for years, the EU mainly reacted defensively to US attacks, notably
with respect to the Common Agricultural Policy. The EU's focus on regional
integration and the reluctance to actively engage in multilateral trade liberalisa-
tion fuelled concerns about a fortress Europe. Yet, fears that the EU would turn
inward-looking at considerable costs for outsiders have not materialised so far.
In 1991, the GATT concluded from its Trade Policy Review Mechanism:
"There is little evidence of any recent major intensification of protective meas-
ures on the part of the EU" [GATT, a, p. 20]. In the subsequent evaluation of
1993 [GATT, c], the EU was given credit for having stimulated economic




Nevertheless, the EU seems to be badly prepared to meet the challenges aris-
ing from globalised production and investment patterns.
15
4 First, the positive
GATT assessment mainly relates to the economic boom period in the late
1980s and early 1990s. The GATT review adds an important qualification by
calling into question whether a liberal policy stance will be maintained under
the less favourable conditions of economic stagnation and high unemployment.
Second, disputes within the EU about which body shall have the major say
in shaping trade policy have added to uncertainties concerning the future policy
stance. More restrictive attitudes can be expected, as the Commission may be
authorised by a single majority vote of the Council of Ministers to operate anti-
dumping procedures and countervailing duties. In the past, such decisions re-
quired a qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers, in which the mi-
nority of relatively liberal member states could veto the implementation of such
measures.
15
3 An even more favourable conclusion has been reached by Baneth [1993], who
considers allegations of a fortress Europe to be a myth. This judgement is primar-
ily based on the observed steep increase of manufactured EU imports from its
trading partners. The EU's trade policy measures, on which the subsequent para-
graphs are focused, are not explicitly considered by Baneth. Hence, it remains open
to question whether import growth has to be attributed to a liberalised policy
stance of the EU, or rather to deteriorating competitiveness of EU suppliers under
the conditions of more or less unchanged import restrictions.
15
4 The subsequent paragraphs draw on Langhammer [1993].134
Third, EU trade policy has traditionally been characterised by discrimina-
tion.
15
5 MFN (most-favoured nation) treatment (i.e., non-preferential market
access), which would provide a level playing field for global actors based in
different locations, has lost further ground in the context of the widening of in-
tegration in Europe. EFTA countries have been granted free mobility of capital
and labour under the agreement on the European Economic Area, and most of
them are going to join the EU. The Europe Agreements, which the EU con-
cluded with Central and East European countries, have promoted them from the
bottom almost to the top of the pyramid of EU trade preferences. MFN treat-
ment by the EU is confined to six trading partners comprising Australia, Ca-
nada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States and Taiwan.
15
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Fourth, selectivity and discretion are typical features of EU trade policy.
This is evident from the instruments of contingent protection preferred in the
past (for details, see Hiemenz et al. [1994]), which include "voluntary" export
restraints and anti-dumping procedures. Japan and Asian NIEs were the princi-
pal targets. Recent indications suggest an increasing propensity of the EU to
tackle trade conflicts on a bilateral basis.
15
7 Bilateral consultations character-
ised the final phase of the Uruguay Round and are favoured by the EU in deal-
ing with prospective member countries in Central Europe. Furthermore, discre-
tion appears to be on the rise:
— Interest groups demand "orderly marketing arrangements" in a growing
number of products considered to be "sensitive". The tendency towards
surveillance of imports over time and from various origins represents the
first step on the road to managed trade. The stipulation of tolerable im-
port volumes and the request for export monitoring by selected trading
partners may follow. The downward revision of quota restricted car ex-
ports from Japan to the EU in 1993 is a first indication to this effect.
— Since the so-called screwdriver-plant legislation of 1987, anti-dumping
measures may be imposed on products assembled in the EU, if imports
of those products are already subject to such measures and if the share of
15
5 Besides EFTA countries, ACP and Mediterranean countries have been the principal
beneficiaries of preferential treatment since recently.
15
6 These countries accounted for 36 per cent of extra-EU imports in 1992. As a com-
parison, almost 90 per cent of US trade was conducted on a MFN basis.
The EU has not practised an outspoken bilateralism, as laid down in the US trade
law, so far, however. The so-called New Commercial Policy Instrument of 1984,
which provides for retaliation against "unfair" trade practices of trading partners,
was applied in a few cases only until 1993. These cases mainly concerned conflicts
on intellectual property rights and were settled after consultation.135
parts supplied by the country concerned accounts for at least 60 per cent
of the total component value [Koopmann, Scharrer, 1989, pp. 211-212].
— The reduced effectiveness of trade restrictions, because of evasion
through FDI, has prompted the next turn in the interventionist spiral.
Trade measures have been supplemented by investment-related meas-
ures. For instance, Japanese investors in car manufacturing had to meet
strict local content requirements. Moreover, EU countries such as Italy
have suggested to consider not only imported cars but also Japanese
transplant production in the EU when assessing whether targeted market
shares are exceeded. In other words, the concept of managed trade
would be extended to include ad hoc interventions related to FDI.
The principal features of EU trade policy create problems for foreign trading
partners and investors in the first place. They suffer from increased uncertainty,
which is the logical consequence of selective and discretionary interventions. It
is increasingly the EU that defines the rules of the game. Its leverage in trade
negotiations has been enhanced due to the fact that the Single European Market
represents a critically important sales outlet for most trading partners, whereas
non-European markets are generally far less important for EU suppliers. None-
theless, it would be wrong to conclude that the EU's policy stance is in its own
best economic interest What is seemingly a paradox may be explained in po-
litical economy terms. Policymakers have a preference for short-term "solu-
tions" in order to get reelected, and their decisions are influenced by well-or-
ganised interest groups. Typically, lobbying has been dominated by industries
under heavy competitive pressure, at least partly because they were lagging be-
hind in terms of globalisation. Their request for selective and tailor-made pro-
tection, of which the export restraint on Japanese cars is a prominent example,
has not met with effective opposition from the business sector so far. As a re-
sult, the policy response to globalised production and marketing may largely
ignore longer-term interests and second-round effects on less influential groups
and competitive industries.
Although the ensuing welfare losses cannot be exactly quantified, the costs
of restrictive trade and FDI regulations are likely to rise in the era of globalisa-
tion. EU economies have to strengthen their adjustment flexibility and innova-
tive capacity in order to remain attractive locations. Trade and investment-re-
lated restrictions have exactly the opposite effect. They impair employment
creation in sectors depending on competitive inputs for their expansion. The
policy-induced preservation of obsolete production structures weakens the in-
centives of investors to search for product and process innovations. New market
opportunities are foregone if structural adjustment is delayed and DCs are de-
nied better chances to catch up economically, thereby constraining their import136
demand. FDI-related restrictions, if effective, create further impediments to
flexible adjustment and innovation in the EU. If foreign investors are deterred
from productive activities, chances for technological and organisational imita-
tion may be foregone and adaptation to superior management systems is ren-
dered more difficult.
The recent attractiveness of the EU for international investors (Section II.2)
suggests that the costs of its defensive policy stance towards globalisation have
been limited so far. This can reasonably be attributed to the progress made in
the deepening of integration and the anticipated widening of European integra-
tion. Regionalism may grant respite in dealing with global challenges. How-
ever, it is no lasting alternative to improved competitiveness by world-market
standards, since the mobility of production factors is too high to be effectively
constrained over time. A liberal trade policy stance still appears to be the best
recipe for creating sufficiently strong incentives for adjustment, which, in turn,
helps sustaining competitiveness and attractiveness for foreign and domestic
investment.
b. The United States
In contrast to the EU, multilateralism had rested on rather solid foundations in
the United States. Recently, though, the United States have moved towards re-
gionalism and bilateralism [Stehn, 1993]. Partly as a reaction to European inte-
gration, NAFTA was concluded with Canada and Mexico and the "Enterprise
of the Americas" initiative was launched. This policy move of one of the major
players has aggravated the conflict between multilateralism and regionalism as
guiding principles of the international trading system [Bhagwati, 1991].
The United States have, furthermore, intensified the use of anti-dumping
procedures as a response to mounting pressure by interest groups to protect US
industries facing adjustment problems. Under the Clinton administration, the
tendency to focus on domestic economic concerns and to tackle trade disputes
bilaterally has gained considerable momentum. The revival of the GATT in-
consistent "Super 301" legislation is the clearest indication to this effect. Ac-
cording to Section 301 of US trade law, the administration may impose sanc-
tions unilaterally against countries that impede the access of US companies to
their markets. Bilateral trade deficits are considered to be a criterion for unfair
trade practices, which sharply conflicts with the multilateral GATT framework
and does not make any economic sense.
Japan is affected in the first place, but other competitive trading partners
such as South Korea may become the next targets. "Super 301" provides the
leverage to enforce quantitative targets for US exports to the country accused137
of unfair trade policies. This result-oriented approach (in contrast to a rule-ori-
ented approach) has been subject to fine-tuning recently. Broadly defined trade
targets
15
8 have been specified in order to promote the exports of particular in-
dustries. For the time being, the heyday in this development was reached in
March 1994, when Japan gave in to US demands for quantitative targets con-
cerning one particular US company.
15
9
The aggressive bilateralism of US trade policy primarily aims at short-term
job security. It opens substantial leeway for economic interest groups to exert
influence on both the choice of result-oriented measures and the identification
of countries to be accused of practising "unfair" trade policies [Stehn, 1993, p.
14]. The conflict with Japan is telling in this respect. Given the unsettled debate
on the degree of openness of the Japanese economy, it is mainly interest groups
that determine what is "unfair." The argument that measurable trade barriers
are low
16
0 is discounted by allegations of highly restrictive informal barriers
such as buy-Japanese attitudes and effectively closed distribution channels.
However, it is still open to question to which extent low import penetration ra-
tios are due to government and business practices that discriminate against for-
eign firms, or whether they are due to insufficient competitiveness of foreign
firms and specific consumer preferences in Japan.
16
1
Similar to the EU, the longer-term vision of revitalising the domestic econ-
omy through competitive pressure resulting from an open trading environment
does not figure high on the actual economic agenda of the US administration.
Hence, the innovative capacity of the US economy is also likely to suffer in the
15
8 For example, Dornbusch [1990] advocated an administered increase of Japan's
manufactured imports from the United States at an annual average of 15 per cent in
real terms during the 1990s. In February 1993, a bill was initiated that required Ja-
pan to reduce its trade surplus with the United States by 20 per cent per annum
[Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 February 1993].
' ' US government officials pressed for the resolution of a dispute over cellular tele-
phones. As a result, Japan's cellular carrier (IDO Corp.) agreed to build 159 addi-
tional base stations in the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor by the end of 1995, providing
the US company Motorola with 9900 more voice channels [The Wall Street Jour-
nal Europe, 14 March 1994, p. 2].
16
0 Japan's tariff barriers are the lowest among all OECD countries [Langhammer,
1994].
16
1 If it is accepted that Japanese markets are closed because of informal entry barri-
ers, the policy of aggressive bilateralism involves a striking paradox [Stehn, 1993,
p. 15]. In order to enforce specified import targets, more government interference
is needed to organise and monitor import cartels in all major industries. In other
words, aggressive bilateralism requires Japan to adopt precisely that kind of eco-
nomic policy that it is alleged for by the advocates of a result-oriented trade strat-
egy.138
long run, which, as was argued before, involves increasing welfare losses with
globalisation proceeding at the corporate level.
c. The Uruguay Round
Given the recent policy stance of the EU and the United States, probably the
greatest success of the Uruguay Round was that a complete breakdown of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations was avoided. Moreover, the protracted negotiations
finally resulted in agreements on liberalisation measures in specific areas. Ma-
jor examples are: tariff reductions, improved market access and reduced export
subsidies in agriculture, the reintegration of MFA trade into the GATT frame-
work and institutional reforms to prevent breaches of GATT rules.
16
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The keys to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round were held in a very few
hands, among which those of the US and European governments were of over-
riding influence.
16
3 Hence, it could not reasonably be expected that the chal-
lenges of globalisation were dealt with more effectively in GATT negotiations
than in the national realm of the major players. As a matter of fact, the Uru-
guay Round results are rather disappointing exactly where the trade policy re-
sponse to globalisation was at stake. This may be exemplified by contrasting
some of the results with what would have been required if a forward-looking
approach had been followed.
Progress in trade liberalisation was relatively easy to achieve where barriers
had already been low before the Uruguay Round. Tariffs on manufactured im-
ports are a case in point The agreed reduction by about 40 per cent will result
in an (unweighted) average tariff rate of 4 per cent in OECD countries. It is in-
teresting to note, however, that relatively high tariffs remain levied on textiles
and clothing and standardised electronic products, i.e., sectors in which pro-
ducers in industrialised countries are under heavy competitive pressure from
DCs. By insisting on tariff escalation, resulting in higher effective protection of
"sensitive" products, industrialised countries revealed their reluctance to let
16
2 For a comprehensive assessment of the Uruguay Round results, see Langhammer
[1994]. The subsequent discussion, which draws substantially on Langhammer's
paper, is focused on those issues that are of major relevance in the context of
globalisation.
163 jfjg So-called principal-supplier rule increasingly determines the results of GATT
negotiations. Major players offering improved access to large domestic markets
negotiate with other major players in order to get a maximum of counter-conces-
sions for their own offers. As a result, multilateral trade negotiations are effec-
tively confined to the balancing of concessions among the Triad members, with
smaller trading partners typically playing only a minor role.139
globalisation play its role in advancing structural change and promoting the
catching-up of DCs.
The agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round are also ambiguous with
respect to the broad issue of enforcing adherence of member states to GATT
rules, defining waivers more precisely and monitoring escape clauses effec-
tively. While GATT discipline figured high on the agenda of the Uruguay
Round, it is unlikely that the achievements made are sufficient to stop the trend
towards regionalism and bilateralism. For example, GATT monitoring of re-
gional trade arrangements continues to be deficient. Art. XXIV GATT author-
ises deviations from MFN treatment if free trade areas and custom unions cover
"substantially all" the trade among partner countries and do not raise trade bar-
riers against outsiders. These requirements suffer from serious enforcement
problems, however. None of the about 80 regional trade arrangements that had
been notified to the GATT until 1993 was rejected as inconsistent with GATT
obligations [Hufbauer, Schott, 1993].
A stricter monitoring would be required in order to prevent regionalism from
further undermining multilateralism [Nunnenkamp, 1993a]. Two conditions
have to be met to reconcile regional trade arrangements with multilateralism.
First, integration schemes must be open to new members who are ready to
comply with the obligations of the regional trade accord. Second, transparent
mechanisms have to be implemented providing for compensation for those non-
member countries whose trade is negatively affected.
16
4 These suggestions
have not been taken up in the Uruguay Round.
16
5 This appears to be short-
sighted given that it is not only in the interest of outsiders but also in the long-
term self-interest of member countries to prevent regional integration from re-
sulting in protectionist trading blocs and to preserve external competition, in
order to encourage economic adjustment and restructuring.
The major players in the Uruguay Round were also reluctant to effectively
control contingent protection. As concerns anti-dumping measures, discretion
was indeed reduced by specifying the conditions under which such measures
are tolerated.
16
6 However, consumer interests and the degree of domestic com-
petition continue to be ignored in deciding on the GATT conformity of anti-
16
4 For a similar reasoning, see, for example, Bhagwati [1991]. Hufbauer and Schott
[1993] have developed a pragmatic scheme for calculating the compensation
required to offset trade diversion effects of regional integration schemes. For an
empirical application to the case of the EU, see Nunnenkamp [1993b].
16
5 Art. XXVin GATT postulates for compensation, however, if external tariffs are
raised after the formation of a custom union.
16
6 Stricter criteria relate to the tolerable duration of anti-dumping measures and the
verification of injury of the domestic industry caused by dumped imports, for ex-
ample.140
dumping measures. Moreover, there still is the risk that such measures will dis-
play cascading effects by extending them to down- and upstream stages in the
production process [Hoekman, Leidy, 1992]. Likewise, contingent protection in
the form of safeguard clauses remains problematic, although it was principally
agreed in the Uruguay Round to apply Art. XIX GATT on a non-discriminatory
basis.
16
7 Especially the EU insisted on selectivity. As a result, safeguard meas-
ures may still be directed at specific trading partners if imports from individual
countries have risen "disproportionally".
The trade policy response to globalisation was at stake especially in those
areas in which the agenda of the Uruguay Round went beyond earlier GATT
negotiations. Among these new issues, trade in services and trade-related in-
vestment measures (TRIMs) were of particular importance.
16
8 Trade in serv-
ices provided an important stimulus to the international fragmentation of pro-
duction. The extension of GATT rules to services would put corporate globali-
sation strategies on a reliable basis and reduce remaining uncertainties. Yet, ex-
pectations were largely frustrated that the Uruguay Round would be a mile-
stone in this respect. An agreement on trade in services (GATS) proved impos-
sible without taking into account the numerous reservations of contracting par-
ties. As a result, GATS mainly consists of annexes in which country- and sec-
tor-specific concessions and exceptions are laid down. Each country could
submit a list of services for which MFN treatment was not to apply. For the re-
maining service sectors, country-specific annexes contain national commit-
ments to liberalisation measures. Binding and universally applied conditions for
market access and equal treatment of domestic and foreign suppliers of services
were not formulated. Hence, progress was mainly made in terms of better
transparency of country-specific regulations. Whether greater discipline in
regulating trade in services will finally result from future negotiations remains
to be seen.
More discipline with regard to TRIMs, including local content requirements
and export obligations, would have provided better chances to globalise pro-
duction and marketing through FDI. The progress achieved in the Uruguay
Round remained marginal. The results went hardly beyond the existing Art. Ill
and XI GATT, which postulate for equal treatment of foreign and domestic
products and the removal of quantitative restrictions. It was agreed to notify
TRIMs that are incompatible with Art. Ill and XI, and industrialised countries
are requested to remove such measures within two years. However, the illustra-
16' It was also agreed to notify "voluntary" export restraint agreements and to phase
them out within four years, or to transform them into GATT consistent measures.
16° We will address the issue of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) in Section VII.3.a.141
tive list of incompatible measures in the respective annex remains fragmentary.
Therefore, monitoring and enforcement problems are likely to continue.
The review of major results of the Uruguay Round reveals that enforcement
is still the critical issue in many areas. This relates to the systemic weaknesses
of the GATT framework, among which the serious lack of effective sanction
mechanisms figures most prominently [see also Hauser, 1991]. Hence, much
depends on whether such weaknesses can be overcome in the future. Institu-
tional reforms agreed upon in the Uruguay Round may provide a first step in
this direction:
— In the past, trade agreements on specific issues (for example, technical
trade barriers, subsidies and countervailing duties, and anti-dumping
measures) were legally separated from the GATT Treaty. GATT mem-
bers had the choice to opt out of specific agreements, while participating
in others. This "a la carte" approach according to one's own liking will
no longer be possible, as all agreements will become part and parcel of
the newly established World Trade Organisation (WTO). By joining the
WTO, contracting parties are obliged to adhere to all trade agreements.
Discipline may be enhanced and monitoring may become easier once
discretion is reduced in this way.
— An attempt was made to expedite the process of dispute settlement,
which had been extremely time-consuming in the past The revised
mechanism of dispute settlement will result in decisions that are binding
for both parties involved. However, it is open to question whether major
players such as the EU and the United States are prepared to accept
GATT panel decisions.
The disciplinary effects of institutional reforms are likely to remain limited
unless considerable fines can be imposed in the case of non-compliance with
GATT rules and panel decisions, and compensation is obligatory. In light of the
current trade policy stance of the EU and the United States, it is unreasonable
to rely on goodwill as an alternative to credible sanctions, which are still lack-
ing. This sceptical view is supported by the fact that the conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round was delayed for years, although the major players, who were re-
sponsible for the delay, are the main beneficiaries of trade liberalisation. Vari-
ous empirical studies on the welfare effects of the Uruguay Round demonstrate
that the worldwide increase in welfare is heavily concentrated on OECD coun-
tries (to 66-86 per cent, depending on the assumptions made).
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these studies clearly reveal that a country's welfare is increased by its own lib-
For an overview, see Langhammer [1994].142
eralisation measures in the first place, rather than by improved access to for-
eign markets attributable to liberalisation measures of trading partners. It fol-
lows that sweeping liberalisation would be in each country's own interest, be-
cause it provides the strongest real income gains for consumers and taxpayers
because of an improved allocation of resources.
3. The Options Ahead
a. Ex ante Harmonisation of Production Standards
Well-organised groups of producers and workers facing heavy competitive
pressure from abroad and government myopia blocked a forward-looking strat-
egy of major players in multilateral trade negotiations in the past Traditional
strategies may have to be revised, however, because of rising welfare losses
and increasing evasion activities in the era of globalisation. It is open to ques-
tion in which direction such revisions will point On the one hand, international
competitiveness can only be improved on a sustainable basis if economic poli-
cies contribute to higher adjustment flexibility and encourage the search for in-
novations. On the other hand, defensive attitudes are difficult to overcome un-
der the conditions of economic stagnation and high unemployment in major in-
dustrialised countries.
For the time being, it appears that this policy dilemma will again be tackled
in a defensive way, i.e., by choking up loopholes and rendering entrepreneurial
evasion more difficult. First indications to a more sophisticated protectionism
relate to attempts at ex ante harmonisation of production standards. Common
standards, for example, with respect to social and ecological production condi-
tions, represent a protectionist device that may be more restrictive than tradi-
tional trade barriers. Production standards would remove an important parame-
ter of international competitiveness. Especially the process of catching-up of
lower-income countries might be impeded if DCs were required to adhere to
the typically more demanding standards of industrialised countries. Trade bar-
riers, providing protection for domestic import-competing industries, create an
incentive for export industries to relocate production to lower cost locations.
By contrast, common production standards diminish the chances of lower cost
locations to attract FDI, as cost advantages of producing in the host country are
reduced.
The EU has been among the first to follow the route to ex ante harmonisa-
tion of social production standards. Its initiatives at the regional level may indi-143
cate future trends in multilateral harmonisation. The Maastricht Treaty, in its
Protocol on Social Policy, contains a mandate to issue, with qualified majority,
directives on minimum requirements with respect to (i) the working environ-
ment to protect workers' health and safety, (ii) working conditions, (iii) infor-
mation and consultation of workers, (iv) gender equality and (v) the integration
of persons excluded from the labour market.
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vote, common standards may be extended to social security and protection,
dismissal protection, worker representation including co-determination, etc.
The EU is claiming authority in the area of social policy because, in its
view, unregulated market operations could be at the disadvantage of workers in
poorer member states, who are in need of protection. The extent to which la-
bour markets are regulated differs substantially within the EU. The reduction of
such differences would run counter to the stated objectives, however: backward
regions will suffer if they have to comply with the more advanced social stan-
dards of the richer member countries. The mandated social benefits will raise
labour costs so that the EU periphery will lose its comparative advantage and,
thereby, the chances of catching-up in terms of per capita income. As a corol-
lary, core regions are subject to less pressure to foster their growth potential
through innovations. In other words, applying such a strategy means that loca-
tional characteristics would be denied their role in shaping the international di-
vision of labour.
Seemingly altruistic objectives, such as improving the working conditions of
the poor, are also mentioned when it comes to social standards in DCs. How-
ever, the motive to avoid "unfair" competition in the form of "social dumping"
is a rather selfish one. Multilateral harmonisation can be viewed as an attempt
to raise labour costs in DCs, in order to diminish the pressure on real wages in
industrialised countries (Chapter VI). Obviously, common social standards im-
ply an asymmetrical treatment of locational characteristics: "Locational advan-
tages of a rich country, such as a well-developed infrastructure and a high-
skilled workforce, are perceived as fair, whereas the locational advantages of
poor countries, such as low labour costs in terms of money wages and effective
social regulations, are perceived as unfair. This is the old-fashioned protection-
ist pauper-labour argument" [Paque\ Soltwedel et al., 1993, p. 38]. Resistance
against structural change and flexible labour markets is understandable from
the point of view of those who have to adjust. The demand for protection in the
form of common social standards cannot be supported by taking recourse to
considerations based on economic fairness, however. In an integrating world
economy, fairness in terms of economic competition should mean a guarantee
For detailed information and a critical evaluation, see Paque, Soltwedel et al.
[1993, pp. 36 ff.].144
against discrimination. Therefore, economic fairness could be best realised by
strict adherence to the MFN principle of the GATT.
Additional variants of ex ante harmonisation have been introduced into the
discussion recently:
— The notion of "unfair" competition has been extended to include "eco
dumping". Similar to social standards, it is ignored that countries at dif-
ferent stages of economic development face different relative prices and
various alternatives to spend scarce resources, for example for educa-
tion, health care or the environment. Growing ecological concerns in in-
dustrialised countries are thus no sufficient proof of the need for world-
wide minimum standards.
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1 Nevertheless, a first step in this direction
has been made in the Uruguay Round [Langhammer, 1994]. Environ-
ment-related measures have become part of the agreement on technical
standards. International standards shall be developed, though the con-
tracting parties are not (yet) obliged to adjust their national regulations.
— Harmonisation is an issue in the agreement on intellectual property
rights (TRIPs), too. In the case of complaints by trading partners, na-
tional regulations have to be in accordance with common rules in order
to escape unilateral retaliation. Patents are an important case in point.
They shall be protected for 20 years. This is substantially above the
typical DC norm so that it is again DCs that have to adjust [Hoekman,
1993, p. 1531].
— International rules of competition are considered to be a means by which
restrictive business practices can be tackled more effectively than by
anti-dumping measures. It cannot be disputed that globalisation and in-
ternational networking have encouraged private concerted actions that
escape GATT monitoring and surveillance [Paqu6, Soltwedel et al.,
1993, p. 25]. However, it is open to question whether harmonised com-
petition rules will result in more or less competition. If informal restric-
tions such as effectively closed distribution channels were removed in
this way, the rules could have a positive effect. The effect would be
Common ecological standards are frequently justified by referring to negative ex-
ternalities of pollution-intensive production. Nonetheless, ex ante harmonisation of
standards appears to be a protectionist device in the first place. There is no eco-
nomic rationale for international harmonisation in the case of externalities at the
local or national level, which are generally assumed to be far more important than
international spillovers. Even in the case of cross-border externalities, the appro-
priateness of harmonised standards is highly questionable. Alternative instruments
such as tradable emission permits are superior in tackling global ecological prob-
lems without interfering with the international division of labour.145




Ex ante harmonisation is likely to play a major role in future GATT negotia-
tions [Langhammer, 1994]. The protectionist motives underlying this move are
evident. Especially lower-income countries will be subject to pressure to com-
ply with common standards that basically reflect the interests of industrialised
countries. Catching-up will become more difficult to the extent that ex ante
harmonisation replaces the competition between economies with different insti-
tutional and regulatory settings. This may indeed ease the adjustment burden of
industrialised countries for a while. However, harmonisation does not offer a
long-term solution to the challenge of globalisation. Most importantly, fore-
closing institutional competition involves considerable costs because it leads to
allocative inefficiency and structural rigidity in the protected economies, while
the incentives to increase productivity through innovation are weakened.
Furthermore, harmonised standards cannot prevent evasion even if there are
fewer loopholes than for traditional trade barriers. Assuming that standards are
effectively enforced, the ultimate consequence will be more migration of work-
ers who are deprived of the chance to achieve higher per capita incomes when
staying at home: if capital does not flow to poor countries, labour will move
into rich countries.
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3 Less spectacular evasion activities may erode the effec-
tiveness of harmonised standards over time. Similar to trade restrictions against
labour-intensive and standardised imports, harmonised standards will induce
competitive suppliers (for example, Asian DCs) to intensify efforts towards up-
grading their production and export structure. The ensuing shortening of prod-
uct cycles would shift the adjustment burden from traditional and declining in-
dustries to those sectors in which industrialised countries should have a com-
parative advantage.
Finally, it may be difficult to agree on common standards from the very be-
ginning, especially in areas where not only DCs but also industrialised coun-
tries are likely to oppose harmonisation. This applies, for example, to Japan
that is blamed for informal entry barriers, including restrictive business prac-
tices. In other areas, harmonisation may be resisted by national pressure groups.
For example, an unanimous support for common social standards is unlikely
even in industrialised countries. Producers find themselves in a dilemma. Some
The example of merger control in the EU reveals the practical relevance of this
dilemma. The major thrust of competition policies is still subject to controversies
between different interest groups [Paque, Soltwedel et al., 1993, p. 25].
Apparently, industrialised countries are aware of this threat. Common rules for
regulating the inflow of labour have been added to the list of issues for future har-
monisation [Langhammer, 1994].146
industries will support harmonisation in order to curtail foreign competition.
Others may see this very competition as a vehicle to exert pressure on strict
domestic labour market regulations. Harmonisation may also be opposed by
producers who are well advanced in terms of globalisation, as common stan-
dards would erode their competitive advantage derived from worldwide
sourcing. At present, the final outcome of this struggle between different inter-
est groups is impossible to predict. In any case, common minimum standards
may become redundant over time due to an ongoing trend towards stricter
norms in leading economies, for example in the area of ecological production
conditions. A permanent adjustment of common standards, which, principally,
may help to avoid redundancy, may easily overtax administrative capacities in
regulating and enforcing ever-changing rules.
b. Industrial Policy
Similar to ex ante harmonisation, industrial policy is likely to be one of the
controversial topics of the future discussion on how to meet the challenge of
globalisation.
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4 This refers especially to the EU, where concerns about having
lost technological leadership are manifest [Seitz, 1991]. The advancement of
Japanese companies in terms of world-market performance and international
networking is increasingly attributed to strategic long-term planning, in which
the Japanese Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) is considered
to be the driving force. Japanese competitors are said to enjoy the advantages
of an unlevel playing field, rather than simply being better players. Hence, it is
argued that the EU should have its own MITI or at least strengthen coordinated
efforts, involving governments, employers and unions, in order to counter the
erosion of its competitiveness and technological position.
Strategic industrial policy has several means at its disposal to counterbalance
foreign competition, ranging from traditional trade policy measures and out-
right subsidies granted to strategically important industries to state-aided coop-
eration and concentration within the corporate sector. Most of these instruments
were already applied in the past, at both the national and the EU level. Re-
cently, industrial and technology policy has gathered considerable momentum.
The Treaty of Maastricht endows the EU with new and far-reaching compe-
tence in this area. The promotion of the competitiveness of EU industries shall
become a major task for EU authorities [for details, see Vertrag iiber die EU,
1992]:
' For detailed analyses on which the subsequent paragraphs draw, see Bletschacher,
Klodt [1991; 1992] and Paque, Soltwedel et al. [1993].147
— Art 130 of the Maastricht Treaty lists various policy instruments that
aim at industrial targeting, including public assistance for structural ad-
justment and official support for cooperation among enterprises.
— In the field of technology policy, specifically designed promotion
schemes may be adopted by the Council of Ministers at the request of
the Commission (Art. 130 i). The EU may establish "common enter-
prises" or make similar arrangements to carry out coordinated research
programmes and foster technological development.
— Comparable measures at the national level are largely exempted from
EU provisions against cartelisation and mergers.
Past experience suggests that the effectiveness of strategic industrial policy
is limited, while tremendous costs may be involved. Data on the sectoral distri-
bution of subsidies in Germany reveal that industrial policy has mainly reacted
to adjustment problems of ailing sectors.
17
5 Until the early 1990s, subsidies re-
mained concentrated on agriculture, mining, iron and steel, shipbuilding and
railways.
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6 This indicates that most public support programmes, while in-
tended to be only temporary, were usually prolonged again and again when sec-
toral adjustment problems turned out to be persistent. Rather than having pro-
moted the development of technologically advanced industries, industrial pol-
icy has contributed to conserving resource-intensive and capital-intensive low-
tech industries in the first place.
The few examples of industrial targeting at technologically more advanced
industries in Europe are not encouraging either [Bletschacher, Klodt, 1991;
1992]. Estimates suggest that the increase of the European market share in civil
aircraft sales (from 12 per cent in 1971-1975 to 21 per cent in 1986-1990) was
only achieved at the costs of about $20 billion of government subsidies. Tem-
porary state aid was justified as a means to induce learning effects so that the
European aircraft industry could cope up with US competitors after a transition
period. This infant industry argument has been discredited by the perpetuation
of subsidies over more than two decades. In the case of semi-conductors, a
combination of import tariffs, export restraints concluded with Japan and con-
siderable subsidies supporting the research activities of European companies
17
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was applied to help the establishment of manufacturing capacity in Europe.
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5 For details, see Weiss et al. [1988] and Rosenschon [1991].
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6 These sectors accounted for nearly half of total subsidies in Germany in 1990. In
per capita terms, subsidies to mining and railways were 12-13 times the average
figure for the total business enterprise sector.
For example, DM 8 billion were devoted to the JESSI project (Joint European
Semiconductor Silicon) at its start in 1989 [Bletschacher, Klodt, 1991, p. 26].148
This attempt proved largely unsuccessful: after the decline of Europe's world-
market share in semi-conductors in 1978-1983, its share remained at a low
level of about 10 per cent until the early 1990s [Bletschacher, Klodt, 1991, p.
22]. A final example relates to the development of a European variant of the
high-definition television (HDTV). In late 1992, the EU was asked to provide
ECU 600 million over five years for this purpose [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung, 5 December 1992]. This request was tantamount to a waste of public re-
sources given that the Japanese HDTV system had been fit for production in
1989 already [Koopmann, Scharrer, 1989, p. 213].
From past experience it appears that industrial policy is inherently flawed.
Typically, the opportunity costs of strategically motivated support of high-tech
industries are ignored. The fiscal effects of subsidies translate into a higher tax
burden falling on non-favoured industries and, thereby, affecting their interna-
tional competitiveness. The privileges granted to some industries at the expense
of others encourage lobbying, i.e., scarce resources are absorbed for obtaining a
privileged status and are no longer available for productive purposes. Small and
medium-sized enterprises are most likely to suffer from discrimination because
they are less influential in the political arena. Large enterprises, which have
traditionally been the main beneficiaries of subsidies, have better chances to
get involved in coordinated attempts at industrial targeting, although they are
not necessarily the most innovative segment of the corporate sector.
As concerns the targeting of subsidies and related privileges, the proponents
of strategic industrial policy implicitly assume that potential growth industries
are easily identified by the state. This assumption is a rather heroic one. The
strategy of picking winners faces tremendous constraints in terms of collecting
and evaluating the relevant information. It is difficult to conceive that govern-
ments and public administrations are better equipped than profit-oriented inves-
tors to trace future growth areas. The problems of targeting are further compli-
cated under the conditions of globalised production. Attempts at promoting na-
tional (or European) "champions" face legal and practical constraints once for-
eign-based TNCs are closely involved in the respective industries. Legal provi-
sions are that European companies and foreign-based TNCs producing in the
EU have to be treated on equal terms: "Under these circumstances, it will prove
very hard to secure European-based firms a competitive edge by providing in-
ternal or external protection to these firms exclusively" [Paque, Soltwedel et
al., 1993, p. 28]. Moreover, the example of the automobile industry (Section
IV. 1) has shown that international networking and cooperation increasingly
disguise which company will be the main beneficiary of subsidies and other
promotion schemes. The potential for rent shifting through strategically moti-
vated R&D support schemes is reduced, since cross-border R&D alliances con-
tribute to a quick diffusion of technological progress and promote the tendency149
to separate research activities from production activities [Krakowski, 1993, p.
62]. As a result, it is rather unlikely that subsidies for R&D activities can raise
the domestic growth rate relative to economic growth in other countries.
All in all, strategic industrial policy is no promising response to the chal-
lenge of globalisation.Defensive attempts to ease the adjustment burden of ag-
ing industries will not prevent their decline and eventually reduce the adjust-
ment flexibility of the whole economy. The promotion of future growth indus-
tries runs the risk that scarce public resources are wasted. Finally, strategic be-
haviour of one major player such as the EU provokes retaliation by other play-
ers so that all countries would suffer (see, for example, Siebert, Koop [1990]).
Hence, there is no alternative to improving the internal efficiency and adjust-
ment flexibility of EU companies, in order to withstand fiercer competition for
markets and mobile factors of production. Important elements of a forward-
looking approach include the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the
deregulation of sectors shielded from internal and external competition. Among
the latter, the transport sector is a prominent case in point The major policy
problem concerns the future chances of low-skilled labour in industrialised
countries, however (Chapter VI). Consequently, the focus is on wage policies
and human capital formation in the subsequent sections.
c. Wage Policies
The preceding discussion has shown that traditional and innovative protection-
ist measures and industrial policies do not offer promising avenues to ensure
employment of low-skilled workers in industrialised countries. The effective-
ness of defensive policy measures is fairly limited in the longer run, and the
strategy of buying time for adjustment is typically very costly. Frequently, ad-
justment is simply postponed rather than smoothened over time. This is not
surprising because defensive policy interventions distort relative prices, which,
therefore, can no longer signal the direction of the required structural change.
The conclusion that emerges from the comparison of the US and European
reaction patterns to fiercer international competition (Chapter VI) is that wage
discipline is necessary in order to maintain employment of low-skilled workers
in industrialised countries. The US example shows that the chances for em-
ployment are improved if increasing relative wage dispersion is accepted. New
employment opportunities were mainly offered in service sectors characterised
by relatively low productivity growth. This has led to concerns that the US ap-
proach may result in a highly dualistic economy, a trap that may be difficult to
escape once it has snapped. However, dualism has not been avoided in Euro-
pean economies either: the consequence of a rigid wage structure at times of in-150
tensified competition was rising unemployment, especially of low-skilled
workers.
Although both types of dualism give rise to social tension, the US approach
appears to be superior to the European approach. High and persistent unem-
ployment can easily result in a vicious circle. It leads to a rising financial bur-
den falling on the government budget and the social security system. In order to
finance rising unemployment benefits, the authorities have to increase social
security contributions of workers and producers or to raise higher taxes. Conse-
quently, total labour costs will further increase, the international competitive-
ness of domestic producers continues to decline, and unemployment is likely to
mount.
In European countries, wage flexibility and wage differentiation have fre-
quently been resisted, as trade unions have aimed at greater equality of wages
across skills and regions. Hence, trade unions have to give up a guiding princi-
ple in bargaining with employers in order to alleviate the restructuring of indus-
tries under heavy competitive pressure and reduce unemployment. Recent wage
agreements in Germany point to an emerging consensus that wage discipline is
unavoidable and real wage cuts have to be accepted once job security has be-
come the major concern. It is still questionable, however, whether trade unions
will agree to a more pronounced wage differentiation. Their resistance, which
hinders flexible labour market adjustment and labour mobility, appears to be
mainly due to incentive problems and can be explained in terms of opportunity
costs:
— The trade union's position in centralised collective bargaining would be
undermined if more wage differentiation were accepted, which basically
means accepting the outcome of a flexible labour market.
— Trade unions and employers have insufficient incentives to take the em-
ployment effects of collective wage agreements into account, because
the responsibility for fighting unemployment has been shifted to gov-
ernments in many industrialised countries, for example, in Germany.
— Trade unions do not have to support their members in the case of unem-
ployment. In turn, the incentives of workers to search for new employ-
ment opportunities and to accept lower paid jobs are inversely related to
the generosity of unemployment benefits provided by the government in
terms of eligibility, duration and the level of payments relative to wage
incomes.
It follows that governments bear major responsibility for overcoming incen-
tive problems and, thereby, improve the chances for wage differentiation. Es-
pecially the incentive compatibility of the system of unemployment benefits151
may be strengthened in several respects. Strict eligibility criteria should be ap-
plied if job offers are declined by beneficiaries. For example, the payment of
benefits may be terminated if offers are declined that would have required
wage concessions and regional or sectoral mobility. The duration and level of
payments should be linked to the beneficiary's willingness to participate in
qualification and retraining programmes. Sanctions may be differentiated ac-
cording to the age of the unemployed, since younger workers should reveal a
higher degree of flexibility [Langhammer, Paqu6, 1994]. Positive incentives
may include government support for training programmes offered by the busi-
ness sector.
The effectiveness of revising the system of unemployment benefits is likely
to remain limited, however, unless trade unions and employers take responsibil-
ity for securing employment. This requires governments to be committed not to
make up for adverse employment effects of collective wage agreements, for
example, by granting protection and subsidies. At present, it can be doubted
that such a commitment would be credible. The previous sections have shown
that the governments' stance with regard to trade and industrial policies has
been influenced by well-organised interest groups, and it can safely be assumed
that lobbying will continue. Hence, it cannot reasonably be expected that the
required reversal of economic policies will emerge from autonomous govern-
ment action alone. In the future, much depends on whether traditional policy
failures will lead to the formation of influential interest groups that counterbal-
ance the pressure for government support of non-competitive industries.
An effective opposition against industry-specific demands for protection and
subsidies may arise from those industries that have to bear the costs of such a
strategy in terms of higher input prices, rising taxes and impaired competitive-
ness. Globalisation may raise the propensity to lobby for major policy revisions
for various reasons: First, protectionism and similar measures cause increasing
welfare losses under the conditions of globalised production and markets.
Second, the more industries are protected and granted a privileged status, the
more difficult it becomes to widely diffuse the welfare losses. Consequently, an
increasing burden has to be shouldered by a declining number of competitive
industries, which provides a strong incentive to organise opposition against the
vested interests of well-established pressure groups. Third, the traditional pol-
icy stance increasingly fails to achieve its stated objective, as is evident from
mounting unemployment in many industrialised countries.
Provided that lobbying is less biased in favour of non-competitive industries
in the future, governments will find it easier to resist industry-specific demands
for securing jobs. Under such conditions, it may be possible to establish a
credible link between government support for the restructuring of declining in-
dustries and the industry's own adjustment efforts. For example, the provision152
of production-neutral subsidies for a specified time period could be made con-
ditional on collective agreements on wage restraint and a differentiated wage
structure [Langhammer, Paqu6,1994]. If appropriate wage policies were a pre-
condition for government help, public support would no longer discourage la-
bour market flexibility and the mobility of workers, as was typically the case in
the past.
d. Human Capital Formation
Wage flexibility and differentiation would help to ease employment problems
in industrialised countries in the short and medium run. They represent an ap-
propriate market response to fiercer international competition, by which dis-
missals of low-skilled workers in the affected industries can be prevented.
However, flexible wage policies cannot halt globalisation and the ensuing de-
valuation of low-skilled labour in industrialised countries.
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pressure will persist for two reasons: (i) the long-term trend towards labour-sav-
ing technological progress is likely to continue, and (ii) new competitors from
the developing world and the former socialist bloc will increasingly challenge
the competitive position of industrialised countries.
In order to escape this dilemma, the suggested wage policies should be re-
garded as a cushion that renders it easier to embark on a long-term strategy of
tackling the causes rather than the symptoms of impaired competitiveness. If
low-skilled labour is the major problem, such a strategy must focus on human
capital formation. In other words, industrialised countries have no choice but to
strengthen their comparative advantage in human-capital-intensive sectors by
improving the qualification of the workforce. To some extent, a gradual im-
provement of the average level of qualification may result from natural changes
in the structure of labour supply. Specifically, competitiveness would increase
if retired low-skilled workers were replaced by better educated school-leavers
[Langhammer, Paqud, 1994]. The basic assumption underlying this reasoning is
that the productivity of workers at school-leaving age is relatively high because
of better formal education, more flexibility in meeting new job requirements
and greater familiarity with recent production and communication technologies
(for example, computer literacy). The validity of this assumption depends on
several factors, however, among which the adequacy of the system of formal
education and the relevance of training on the job (relative to formal education)
are most important.
In order to do so, the wage dispersion in industrialised countries would have to in-
crease to a degree that is socially unacceptable.153
Generally speaking, the system of formal education has to ensure that work-
ers are well prepared to meet current and future job requirements. Given the
permanent change of these requirements in the era of globalisation, human
capital has to be built in a way that allows for flexibility and mobility of the
workforce. This should have consequences for both the curricula of schools and
universities and the focus of government budgets for education. As concerns
curricula, it seems necessary to bring schools (including universities) and in-
dustry closer together in order to narrow the gap between the skills supplied
and those required in labour markets. As concerns government outlays, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that the widespread precedence of higher over basic edu-
cation is inappropriate. A survey of the literature reveals that the returns to
primary education are significantly higher than the returns to secondary educa-
tion, which in turn exceed the returns to higher education [Psacharopoulos,
1993]. This finding does not only apply to DCs but also to OECD countries.
The evidence supports the notion that further spending on all forms of edu-
cation may be warranted in OECD countries. The relatively low return on
higher education still exceeds 8 per cent, which is probably above the social
discount rate in OECD countries. However, the focus of government spending
should be on basic education rather than universities. This requires major revi-
sions in many industrialised countries. Cases in point are the United States and
the United Kingdom, where basic education has traditionally been relatively
poor. But the quality of basic education may deteriorate in Germany as well, if
the trend against the lower segment of the education system ("Hauptschule")
continues.
The relevance of and the returns to vocational training are more difficult to
assess. Studies that compared academic or general education at the secondary
level with technical or vocational education have found returns to the former to
be significantly higher [Psacharopoulos, 1993].
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company training is largely lacking, however. Likewise, the relative role of
training on the job is open to debate. On the one hand, the positive correlation
between wages and the duration of employment in a particular firm indicates
that experience is considered to be a relevant factor in enhancing productivity.
On the other hand, the acquired skills may not fit easily into other workplaces
to the extent that they are firm-specific.
The debate on the appropriateness of different training systems is still unset-
tled because of the ambiguities with regard to vocational training [The Econo-
mist, 1994]. Systems that were successful in the past may reveal significant
flaws once flexibility is of overriding importance. The widely admired appren-
" The reason is that vocational training is far more expensive to provide than aca-
demic education.154
ticeship system in Germany may provide an example. First, it may be less effi-
cient in service sectors with a relatively short life cycle of vocational skills than
in manufacturing. Second, the system produces fairly narrow specialists, rather
than flexible generalists, who will increasingly be required in the era of
globalisation. Finally, the expensive apprenticeship system is not easily trans-
ferable to other countries with completely different social institutions and rela-
tionships.
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0 Likewise, the Japanese system of prolonged in-company training,
which allowed the country to pioneer flexible production processes, is not only
difficult to copy; it may also need major revisions in Japan itself, once life-time
employment can no longer be guaranteed and growing individualism raises the
risk of poaching.
A related question concerns the role that governments have to play with re-
gard to vocational training. The case for public involvement depends on the ex-
istence of market failure, i.e., in-company training remaining below its social
optimum because a worker trained at the cost of one company may be poached
by another one. The degree of such externalities has generally been overstated.
Typically, workers involved in vocational training will be paid less than the
value of their work to the company that runs the training programme. In other
words, workers (rather than companies) bear the costs of training and capture
the subsequent benefits in terms of higher wages [Becker, 1994]. Nevertheless,
markets may fail to provide sufficient vocational training from the society's
point of view. Most notably, a bigger stock of skilled labour may deliver social
benefits in terms of greater flexibility in responding to economic change
[Porter, 1990]. Hence, there is reason for governments to support vocational
training, although specific training may be largely left to the market and the
exact degree of government involvement is open to debate.
In summary, human capital formation is of increasing importance under the
conditions of globalised production and markets. Some unsettled issues con-
cerning the relative effect of formal education and training on the job and the
role of public versus private training activities require further research. None-
theless, the presently available evidence offers some relevant guidelines for
policy reforms in industrialised countries. What appears to be required in the
future are flexible generalists rather than narrow specialists. Consequently, cur-
ricula must be revised in cooperation with the business sector. Government out-
It may be noted that the merits of apprenticeships are increasingly discounted by
young Germans, too. More than half of school-leavers are now choosing to go into
higher education rather than take an apprenticeship. Notwithstanding the appar-
ently higher private rates of return of this strategy, the social rates of return seem
to be much lower because "Germany's universities are some of the worst organised
in the rich world, with ... an average graduation age of more than 30" [The
Economist, 1994, p. 28].155
lays should be concentrated on establishing a sound educational basis that al-
lows to acquire a broad spectrum of specific skills according to changing de-
mands. Training and retraining should take place within companies to the larg-
est extent possible and may be promoted by the government. Reforming the
system of education and training will take considerable time to become effec-
tive. It is exactly because of these time lags that reforms should no longer be
postponed.156
VIII. Summary and Policy Conclusions
The world economy has become more integrated since the 1980s. Previously,
this process was mainly driven by international trade offering chances for spe-
cialisation. The globalisation of production and markets has added a new di-
mension to the international division of labour. The fragmentation of produc-
tion at a worldwide scale has gathered momentum over approximately the last
decade. The trend towards globalisation, which is highly likely to continue, has
been fuelled by various factors. The number of players in world markets have
increased significantly attributable to the success of many DCs in catching-up
with industrialised countries, so that market size no longer constrains globalisa-
tion strategies. At the same time, transaction and communication costs have
fallen, and standardised business services have been available around the globe.
Furthermore, improved macroeconomic stability has reduced the risks for in-
ternational investors and, therefore, promoted globalisation. In turn, the high
mobility of financial capital predisposes economic policies towards achieving
macroeconomic stability in economies competing for risk capital.
Booming FDI flows in the 1980s are the clearest indication of globalised
production patterns. Regional integration, particularly in Europe, has definitely
contributed to the unprecedented growth of FDI. However, international inves-
tors have not considered a stronger regional engagement to be an alternative to
worldwide production, sourcing and marketing, as is evident from rising inter-
regional FDI flows. Regionalisation and globalisation have rather proceeded
hand in hand. The evidence on non-equity forms of international cooperation
provides further support in this respect. NEC has grown parallel to FDI and
plays an increasingly important role in the globalisation strategies of foreign
investors. It allows for risk diversification and provides a means to circumvent
FDI restrictions. NEC is the preferred mode of globalisation if production proc-
esses are standardised (for example, in the manufacture of clothing), while FDI
dominates in human-capital-intensive industries (for example, the automobile
industry).
From the analysis of corporate strategies at the sectoral level, it is also evi-
dent that industry characteristics, such as factor intensities and the competitive
environment, are relevant for globalisation:
— The recent move towards the deepening and widening of integration in
Europe has induced a relocation of automobile production within the re-
gion, while it has not affected the efforts of EU companies outside
Europe. However, automobile producers based in the EU are generally157
far narrower in global terms than their competitors from the United
States and Japan. Policy interventions, notably import restrictions, have
added to the reluctance of EU companies to go global. As a result, they
are facing considerable difficulties to catch up with Japanese standards
in terms of cost efficiency. Closer intra-EU cooperation will probably
remain insufficient to meet the challenge of fiercer worldwide competi-
tion.
— The competitive position of EU producers appears to be much better in
the physical-capital-intensive chemical industry, in which EU producers
have been among the frontrunners of globalisation. Rather, they had
weak incentives to focus their attention on the emerging Single Euro-
pean Market, while globalisation was encouraged by the need for re-
structuring chemical production. FDI by means of mergers and acquisi-
tions dominates their engagement in industrialised countries, particularly
in entering US markets, whereas NEC dominates their engagement in
DCs.
— Notwithstanding intense policy interference over decades, competitive
pressures from newly emerging suppliers are particularly pronounced in
textiles and clothing. Trade restrictions have caused substantial evasion,
starting with moves towards globalisation by Japanese trading compa-
nies in the 1960s. NEC-type arrangements such as subcontracting and
offshore processing have a long tradition especially in the labour-inten-
sive manufacturing of clothing, which is an ideal candidate for globali-
sation. Tapping labour markets of low-wage countries, without losing
control over design and marketing, was the major motive underlying the
globalisation of clothing production. FDI is more important in the rela-
tively capital-intensive textile industry. Although textile production of
EU suppliers was increasingly relocated to competing industrialised
countries, in order to produce in proximity to overseas customers, there
is no evidence on investment diversion at the expense of DCs. Globali-
sation in both textiles and clothing will become an even more important
determinant of competitiveness in the future, when the MFA will be
phased out.
Obviously, globalisation is attributable to corporate reactions to changes in
the international environment and provides a means to restore or enhance com-
petitiveness. Constraints that hindered globalisation in the past are no longer
binding. At the same time, globalisation increasingly constrains governments to
pursue economic policies of their own liking. At the sectoral level, the effec-
tiveness of trade restrictions is eroded if FDI and NEC are used to jump over
protectionist fences. The constraints for economic policy become even more158
binding if globalisation is associated with more rather than less trade at the ag-
gregate level. Most importantly, national governments will find it increasingly
difficult to protect less competitive factors of production if the international di-
vision of labour proceeds through trade and foreign investment at the same
time. The empirical analysis of the link between FDI and trade flows shows
that this is exactly what has happened.
First of all, bilateral FDI flows and trade flows are positively correlated. The
higher contemporary and past FDI flows from Germany, Japan and the United
States to foreign countries, the higher exports to and imports from the host
countries are. The positive link is strongest for Japan, but relatively weak for
the United States. Notwithstanding such differences among major investor
countries, the evidence is consistent with the globalisation hypothesis according
to which both FDI and trade are driven by a common set of determinants. As a
consequence, FDI is positively correlated with exports of home countries and
with exports of host countries.
In addition, globalisation has contributed to profound changes in the regional
and structural pattern of international trade. The increasing number of competi-
tive suppliers in world markets indicate the adjustment problems that result in
industrialised countries. Asian DCs have strongly increased their share in trade
of manufactures with the Triad. The adjustment pressure will mount when fur-
ther DCs become integrated into the globalisation strategies of TNCs. Espe-
cially Latin American economies have regained international competitiveness
after the recent reforms towards macroeconomic stability and trade liberalisa-
tion. But globalisation has not only stimulated trade between countries with dif-
ferent factor endowments and per capita incomes. At the same time, trade in
manufactures has further increased between industrialised countries despite
similar factor endowments.
Expanding trade in manufactures within the Triad and the growing role of
Asian DCs have led to an increase of intra-industry trade. This increase has
been most pronounced for Japan. At the same time, inter-industry specialisation
has continued to be of major relevance for Japan in relatively labour-intensive
sectors. This pattern suggests that Japan's integration into the international di-
vision of labour has been most successful among the members of the Triad. By
contrast, EU trade has been at least partly in conflict with factor endowments.
The EU reveals an extremely high level of intra-industry specialisation not only
in human-capital-intensive industries but also in traditional industries. This dis-
tinct EU pattern reflects the complex interplay of globalisation strategies and
EU trade policies. Apparently, policy interventions have hindered industrial re-
structuring, i.e., a more pronounced shift from labour-intensive to human-capi-
tal-intensive sectors. Delayed adjustment in relatively labour-intensive indus-
tries in the EU has contributed to increasing competitive pressure for more dif-159
ferentiated goods. Intra-firm trade, which has amounted to a substantial fraction
of total merchandise trade, adds to this pressure. For example, intra-firm trade
data point to an increasing competitiveness of Asian suppliers (notably Japan
and South Korea) in relatively technology-intensive and human-capital-inten-
sive industries.
From the analysis of the FDI-trade link, it follows that the effects of globali-
sation strategies on the volume and structure of trade depend on the way in
which globalisation proceeds. However, different globalisation strategies have
in common that they give rise to mounting pressure on non-competitive factors
of production in industrialised countries. Although it is very difficult to empiri-
cally disentangle the complex linkages between international trade and FDI
flows on the one hand and technological change, jobs and wages on the other
hand, our results indicate that increasing globalisation is at least partly respon-
sible for the adjustment pressures that worry policymakers, producers and
workers in advanced countries. Trade data show that the prices for goods pro-
duced with a relatively large input of low-skilled labour have fallen compared
with goods produced with a relatively large input of high-skilled labour. This
result implies that the relative wage for unskilled labour tends to fall, or, if
wage flexibility is restricted, that unemployment of low-skilled workers tends
to rise. It is of minor relevance whether globalisation also works indirectly
through labour-saving technological change, or whether this technological
change is not at all related to globalisation. In any case, the adjustment pressure
for unskilled labour will further increase on top of intensified competition re-
sulting from a more integrated world economy.
Rising and persistent unemployment has become the major concern of eco-
nomic policymakers in industrialised countries, especially in the EU. Even
though globalisation cannot be blamed for all the economic ills in advanced
countries, it tends to aggravate the problem of unemployment. Hence, the rele-
vant question is what governments can do to cure unemployment in the age of
globalisation. Typically, governments resorted to protectionism in order to
maintain employment in non-competitive industries. However, economic poli-
cies aiming at redistribution are increasingly constrained under the conditions
of highly mobile production factors. Traditional attempts at protecting non-
competitive production factors in industrialised countries, notably low-skilled
labour, are bound to fail. Especially the effectiveness of trade restrictions is se-
riously undermined because globalisation offers more options for evasion and
increases competitive pressures. Therefore, the principal players in multilateral
trade negotiations should give up their defensive attitudes with respect to
sweeping trade liberalisation. A liberal world trading system is not only best
suited to raise economic welfare at a worldwide scale. It is also in the self-in-
terest of the major players. Open markets for imports and FDI help to overcome160
policy-induced inflexibility and disincentives to adjustment. They provide the
best chances to participate successfully in the global competition for risk capi-
tal and, thereby, create new employment opportunities. This applies to major
regional integration schemes such as the EU as well. The deepening and widen-
ing of integration are no promising alternative to worldwide sourcing and mar-
keting, i.e., improving competitiveness by world-market standards.
It follows that the current trade policy stance should be revised in various re-
spects:
— The trend towards tackling trade conflicts on a bilateral and discretion-
ary basis must be reversed. Otherwise, greater GATT discipline will re-
main an illusion although it figured high on the agenda of the Uruguay
Round. Credible sanctions are indispensable to enforce GATT rules.
— In order to prevent regionalism from undermining multilateralism,
transparent mechanisms have to be implemented providing for compen-
sation for those non-member countries whose trade is negatively af-
fected.
— Rather than extending the concept of managed trade to investment-re-
lated restrictions, TRIMs such as local content requirements must be
prohibited to substantiate the principle of equal treatment of foreign and
domestic investors.
— GATT rules should apply to trade in services as well, so that globalisa-
tion can proceed on a reliable basis. This requires that future GATT ne-
gotiations must aim at overcoming the numerous qualifications made by
contracting parties during the Uruguay Round.
— Attempts at applying harmonised production standards as a sophisticated
protectionist device must be resisted in future GATT negotiations. Eco-
nomic fairness requires strict adherence to the MFN principle, rather
than mandated social standards, which would erode the locational ad-
vantage of low-income countries. Ecological problems of a worldwide
dimension should be tackled by market-related instruments (for exam-
ple, tradable permits or taxes) aiming at production rather than trade. In
the case of local ecological problems, there is no economic rationale
whatsoever for multilateral action (except aid).
In addition to conventional and innovative trade restrictions, governments
have attempted to tackle the problem of unemployment by referring to selective
industrial policies. Non-competitive sectors have been granted huge subsidies
on a prolonged basis. At the same time, public support was targeted at potential
future growth industries. The rather discouraging results suggest that policy re-
orientation is not only required with respect to trade interventions but also with161
respect to industrial policies. Most importantly, the tremendous costs of subsi-
dising ailing industries should no longer be ignored. Much depends on whether
those industries that have to bear the costs in terms of higher input prices, rising
taxes and impaired competitiveness organise an effective opposition against
such a strategy. However, countervailing lobbying should not aim at a different
form of selective industrial policies, for example, a strategy of picking the win-
ners. Technological leadership has to be restored by means of entrepreneurial
adaptation and innovation, rather than by the governments pursuing a policy of
industrial targeting. The deeper governments are involved in selective indus-
trial policies, the less prepared they are (in both financial and administrative
terms) to fulfil their fundamental role in the era of globalisation, i.e., to provide
an economic policy framework that is predictable and stimulates innovative in-
vestment and, hence, employment on a non-discriminatory basis. Major ele-
ments of the policy that strengthens the locational advantages of economies un-
der heavy competitive pressure are: deregulation and privatisation, a reduced
tax burden, a critical review of the social security system, the provision of ade-
quate infrastructure and investment in education. The business sector should
realise that the chances for such reforms improve to the extent that industry-
specific demands for government support are resisted.
Hence, it depends on both the governments and the corporate sector whether
industrialised countries will remain competitive in the future. Globalisation im-
plies a greater need for structural change and adjustment flexibility. The chal-
lenge is felt in labour markets in the first place. Resistance against flexible la-
bour markets is understandable from the point of view of those who have to ad-
just. From a macroeconomic point of view, however, there is no choice but to
accept that globalisation is associated with considerably reduced degrees of
economic freedom in the national realm. In the short run, wage discipline and
wage differentiation are indispensable to contain unemployment of low-skilled
workers in industrialised countries. Flexible wage policies cannot halt globali-
sation, but they provide a cushion until a long-term strategy becomes effective.
Such a strategy must focus on human capital formation in order to strengthen
the comparative advantage of industrialised countries in skill- and R&D-inten-
sive sectors. It is thus of utmost importance that governments, business associa-
tions and trade unions critically review whether traditional systems of educa-
tion and training are still appropriate under the conditions of globalised produc-
tion and markets, and that the necessary reforms are implemented without fur-
ther delay.162
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Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Japan. —
 cLarge disinvestment in
Belgium-Luxembourg and undisclosed flow to "other industrialised countries".




















Shanghai Car plant, China





















i and Cooperation Agreements
a
Operational relationship
Licensing agreement in 1991. Production of engines and
CVs to start in 1994; possible stake in the company.
Plan for a joint production of a 4WD vehicle.
Technical collaboration agreement.
Builds the G-Wagen.
Builds the 500E for Mercedes-Benz.
Wholly acquired.
Joint venture with Ford.
Formation of a new joint-stock company.
Produces transmissions and presses.
Production start in 1993.
Wholly acquired by Shanghai Volkswagen in 1992.
Joint venture with Ching Fong Investment. Plan for a
joint production of vans and pickups.
Joint production of the "Taro".
Joint venture in 1990 to produce a multi-purpose vehicle
in Portugal (represents the largest single FDI in Portu-
gal).











































Joint venture commercial plant with Fiat.
Joint venture with Renault.
Joint venture in 1990; production of 150,000 Citroen ZX
per year planned.
Licensing agreement for diesel engines.
Industrial agreement with Iran in 1989.
Small joint venture.
Research partnership.
Engine research agreement in 1989.
Produces diesel engines for Rover cars.
Technical cooperation agreement in 1992. PSA will pro-
duce at least 2,000: 405s per year from kits at FSL.
Joint venture with local investment.
Complex cross shareholding; the planned strategic al-
liance was finally rejected by Volvo in late 1993 and
equity stake was reduced to 3.45% in 1994; engine re-
search agreement since 1971.
Partnership agreement and joint venture with IMV (YU).
Joint venture with Peugeot.
Joint production of 4WDs in 1992 in Spain. Sales and
distribution agreement in France until 1992.














Alfa Romeo, Autobianchi and 1986: 50% (100%)
Lancia, Italy
Ferrari, Italy 1986: 50% (90%+)
Innocenti, Maserati, Italy 51% or 49%
ZJA, former Yugoslavia 18% (50%+)
VAZ, Russia 1991: 30%
FSM, Polen 1992: 90%
Chrysler, United States —
Operational relationship
Agreement for diesel engines.
VW produces automatic transmissions.
Majority stock (80%) acquired by BMW in January 1994.
20% cross-shareholding.; in 1994, Honda decided to sell
its shares to BMW.
Letter of intent to set up car assembly plants in Iran.
Joint venture commercial plant with PSA.
Wholly acquired.
Wholly acquired.
Factory built using Fiat expertise.
Licensing agreement; acquisition in 1992.
Joint venture imports and distributes the Alfa Romeo
164 in the United States.
aLocal assembly plants and subsidiaries excluded. The situation portrayed is basically as of 1992; more recent information is
included where available from press and company reports. — ''Figure
the future.
s in parenthesis refer to extended equity stakes planned for
Source: EIU [1992].167
Table A5 — Share of the Chemical Industry in Total Inflows and Outflows of
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eIncludes Denmark,
Based on data con-
— 'United Kingdom only 1984. —
Source: OECD [e]; Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data; Banque de France [a,
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EU: Italy: Ravizza (1986, A), Pigmenti Italia (1986, A), Cesano Mademo
(1986, A), Bio Research (1990, A), Routland (1988, A). — United
Kingdom: Monsanto (1986, merger of the polyamid production in United
Kingdom). —Denmark: DanoChemo (1992, A) — Spain: Critesa (1989,
A).
Other industrialised countries: United States: Immont Corp. and American
Immont Group (1985, A), American Enka (1985, A, fibres), Polysar
(1988, A, Latex-Division). —Japan: Idemitsu Petrochemicals (1985, L),
Takeda Chemical Ind. (1988, JV), Nippon Oil (1990, TC and JV). —
Switzerland: CMT International AG (1988, A). —Austria: Leopold &
Co. (1988, A).
DCs and others: Mexico: Aurolin (1989, A). — Argentina: Lusol (1988, A).
— Hungary: Kemipur (1989, JV). — Russia: Gazprom (1990, TC and
long-term contract). — South Korea: Hangyang Basf (1988, JV).
EU: United Kingdom: Sturge (1990, merger of the citric acid bus.). —-
Denmark: Agro-Kemi A/S (stake increased to 100%). — France: Rhone-
Poulenc (1990, merger of citric acid business).
Other industrialised countries: United Stales: Conesco Corp. (1988, A),
Wyrough & Loser Inc. (1987, A), Mobay Synthetics (1988, A), Matrix
(1988, A), Denka Chemical (1987, A), Agrion (1989, A), Cooper
Technicron (1989, A), Creation Aromatics (1989, A), Sterling Drug
(1986, reacquisition of trade mark), Hercules Inc. (1992, merger of the
perfum activities), Nova Corp. (1990, merger of the Polysar rubber div.),
Diamond Scientific Comp. (1989, A), Compugraphic Corp. (1988, stake
increased to 100%). —Japan: V-Tech Fansteel (1990, A), Teijn (1990,
L), Toda Kogyo Corp. (1991, TC), Copal Co. (1987/88, JV and TC). —
Canada: Polysar Rubber (1990, A). —Austria: Chemia GmbH (1991,
stake increased to 100%).
EU: France: Soekami-Lefrancq Lab. (1989, A). —Italy: Milanfarma (1988,
A), Camillo Corvi (1989, A), Deniel (1990, A). — Spain: Laboratories
Hosbon (1988, A). — Portugal: Valentine (1990, A), Finicis (1990, A).
Other industrialised countries: United States: Celanese (1987, A), Granutec
(1988, A), Custom Pounding (1990, A), Sterling Winthrop (1992, L). —
Japan: Dai Nippon Toryo (1991, JV), Teijn (1991, JV), Asin Chemicals
(1991, TC). —Austria: Altona (1991, JV stake increased).







EU: France: Lesieur-Cotelle S.A. (1987, A), Caourep (1990, A). —
Portugal: Sociedade Nacional de Saboes (1991, merger of detergents
and household cleaners and cosmetics). — United Kingdom: ICI (1991,
A of metal surface cleaning prod.), Nitromers (1989, merger of sealants
and fillers), Unibond-Copydex, Jones & West Starches, Magnus, Samson
Adhesives (1986, A), Henara/Fashion Style (1992, A). — Ireland: Indus-
trial Detergents (1988, A). — Spain: Pulcra S.A. (1986, A), Plastrom
S.A. + Ceras Alex S.A. (1986, A).
Other industrialised countries: United States: Staley (1988, merger of
cleaning products), Specilaty Prod. Marketing Inc. (1988, A), Hercules
Inc. (1987, JV "Aqualon group"), Emery (1989, A), Henkel-Ecolab +
Ecolab Inc. (1991, JV), Ecolab (1990, JV), Oxy Process (1987, A). —
Switzerland: Schnyder & Cie (1990, A), Parker Chemical (1987, A). —
Canada: Canadian Oxy Metal Finishing (1988, A). —Australia: Harcros
Chemicals (1992, merger of Nightingale). —Japan: Lion Corp. (1985,
cooperation + JV). — Sweden: Barnangen (1992, A).
DCs and others: Poland: Pollena SA (1991, A), Henkel Cosmetics Sp.zo.o
(1991, JV), Henkel Bautechnik Polska (1991, JV). — Hungary: Tomi +
Tiszamenti Vegyimuvek (1992, A), Metakemia + Taurus (1990, JV). —
Slovenia: Zlatorg and Rivera (1990, A). — Russia: Sovhenk (1990, JV,
detergents). — CSFR: Henkel-Palma Spol.S.r.o. (1991, A). — China:
Tianjin Synthetic Detergent (1992, JV). — Egypt: Port Said Detergent &
Chemical Industries Co. (1992, JV). — Malaysia: Henkel Rika SDN
(1991, JV), Henkel Kimianka SDN.BHD. (1987, JV).
United States: AKS Corp. (1988, A), Codon (1990, A), Trition Biosciences
(1990, A), Sterling Winthrop (1992, TC + L), Bristol-Myers Squibb (1991,
L). —Japan: Tanabe Seiyaku (L). — Switzerland: Sandoz (1990, TC).
United Slates: Warner Lambert, Liton Bionetics and Wilson-Fiberfil Inter-
national (1985-87), Reliance (1988), Diamond Crystal (1990, merger of salt
business), Stauffer (1990, merger of the chemical division).
EU: Germany: Verwertungsges. (1991, JV), BWR Bizerba Werkstoff-
systeme (1991, A), Chem-Y (1992, sold to Kao Corp. Japan), Sqiribb-
von Heyden (1992, A). — United Kingdom: Freeman Chemicals (1988,
A), ERF Plastics (1990, A). — Belgium: Lwan Comfort (1989, A). Spain:
Fiberfachs (1989, A), Vitroplast (1990, A), Rodex (1990, A).
Other industrialised countries: United States: Polymer (1988, A), Rubber-
maid (1990, JV), Copolymer Rubber & Chemical (1990, new plant),
Novacor (1992, A of thermoplastic elastomers). —Japan: Idemitsu
Petrochemical (1991, JV). — Switzerland: Plaine Chemicals (1988, A),
Alusuisse/Lonza (1990, JV).
DCs and others: Indonesia: (1991, JV). — Hungary: Pannonplast (1991,
JV). — Taiwan: Nan Ya Plastics (1992, cooperation agreement).170
Table A6 continued
ICI EU: Germany: Agroplant Saatenvertrieb (1990, A).
Other industrialised countries: A in United States: Stauffer Chemicals
(1988), Beatrice Companies (1985), Glidden (1985), Tioxide (1990,
stake increased), Adas Powder (1990), Edward J. Funk & Sons (1990),
Ferro Group (1991), Sherwin-Williams (1988).
Others: Ukraine: (1991, new JV).
Rhone- EU: Germany: Nordfaser (1991, A), Boehringer (1992, TC). — United
Poulenc Kingdom: ICI (1988, announcement to take over silicone business). —
Spain: Erkimia (1991, JVs "Erkol" and "Rhodiamul"). —• Canada:
Connaught Biosciences (1990, A).
Other industrialised countries: United States: Rorer (1990, new JV),
Eastman Kodak (1991, new JV "Primester").
DCs and others: Hungary: Viatfort (1991, equity participation). — Ukraine:
Consortium Biochimique (1992, JV). — Czech Republic: Chemlon
(1992, majority stake). — Venezuela: Mantex (1992, JV).
Montedison EU: UK: Erbamont (1989, A), JB Tillozz (1989, A). — Spain: Antibioticos
(1987, A), Guadalco Feruzzi (1989, A). — France: Celtic Langlois
Nutriton Animale (1989, A), Oli Provence (1991, A).
Other industrialised countries: United States: Hercules (1986, new JV
"Himont"), PlasmaScience (1989, A), Colgate Palmolive (1989, JV),
Ferro Inc. (1991, A).—Japan: MGC (1991, JV).
DCs and others: Taiwan: Chao Group (1989, JV in Malaysia). — Korea:
Kolon Industries (1989, JV). —Hungary: Agrocomplex (1991, A). —
Poland: Brzozowo (1991, A), Central Soya Rolpol (1991, A).
A: acquisition, JV: joint venture, L: licensing agreement, TC: technical cooperation.
Source: Annual reports of the companies under consideration, various years;
Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften [var. issues].171






















































































Source: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 January 1994, p. 14.
Table A8 — The Significance of FDI Outflows in Textiles and Clothing for
Major Industrialised Countries,
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l the US. —
 bExports under SITC 65 and 84.
Source: OECD [e]; UN [b]; Deutsche Bundesbank, unpubl. data.172
Table A9 — EU Textile and Clothing Companies: Recent Major Acquisitions
and Joint Ventures
8











United Kingdom: Donisthorpe & Cy. Ltd. (1988, A, 100%, in-
dustrial textiles). — Turkey: Bozkurt Mensucat Sanayii (1988,
equity stake 50%).
United States: Joseph & Feiss Company and the parent com-
pany TJFC Inc. (1989, A, 100%, clothes for men and women).
— Ireland: Kingcourt Sportswear Ltd. (1986, A, 50%). —
Australia: Hugo Boss Australia (1989, JV, 50%, garment
manufacturer). — Brazil: Hugo Boss Moda Ltda. (1988, JV
and L, 33%, produces Boss products for the local market).
United States: Fashion Fabrics of America Inc (1989, cloth
printing fabric). —Hungary: KBC Kelmenyomo R.T. (1988,
JV, 50%, garment manufacturer). —Netherlands: Watermolen
B.V. (1989, A, 100%).
United States: Dimension Sailcloth Inc. (1991, A, 100%,
manufacturer of sailclothes), Burrell-Belting Company (1991,
A, 100%, belting business). — Italy: LederOrago (1992, A of
the belting division). — Switzerland: Leder Co. AG (1990, A
of the belting business, 100%).
United States: Prince Holdings Inc. (1990, A, sport articles).
United Optical (1988, cooperation, manufacture of eyeglasses),
Benetton Manufacturing Corporation (1986, 100%, cotton arti-
cles), Marubeni (1988, cooperation, manufacturer of shoes). —
Japan: Seibu/Saison (1989, formation of the JV "Linz Co.
Ltd." and licensing agreement).
Turkey: Benetton Bosphorus Casual Wear A.S. (1991, JV,
50%). — Brazil: Benetton do Brasil Textile Ltda. (1987,
100%, manufacturer of clothing articles). —Argentina: Vantoc
S.A. (1988, JV, 47.2%, manufacturer of clothing articles). —
Russia: Ajas Benetton (1990, JV).
Germany: Boss Konzem (1991, majority stake, 77.5%).
United States: Weathside (1992, sold). —Ireland: Atlantic
Mills (1988, A, Denim fabrics). — United Kingdom: Stolz &
Co. (1988, A, 100%, interlinings for the clothing industry). —
South Africa: Mooi River Textiles Ltd. (1989, sold).173
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EU: France: Steiner Freres (1991, A, crafts). — United King-
dom: Tootal (1991, A, thread). — Germany: Opti-Werk GmbH
& Co KG (1989, A, zip business). — Netherlands: Lantor BV
and Tootal Fabrics (1991, A, yarns & fabrics).
Other industrialised countries: United States: Talon (1991, A,
zip business). — Canada: Consoltex (1991, disposal). —
Sweden: Molnlycke Sytrad AB (1991, thread).
DCs and others: Chile: Cia Ind. — Hiols Cadena (1988, stake
increased to 93%). — China: Guangying Spinning Company
Ltd (1991, JV, 50%), Jingying Spinning Company Ltd (1991,
JV, 50%). —Hong Kong: Coats Patons Limited (1989, S,
100%, industrial sewing products), China Thread Development
Company Limited (1991, thread). — Hungary: Coats Hungary
Ltd (1990, JV, 60%). — Indonesia: PT Coats Rejo (1989, JV,
60%), PT Tootal Thread Indonesia (1991, JV, 70%, thread). —
Malaysia: J. & P. Coats Sdn Bhd. (1989, JV, 51%), Tootal
Thread Malacca Sdn Bhd (1990, JV, 51%, thread). —
Morocco: UCOM (1989, A, sewing thread manufacture). —
Philippines: Allied Thread Company Inc. (1991, thread). —
Slovenia: agreement for a JV plant (1992, precision engineer-
ing).— South Africa: Gelvenor Textiles (1991, disposal).
France: Georges Reich SA (1989, A, 100%, designer clothing).
— Morocco: Chella Confection SA (1990, increased stake
from 34 to 68%).
aExcluding sales outlets and franchises. A: acquisition, JV: joint venture, L: licensing.
Source: Annual reports of the companies under consideration, various years;
Stopford [1992]; Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften [var.
issues].174
























































































































Source: IFM [b; c]; MOF [var. issues]; OECD [e]; Deutsche Bundesbank, un-
publ. data.175
Bibliography
AGARWAL, Jamuna P., "Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment". Welt-
wirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 116, 1980, pp. 739-773.
—, Andrea GUBITZ, Peter NUNNENKAMP, Foreign Direct Investment in
Developing Countries: The Case of Germany. Kieler Studien, 238,
Tubingen 1991.
—, Erich GUNDLACH, Ulrich HIEMENZ, Rolf J. LANGHAMMER, Peter
NUNNENKAMP, "EC Economic Integration and Its Impact on Foreign Di-
rect Investment and Developing Countries". In: Koichi OHNO, Yumiko
OKAMOTO (Eds.), Regional Integration and Foreign Direct Investment:
Implications for Developing Countries. Institute of Developing Economies,
Tokyo, March 1994, pp. 283-384.
AQUINO, Antonio, "Intra-Industry Trade and Inter-Industry Specialization as
Concurrent Sources of International Trade in Manufactures". Weltwirt-
schaftliches Archiv, Vol. 114, 1978, pp. 275-296.
BANETH, Jean, "Fortress Europe" and Other Myths about Trade. Policies to-
ward Merchandise Imports in the EC and Other Major Industrial Economies
(and What They Mean for Developing Countries). World Bank Discussion
Papers, 225, Washington 1993.
BANQUE DE FRANCE, La Balance des Paiements de la France. Annexes au
Rapport Annuel. Paris, various issues.
BARRO, Robert J., Jong-Wha LEE, "International Comparisons of Educational
Attainment". Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 32, 1993, pp. 363-394.
BAUMOL, William, "Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy
of Urban Crisis". The American Economic Review, Vol. 57, 1967, pp. 415-
426.
BECKER, Gary S., Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.
Third Edition, Chicago 1994.
BENSAOU, M., Interorganizational Cooperation: The Role of Information
Technology. An Empirical Comparison of US and Japanese Supplier Rela-
tions. INSEAD Working Papers, 93/62/TM/SM, Fontainebleau 1993.176
BERMAN, Eli, John BOUND, Zvi GRJLICHES, Changes in the Demand for
Skilled Labor Within U.S. Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from the
Annual Survey of Manufacturing. NBER Working Papers, 4255, Cam-
bridge, Mass., January 1993.
BHAGWATI, Jagdish N., The World Trading System at Risk. New York 1991.
—, Elias DINOPOULOS, Kar-yiu WONG, "Quid Pro Quo Foreign Invest-
ment". The American Economic Review, Vol. 82,1992, pp. 186-190.
/1 BLAIR, Roger D., David L. KASERMAN, Law and Economics of Vertical In-
j j tegration and Control. New York 1983.
BLETSCHACHER, Georg, Henning KLODT, Braucht Europa eine neue Indu-
striepolitik? Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion Papers, 177, De-
cember 1991.
—, —, Strategische Handels- und Industriepolitik: Theoretische Grundlagen,
Branchenanalysen und wettbewerbspolitische Implikationen. Kieler
Studien, 244, Tubingen 1992.
BONTURI, Marcos, Kiichiro FUKASAKU [1993a], Intra-Firm Trade. OECD,
Trade Policy Issues, 1, Paris 1993.
—, — [1993b], "Globalization and Intra-Firm Trade: An Empirical Note".
OECD Economic Studies, Spring 1993, pp. 145-159.
BORJAS, George J., Richard FREEMAN, Lawrence F. KATZ, On the Labor
Market Effects of Immigration and Trade. NBER Working Papers, 3761,
Cambridge, Mass., June 1991.
BOUND, John, Georg JOHNSON, "Changes in the Structure of Wages in the
1980s: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations". The American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 82,1992, pp. 371-392.
BRADLEY, John, et al., The Economics of 1992. A Symposium on Sectoral Is-
sues. The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin 1989.
BUNDESVERBAND BEKLEIDUNGSINDUSTRIE (BBI), Die deutsche Be-
kleidungsindustrie. Cologne 1991.
BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Competitive Alliances:
How to Succeed at Cross-Regional Collaboration. New York 1987.177
CAVES, Richard E., International Trade, International Investment, and Imper-
fect Markets. Princeton University, Special Papers in International Econom-
ics, 10, Princeton 1974.
CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, Business Monitor, MA4, Overseas Trans-
actions. London, various issues.
CONTRACTOR, Farok J., "Inter-Firm Technology Transfers and the Theory of
Multinational Enterprise". The International Trade Journal, Vol. 4, 1989,
No. 1, pp. 21^8.
—, "Ownership Patterns of US Joint Ventures Abroad and the Liberalization of
Foreign Government Regulations in the 1980s: Evidence from the Bench-
mark Surveys". Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 21, 1990,
No. 1, pp. 55-73.
—, Peter LORANGE, "Why Should Firms Cooperate? The Strategy and Eco-
nomic Basis for Cooperative Ventures". In: Farok J. CONTRACTOR, Peter
LORANGE (Eds.), Cooperative Strategies in International Business.
Lexington 1988, pp. 3-30.
DAVIS, Steven J., "Cross-County Patterns of Change in Relative Wages". In:
Olivier J. BLANCHARD, Stanley FISCHER (Eds.), NBER Macroeconom-
ics Annual 1992. Cambridge, Mass., 1992, pp. 239-292.
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, Kapitalverflechtung mit dem Ausland. Beilage
zur Zahlungsbilanzstatistik. Frankfurt/M., various issues.
DICKEN, Peter, Global Shift. The Internationalization of Economic Activity.
Second Edition, New York 1992.
DIEKMANN, Achim [1992a], "Die europaische Automobilindustrie: Aufga-
ben, Struktur und Perspektiven". Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 72, 1992, pp. 73-
79.
— [1992b], "Riickkehr zur Normalitat: Strukturanpassung in der Automobilin-
dustrie". Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 72,1992, pp. 615-619.
DORNBUSCH, Rudiger W., ..Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case for Bi-
lateralism". In: Robert Z. LAWRENCE, Charles L. SCHULTZE (Eds.), An
American Trade Strategy: Options for the 1990s. Washington 1990, pp.
106-141.178
DUNNING, John H., "Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the MNE: A
Search for an Eclectic Approach". In: Bertil OHLIN, Per O. HESSEL-
BORN, Per M. WIJKMAN (Eds.), The International Allocation of Eco-
nomic Activity. London 1977, pp. 395-418.
—, International Production and Multinational Enterprise. London 1981.
The ECONOMIST, Everybody's Favourite Monsters. A Survey of Multination-
als. Vol. 326, No. 7854,27 March 1993.
—, "Training for Jobs: O Brave New World". Vol. 330, No. 7854, 12 March
1994, pp. 21-28.
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (EIU), The World Motor Industry.
Anatomy by Manufacturer. Special Report, 2191, London, January 1992.
—, Textile Outlook International - November 1993. London 1993.
EMERSON, Michael, et al., The Economics of 1992. An Assessment of the Po-
tential Economic Effects of Completing the Internal Market of the European
Community. European Economy, 35, Brussels, March 1988.
EUROPEAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COUNCIL, Economic Outlook of the
European Chemical Industry and Basic Economic Statistics. Brussels, vari-
ous issues.
EUROPEAN ROUND TABLE OF INDUSTRIALISTS (ERT), Survey on Im-
provements of Conditions for Investment in the Developing World. Brussels
1993.
EUROSTAT, CTCI-5-Pays-Produits, SCE-2311, CD-ROM, various issues.
The EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF JAPAN (EXIM), The Outlook of Japanese
Foreign Direct Investment. EXIM Japan 1993 Survey, News Release NR 3-
34, Tokyo, December 1993.
FLAM, Harry, "EC Members Fighting About Surplus: VERs, FDI and Japanese
Cars". Journal of International Economics, Vol. 36,1994, pp. 117-131.
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) [a], Trade
Policy Review: European Communities. Geneva 1991.
— [b], International Trade 91-92. Vol. II, Geneva 1992.
— [c], Trade Policy Review: European Communities. Geneva 1993.
— [d], GATT Activities. Geneva, various issues.179
De GHELLINCK, Elisabeth, "The Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries".
In: David G. MA YES (Ed.), The European Challenge: Industry's Response
to the 1992 Programme. New York 1991, pp. 337-371.
GLOBERMAN, Steven, James W. DEAN, "Recent Trends in Intra-Industry
Trade and their Implications for Future Trade Liberalization". Weltwirt-
schaftliches Archiv, Vol. 126, 1990, pp. 25^9.
GRAY, H. Peter, "Intra-Industry Trade: An 'Untidy' Phenomenon". Weltwirt-
schaftliches Archiv, Vol. 124, 1988, pp. 211-228.
GREENAWAY, David, "Trade and Foreign Direct Investment". European
Economy, 1993, No. 52, pp. 103-128.
—, Robert C. HINE, "Intra-Industry Specialization, Trade Expansion and Ad-
justment in the European Economic Space". Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 29, 1991, pp. 603-622.
—, Christ R. MILNER, The Economics of Intra-Industry Trade. Oxford 1986.
GRUBEL, Herbert G., Peter J. LLOYD, Intra-Industry Trade. London 1975.
HAGEDOORN, John, Jos SCHAKENRAAD, Technology Cooperation, Strate-
gic Alliances and Their Motives: Brother Can You Spare a Dime, or Do
You Have a Light? Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation
and Technology (MERIT), Maastricht, September 1990.
HANDBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN. Hoppen-
stedt & Co., Darmstadt, various issues.
HARALDSEN, Tone, "Automobile Production Systems in Europe: Industrial
Restructuring and the Internal Market". Norwegian Journal of Geography,
Vol. 27, 1993, pp. 69-77.
HARRIS, Richard G., "Globalization, Trade and Income". Canadian Journal of
Economics, Vol. 26,1993, pp. 755-776.
HAUSER, Heinz, Das GATT und die Uruguay-Runde. Dokumentation zur
Wirtschaftskunde, No. 1/2, Zurich 1991.
HEITGER, Bernhard, Jiirgen STEHN, "Japanese Direct Investment in the EC
— Response to the Internal Market 1993". Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 29,1990, pp. 1-15.180
HERGERT, Michael, Deigan MORRIS, "Trends in International Collaborative
Agreements". In: Farok J. CONTRACTOR, Peter LORANGE (Eds.), Coop-
erative Strategies in International Business. Lexington 1988, pp. 99-109.
HIEMENZ, Ulrich, Erich GUNDLACH, Rolf J. LANGHAMMER, Peter
NUNNENKAMP, Regional Integration in Europe and Its Effects on Devel-
oping Countries. Kieler Studien, 260, Tubingen 1994.
—, Peter NUNNENKAMP, Jamuna P. AGARWAL, Rolf J. LANGHAMMER,
Dean SPINANGER, The International Competitiveness of Developing
Countries for Risk Capital. Kieler Studien, 242, Tubingen 1991.
HOEKMAN, Bernard M., "New Issues in the Uruguay Round and Beyond".
The Economic Journal, Vol. 103,1993, pp. 1528-1539.
—, Michael LEIDY, "Cascading Contingent Protection". European Economic
Review, Vol. 36,1992, pp. 883-892.
HUFBAUER, Gary C, Jeffrey J. SCHOTT, "Regionalism in North America".
In: Koichi OHNO (Ed.), Regional Integration and its Impact on Developing
Countries. Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo 1993, pp. 257-302.
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION (HPO), "Transnational Corpora-
tions in India". Quarterly Economic Report of IIPO, Vol. 34, 1993, No. 3,
pp. 19-29.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) [a], Balance of Payments Sta-
tistics Yearbook. Washington, various issues.
— [b], Direction of Trade Statistics. Washington, various issues.
— [c], International Financial Statistics. Washington, various issues.
— [d], Balance of Payments Manual. Fourth Edition, Washington 1977.
KENNEY, Martin, Richard FLORIDA, "Japanese Maquiladoras: Production
Organization and Global Commodity Chains". World Development, Vol.
22, 1994, pp. 27-44.
KIM, Taegi, "Intra-Industry Trade: The Korean Experience". International
Economic Journal, Vol. 6, 1992, No. 2, pp. 95-113.181
KOMMISSION DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN (Kommission),
Die europaische Automobilindustrie: Situation und vorrangige Aktionen.
Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat, das Europaische Parlament und den
Wirtschafts- und SozialausschuB. Dokument KOM (92) 166 endg., Brussels,
8 May 1992.
KOOPMANN, Georg, Hans-Eckart SCHARRER, "EC Trade Policy Beyond
1992". Intereconomics, Vol. 24,1989, pp. 207-215.
KRAKOWSKI, Michael, "Internationale Unternehmenskooperationen: Einge-
schrankter Handlungsspielraum fiir die nationale Wirtschaftspolitik?". In:
Horst SIEBERT (Hrsg.), Die zweifache Integration: Deutschland und
Europa. Tubingen 1993, pp. 49-65.
KRUEGER, Anne O., Perspectives on Trade and Development. New York
1990.
KRUGMAN, Paul, Robert Z. LAWRENCE, "Trade, Jobs, and Wages". Scien-
tific American, Vol. 270,1994, No. 4, pp. 22-27.
KUMAR, Nagesh, Determinants of Traditional and New Forms of Foreign In-
vestments: The Case of Indian Manufacturing. Research and Information
System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries, Occasional
Papers, 24, New Delhi 1989.
LANGHAMMER, Rolf J. [1992a], Die Assoziierungsabkommen mit der CSFR,
Polen und Ungarn: wegweisend oder abweisend? Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft,
Kiel Discussion Papers, 182, March 1992.
— [1992b], The NAFTA: Another Futile Trade Area (AFTA) or a Serious Ap-
proach Towards Regionalism? Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion
Papers, 195, November 1992.
—, Die Handelspolitik der EG nach 1992. Die "Integrationsdividende" in Ge-
fahr. Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion Papers, 214, August 1993.
—, Nach dem Ende der Uruguay-Runde: Das GATT am Ende? Institut fiir
Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion Papers, 228, March 1994.
—•, Ulrich HIEMENZ, Regional Integration among Developing Countries: Op-
portunities, Obstacles and Options. Kieler Studien, 232, Tubingen 1990.
—, Karl-Heinz PAQUE, Die Folgen des Welthandels: Ein niichterner Blick in
die Zukunft. Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, March 1994, mimeo.182
LAWRENCE, Robert Z., Matthew J. SLAUGHTER, International Trade and
American Wages in the 1980's: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?
Brookings Institution, 1993, mimeo.
LEAMER, Edward E., Wage Effects of a U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Agreement.
NBER Working Papers, 3991, Cambridge, Mass., February 1992.
—, "Factor-Supply Differences as a Source of Comparative Advantage". The
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 83, 1993,
pp. 436^39.
LEEMT, Gisbert van, "Economic Globalisation: Labour Options and Business
Strategies in High Labour Cost Countries". International Labour Review,
Vol. 131, 1992, pp. 453^70.
LUCAS, Robert E., Jr., "Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Coun-
tries?". The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 80,
1990, pp. 92-96.
LUCKE, Matthias, "Developing Countries' Terms of Trade in Manufactures,
1967-87: A Note". The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 29, 1993, pp.
588-595.
MILLER, Robert R., "Determinants of US Manufacturing Investment Abroad".
Finance and Development, Vol. 30, 1993, No. 1, pp. 16-18.
MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF), Monthly Finance Review. Tokyo, various
issues.
MURPHY, Kevin M., Finis WELCH, "The Role of International Trade in
Wage Differentials". In: Marvin KOSTERS (Ed.), Workers and Their
Wages. Washington 1991, pp. 39-69.
DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, Quarterly Bulletin. Amsterdam, various is-
sues.
NUNNENKAMP, Peter [1993a], The World Trading System at the Crossroads:
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the Era of Regionalism. Institut fiir
Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion Papers, 204, March 1993.
— [1993b], "Handelspolitischer Kompensationsbedarf aufgrund des EG-Bin-
nenmarktprogramms". Die Weltwirtschaft, 1993, H. 3, pp. 338-360.
—, Jamuna P. AGARWAL, Lateinamerika im internationalen Wettbewerb um
deutsche Direktinvestitionen. Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion
Papers, 215, August 1993.183
OHNO, Koichi, Suminori TOKUNAGA, Kazuhiko YOKOTA, Hideki
IMAOKA, Akira KOHSAKA, Yumiko OKAMOTO, "Economic Interde-
pendence and the Prospect for Regional Cooperation Schemes in East
Asia". In: Koichi OHNO (Ed.), Regional Integration and its Impact on De-
veloping Countries. Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo 1993, pp. 1-
128.
OMAN, Charles (Ed.), New Forms of International Investment in Developing
Countries: The National Perspective. OECD Development Centre, Paris
1984.
—, New Forms of Investment in Developing Country Industries: Mining,
Petrochemicals, Automobiles, Textiles, Food. OECD Development Centre,
Paris 1989.
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT (OECD) [a], Foreign Trade by Commodities. Series C, Paris, vari-
ous issues.
— [b], Employment Outlook. Paris, various issues.
— [c], Indicators of Industrial Activity, 1993, 1, Paris 1993.
— [d], "Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment: A Sectoral Analy-
sis". Financial Market Trends, 54, Paris, February 1993, pp. 67-86.
— [e], International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1993. Paris 1993.
OZAWA, Terutomo, "Japan's 'Revealed Preference' for the 'New Forms' of
Investment: A Stock-Taking Assessment". In: Charles OMAN (Ed.), New
Forms of International Investment in Developing Countries: The National
Perspective. OECD Development Centre, Paris 1984, pp. 199-230.
PAQUE, Karl-Heinz, Rudiger SOLTWEDEL et al., Challenges Ahead: Long-
Term Perspectives of the German Economy. Institut fur Weltwirtschaft,
Kiel Discussion Papers, 202/203, March 1993.
PEARCE, Michael C, Joint Ventures and Agreements in the West European
Motor Industry. EIU, Automotive Special Report, 7, London, March 1987.
PEMBERTON, Max, Europe's Motor Industry: 1992 and Beyond. EUI, Auto-
motive Special Report, 14, London, September 1988.184
PIATTI, Laura, Dean SPINANGER, Redeployment of Production, Trade Pro-
tection and the Global Firm's Strategy: The Case of Germany. Paper pre-
pared for the OECD Conference on "Trade Policy, Productivity and Foreign
Investment: The Textile and Clothing Industry in Europe". Paris, September
1992.
PORTER, Michael E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations. London 1990.
PSACHAROPOULOS, George, Returns to Investment in Education. World
Bank, Policy Research Working Papers, 1067, Washington, January 1993.
REZA, Sadrel, "Non-equity Forms of TNC Participation in Bangladesh".
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 1, pp. 127-134.
ROSENSCHON, Astrid, "Subventionen in den alten Bundesiandern". Die
Weltwirtschaft, 1991, H. 1, pp. 76-90.
RUTTER, John, Recent Trends in International Direct Investment: The Boom
Years Fade. US Department of Commerce, Washington 1993, mimeo.
RYBCZYNSKI, T. M, "Factor Endowments and Relative Commodity Prices".
Economica, Vol. 22,1955, pp. 336-341.
SALVADORI, Didier, "The Automobile Industry". In: David G. MAYES
(Ed.), The European Challenge: Industry's Response to the 1992 Pro-
gramme. New York 1991, pp. 28-91.
SCHOLFIELD, Vanessa, Ian HENRY, The New Car Market in Europe.
1992/93 Edition. EIU, Special Report, R 308, London, November 1992.
SEITZ, Konrad, Die japanisch-amerikanische Herausforderung: Deutschlands
Hochtechnologie-Industrien kampfen urns Uberleben. Stuttgart 1991.
SIEBERT, Horst, Michael J. KOOP, "Institutional Competition. A Concept for
Europe?". Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 45,1990, pp. 439-462.
SINN, Stefan, "Saving-Investment Correlations and Capital Mobility: On the
Evidence from Annual Data". The Economic Journal, Vol. 102, 1992, pp.
1162-1170.
SLEIGH, Paul A.C., The European Automotive Components Industry. 1991
Edition. EIU, Special Report, 2107, London, September 1991.185
SLEUWAEGEN, Leo, Hideki YAMAWAKI, "Foreign Direct Investment and
Intra-Firm Trade: Evidence from Japan". In: Ad KOEKKOEK, L.B.M.
MENNES (Eds.), International Trade and Global Development. Essays in
Honour of JagdishBhagwati. London 1991, pp. 143-161.
SMITH, Alasdair, Anthony J. VENABLES, "Automobiles". In: Gary C.
HUFBAUER (Ed.), Europe 1992: An American Perspective. The Brookings
Institution, Washington 1990, pp. 119-158.
SPINANGER, Dean, MFA and the Spillover of Export Capabilities: The Case
of Hong Kong. Prepared for the OECD Conference "Trade Policy, Produc-
tivity and Foreign Investment: The Textile and Clothing Industry in
Europe", Paris, September 1992.
SPINANGER, Dean, "MFA and Article 115 - Two Complementary Non-Tariff
Barriers". In: Ippei YAMAZAWA, Akira HIRATA (Eds.), Trade Policies
toward Developing Countries. London 1993, pp. 259-271.
STEHN, Jiirgen, Auslandische Direktinvestitionen in Industrielandern. Theore-
tische Erklarungssatze und empirische Evidenz. Kieler Studien, 245,
Tubingen 1992.
—, America's Departure from Multilateralism: Highway or Dirt Road to Freer
Trade? Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, Kiel Discussion Papers, 212, June 1993.
STOLPER, Wolfgang, Paul A. SAMUELSON, "Protection and Real Wages".
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 9,1941, pp. 58-73.
STOPFORD, John S., Directory of Multinationals. New York 1992.
STUVEN, Volker, "Trade Preferences for Processed Goods from Developing
Countries". In: Ippei YAMAZAWA, Akira HIRATA (Eds.), Trade Policies
toward Developing Countries. London 1993, pp. 238-258.
SUMMERS, Robert, Alan HESTON, "The Perm World Table (Mark 5): An
Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-88". The Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, Vol. 106, 1991, pp. 327-368; an update (PWT 5.5) is
available through BITNET or on diskettes.
TEECE, David J., "The Market for Know-how and Efficient International
Transfer of Technology", Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 458,1981, pp. 81-96.186
TEJIMA, Shigeki, "Future Prospects of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) in the 1990s, Based on the Trend and the Features of Japanese FDI in
the 1980s". EXIM Review, Vol. 13,1993, No. 1, pp. 43-95.
THOMSEN, Stephen, Stephen WOOLCOCK, Direct Investment and European
Integration: Competition among Firms and Governments. The Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs, London 1993.
UNITED NATIONS (UN) [a], Bulletin of Statistics on World Trade in Engi-
neering Products. New York, various issues.
— [b], Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York, various issues.
— [c], Industrial Statistics Yearbook. New York, various issues.
— [d], International Trade Statistics Yearbook. New York, various issues.
— [e], UN Comtrade Databank, Commodity Trade Statistics.
— [f], From the Common Market to EC 92. Regional Economic Integration in
the European Community and Transnational Corporations. Transnational
Corporations and Management Division, New York 1993.
UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
(UNCTC) [a], National Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transna-
tional Corporations. New York, various issues.
— [b], Regional Economic Integration and Transnational Corporations in the
1990s: Europe 1992, North America, and Developing Countries. New York
1990.
— [c], Transnational Corporations in the Plastic Industry. New York 1990.
— [d], World Investment Report 1991. New York 1991.
— [e], World Investment Report 1992. Transnational Corporations as Engines
of Growth. New York 1992.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 1993. Programme on Transnational
Corporations. New York 1993.
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (UNECE),
East-West Investment News, 3, Geneva 1993.
UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
(UNIDO), Industry and Development. Global Report 1990/91. Vienna 1990.187
URBAN, Sabine, Serge VENDEMINI, European Strategic Alliances. Co-
operative Corporate Strategies in the New Europe. Oxford 1992.
US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (USDOC) [a], Survey of Current Busi-
ness. Washington, various issues.
— [b], US Direct Investment Abroad: The Benchmark Survey. Washington,
various issues.
US DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Prices
Indexes, Annual Supplement. Washington, various issues.
VERB AND DER AUTOMOBILINDUSTRIE (VDA) [a], Das Auto interna-
tional in Zahlen. International Auto Statistics. Frankfurt/M., various issues.
— [b], Tatsachen und Zahlen aus der Kraftverkehrswirtschaft. Frankfurt/M.,
various issues.
VERBAND DER CHEMISCHEN INDUSTRIE, Chemiewirtschaft in Zahlen.
Frankfurt/M., various issues.
VERTRAG UBER DIE EUROPAISCHE UNION. Verlag Neue Wirtschafts-
Briefe, EG-Vertrage. Herne 1992, pp. 122-193.
WARD, Mike, Japanese Chemicals: Past, Present and Future. EIU, Special Re-
port, R 731, London 1992.
WEISS, Frank D., Bernhard HEITGER, Karl-Heinz JUTTEMEIER, Grant
KIRKPATRICK, Gernot KLEPPER, Trade Policy in West Germany. Kieler
Studien, 217, Tubingen 1988.
WELFENS, Paul J.J., "Internationalization of Production, Investment and
European Integration: Free Trade in Goods, Technology and Assets?". In:
Michael W. KLEIN, Paul J.J. WELFENS (Eds.), Multinationals in the New
Europe and Global Trade. Berlin 1992, pp. 9-61.
WOMACK, James P., Daniel T. JONES, Daniel ROOS, The Machine That
Changed the World. New York 1990.
WORLD BANK [a], World Debt Tables 1993-94. Washington 1993.
— [b], World Development Report 1993. Oxford 1993.